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1.1 Introduction 
In 2008, the new collective agreement for the Dutch metalworking and electrical 
engineering (the so-called ‘large metal’) industry stipulated a 7.75% wage increase. 
In subsequent negotiations on the separate metal and engineering industry (the 
so-called ‘small metal’) collective agreement, the trade unions threatened strikes 
after employers refused their wage increase demands. According to the employers, 
the conflict emerged because the trade unions were unduly basing their demands on 
the metalworking and electrical engineering wage increase without taking into 
account the differing economic situations in the two sectors (Het Financieele 
Dagblad, 2008). Five years later, it was the metal and engineering industry that first 
settled on a new collective agreement. The settlement, a 3.5% wage increase, was 
preceded by a number of strikes and was seen as a trade union victory. The successful 
strikes subsequently inspired the trade union negotiators involved in ongoing 
negations on the new metalworking and electrical engineering collective agreement, 
which led these negotiators to threaten strike actions to obtain their demands 
(Leeuwarder Courant, 2013). 
 These examples illustrate that conflict in one collective bargaining event is 
influenced by information about other collective bargaining events. In the academic 
literature, patterns of influence between collective bargaining events are commonly 
referred to as ‘information spillovers’ or simply ‘spillovers’. Although much is known 
about the impact of spillovers on bargaining outcomes, such as wages1, the way that 
spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining is still not well understood. The 
relevant causal mechanisms, the conditions under which they operate, and their 
impact on conflict remain largely unknown. 
 The present book addresses the question of the impact of spillovers on conflict 
in collective bargaining.2 The central aim of this book is to study whether, how, and 
under what conditions spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining. The book has 
two parts. First, I test various proposed mechanisms for spillovers and their impact 
on conflict with the aid of bargaining experiments. Second, I analyze survey data 
collected among collective bargaining negotiators in the Netherlands to study the 
impact of spillovers on bargaining behavior and conflict in bargaining. 
1 See for instance Eckstein and Wilson (1962); McGuire and Rapping (1968); Mehra (1976); Oswald 
(1979); Swidinsky and Wilton (1980); Vroman, (1982); Lacroix and Dussault (1984); Drewes (1987); Ad-
dison and Chilton (1988); Bremmels and Zaidi (1990); Ready (1990); Prescott and Wilton (1991); Budd 
(1992; 1997); Breitung and Meyer (1994); Erickson, (1996); Greenbaum (2002); Marshall and Merlo 
(2004); Traxler, Brandl and Glassner (2008); Calmfors and Seim (2013); Chistofides, Ingram, Rickman 
and Wadsworth (2013); Camarero, D’Adamo and Tamarit (2014).
2 The thesis is thus concerned with bargaining over collective agreements, not with bargaining process 
within the context of (inter)national bi-partite or tri-partite interaction such as for instance central agree-
ments. 
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1.1.1 Scientific relevance 
Labor conflict3 has been a subject of substantial interest in multiple disciplines and 
sub-disciplines of the social sciences. The subject of labor conflict has been 
extensively studied particularly in economics and sociology.4 For the discipline of 
economics, labor conflict as it occurs in collective bargaining is of interest because 
collective bargaining is an important institutional factor that affects the ‘price of labor’ 
and therefore the labor market. In addition, collective bargaining represents an 
empirical application of economic decision making as described in the more general 
field of economic bargaining theory. For sociology, labor conflict represents a cogent 
empirical domain for the study of societal (class) conflict, and the outcomes of labor 
conflict affect social inequality. 
 As I describe in more detail in section 1.2 of this introduction, the two disciplines 
have differing assumptions about labor conflict and, consequently, differing approaches 
to understanding the effects of spillovers on conflict in collective bargaining. The 
economics approach draws on bargaining theory and assumes that conflict is costly 
and therefore irrational. The economics approach must be further subdivided into 
two different approaches, which I refer to as the mainstream economics approach 
and the behavioral economics approach. The mainstream economics approach 
assumes that negotiators are rational but suffer from information problems. This 
approach suggests that spillovers improve information and, in this way, largely reduce 
conflict. By contrast, the behavioral economics approach relaxes the rationality 
assumption about negotiators and views them as fundamentally concerned with 
achieving fairness and equity in bargaining. This approach suggests that information 
about other bargaining events influences negotiators because their preferences are 
reference-dependent and that this influence is subject to cognitive biases. In this 
approach, spillovers are thought to potentially increase the divergence between 
negotiators and thus to actually increase conflict. The sociological approach draws 
on diffusion theory to explain spillovers and assumes that conflict can actually be 
rational because the cost of conflict can be outweighed by its benefits. This approach 
suggests that spillovers inform negotiators about the potential benefits of conflict and 
thus increase conflict. 
3 ‘Labor conflict’ here refers all types of distributional conflicts between employees and employers, of 
which conflict in collective bargaining is a specific example. I use this broader term because, while 
 sociological literature on labor conflict offers highly valuable insights, it has largely neglected to 
 engage specifically with conflict in collective bargaining. I further elaborate on this point in section 1.2. 
4 It is also a studied extensively within political science, however, studies within political science and 
sociology are highly similar. Hence, I treat these two disciplines as synonymous. Much of the relevant 
 academic discussion has also taken place within the multidisciplinary field of industrial relations, 
which draws on both sociology and economics, as well as on several other disciplines.
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 Although each of these three approaches provides important insights into the 
question of the impact of spillovers on conflict in collective bargaining, each invokes 
different assumptions, mechanisms, conditions under which these mechanisms 
operate, and, consequently, differing predictions about the influence of spillovers on 
conflict in collective bargaining. It is therefore an important task to integrate and test 
these different approaches to improve our understanding of whether, how and under 
what conditions spillovers increase or decrease conflict in collective bargaining. 
1.1.2 Societal relevance
Understanding how spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining is important 
given the far-reaching impact of collective agreements on the well-being of employees, 
the competitiveness of firms, and society at large. Despite a general trend of declining 
trade union membership (cf. Visser, 2006), across OECD countries, well over half of 
all employees on average are covered by a collective agreement (Visser, 2011). This 
is partly because national legal frameworks either automatically make collective 
agreements binding for non-unionized workers and workplaces, or this is achieved 
through extension practices. Hence, collective bargaining determines the terms and 
conditions of employment for a large number of employees. 
 Labor conflict continues to play a major part in collective bargaining. Although 
labor conflict, as evidenced by strikes, has become less common (Piazza, 2005; 
Scheuer, 2006; Brandl and Traxler, 2010; Godard 2010), this downward trend now 
appears to have halted, and conflict levels have relatively stabilized (Scheuer, 2006). 
At the same time, there appear to be considerable and repeated short-term peaks in 
the intensity of labor conflict (Gall, 2012). 
 Moreover, Kelly (1998) argues that labor conflict follows the ‘long wave’ (i.e., 
Kondratiev waves) of economic development. Hence, we will likely witness a general 
resurgence of conflict in the future. Currently, the general worsening of employment 
relations in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis is argued to have increased the risk 
of renewed strife in employment relations (ILO, 2013). Recent studies point toward 
increases in industrial conflict in some developed countries (e.g., Brym, Bauer and 
McIvor, 2013) as well as in developing countries such as China (e.g., Cheng, Ngok 
and Huang, 2011). It is also becoming increasingly evident that a singular focus on 
strike statistics leads to substantial misconceptions about the true extent of labor 
conflict (Franzosi, 1989; Hebdon, 2005; Godard, 2011, Tanguy, 2013; cf. Achterkamp 
and Akkerman, 2003). Against this background, a better understanding of the 
mechanisms by which spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining and the 
conditions under which they operate is of significant societal interest. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I first clarify the use of key terminology that will 
be used. Then, I discuss different approaches to labor conflict and how these different 
approaches have led to the proposition of different theoretical mechanisms for 
14
spillovers and, consequently, to different predictions about the influence of spillovers 
on conflict. In section 1.5, I formulate the central research question that is addressed 
in this book and conclude by formulating specific research questions that are studied 
in the empirical chapters of the book. 
1.1.3 Terminology
I use the terms ‘negotiation’, ‘negotiator’, ‘negotiating’ and ‘bargain’, ‘bargainer’, and 
‘bargaining’ interchangeably in this study.5 I refer to the process of negotiations for 
any particular collective agreement between representatives of employers and 
employees as a ‘negotiation’ or ‘bargaining event’. Bargaining events start with an 
initial demand by union(s) or an initial offer of employers, and they end with the 
signing of an agreement once a bargaining outcome is reached. I refer to the set of 
actors that negotiate over a collective agreement (i.e., trade unions and employers or 
employers’ associations) as a ‘bargaining unit’. Collective agreements are usually in 
effect for a fixed period, after which a new agreement must be reached. Hence, a 
bargaining unit will usually conclude multiple collective agreements in multiple 
successive bargaining events. 
 I use the terms ‘information spillovers’ and ‘spillovers’ interchangeably. The use 
of these terms merits further discussion and clarification. Traditionally, the term 
‘spillovers’ in labor research has been associated with potential patterns of influence 
between different bargaining units, particularly patterns that result in observed 
similarities between bargaining units in the wages to which they agree.6 In this context, 
the term ‘spillovers’ has been applied to both the process of bargaining units 
influencing one another and observed similarities in wages (the assumed result of 
this influence). 
 However, the understanding of spillovers as patterns of similarities in wages has 
four important theoretical drawbacks and methodological implications. The first 
drawback is that this understanding assumes a one-to-one relationship between 
patterns of influence between bargaining units and outcomes of bargaining, 
specifically wages, in these bargaining units. This assumption neglects the 
fundamental role of the bargaining process in determining bargaining outcomes. 
Although the bargaining behavior of any of the negotiators in a bargaining unit may 
change under the influence of information about negotiations, none of the negotiators 
can unilaterally determine the outcome of the inherently joint decision-making 
5 While some scholars (e.g. Flanders, 1969) have highlighted semantic differences between these 
terms, there is no agreement about what such differences would entail, nor would the analysis pre-
sented in this book suffer from their omission.
6 Besides ‘spillover’, such patterns have also been referred to as ‘pattern bargaining’, ‘wage leadership’, 
‘wage imitation’ and ‘wage contours’, although these terms have also been applied to other forms of 
interdependencies in collective bargaining. 
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process that a negotiation represents. Hence, the way the bargaining process 
translates the impact of spillovers on individual negotiators into bargaining outcomes 
must not be taken as a given but should be treated as a question to be studied. 
 The second drawback of defining spillovers as patterns of bargaining outcomes 
singularly in terms of wages is that this understanding neglects the fact that spillovers 
also affect conflict in collective bargaining. Spillovers not only influence wage 
agreements, but they can also influence the probability that a bargaining unit will 
experience a strike, a bargaining impasse or some other manifestation of conflict. 
 Third, equating patterns of influence between bargaining units to observed 
similarities in bargaining outcomes assumes that any pattern of influence will always 
unequivocally entail similarities. However, this observation is not consistent with 
theories of spillovers, which predict patterns of influence between bargaining events 
but often do not actually predict this influence resulting specifically in observed 
similarities. 
 Fourth, by conceiving of spillovers as observed empirical patterns in bargaining 
outcomes, there is no distinction between two very different types of causal effects: 
direct influence (i.e., information about one negotiation directly affects another) and 
indirect influence (i.e., outcomes in one negotiation change the (economic) context in 
which another negotiation takes place). 
 In this book, I will only study direct influence. I use ‘spillovers’ to mean the direct 
impact of information about other collective bargaining events on the bargaining 
behavior of individual negotiators. The source of this information can be negotiations 
that have occurred in other bargaining units or previous negotiations within the own 
bargaining unit. As shorthand to differentiate these two types of sources of information 
that can generate spillovers, I refer to spillovers between different bargaining units as 
‘horizontal spillovers’ and spillovers that run from past to present bargaining events 
within the same bargaining unit as ‘vertical spillovers’.7 
1.2   Research on spillovers and conflict in  
collective bargaining
Our current understanding of the impact of spillovers on conflict in collective 
bargaining is limited. One of the factors that particularly hampers progress is the lack 
of integration of knowledge produced by the different scientific disciplines. Although 
research in both economics and sociology offers relevant explanations, these 
explanations appear contradictory, and little effort has been made to understand how 
7 Thus, the use of ‘vertical’ here does not refer to any hierarchical pattern of influence, such as influences 
across different levels of bargaining in multi-leveled bargaining systems.
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they relate to each other. In this thesis, I therefore aim to integrate and test these 
different explanations. Before discussing the literature on the influence of spillovers 
on conflict in collective bargaining, I first provide a brief overview of the economic and 
sociological literature on labor conflict in general. This overview will show how 
different strands within this literature conceive of the nature of labor conflict differently. 
I confine the overview to those developments in the literature that are relevant to 
understanding these different views. Then, I review the literature on the relationship 
between spillovers and labor conflict, which broadly consists of two strands: 1) 
 bargaining-theoretic studies of the impact of spillovers on conflict in collective 
bargaining, which mostly developed within economics and employment relations 
literature and can be further divided into the mainstream approach and the behavioral 
approach; and 2) analyses of diffusion and contagion in labor conflict, which have 
been predominantly confined to sociology. 
1.2.1 Labor conflict: a brief overview of the literature
Economics
A defining insight in the study of labor conflict was articulated by the economist John 
Hicks (1932) in The Theory of Wages. Hicks developed an economic bargaining 
theory of wage determination based on bilateral (i.e., union-firm) negotiations (cf. 
Pigou, 1905; Zeuthen, 1930) in which each party8 rationally weighs the expected cost 
of conflict against the cost of concession. Because conflict (e.g., strikes) always 
entails cost to both parties, it seems to defy rationality because both parties would be 
better off immediately agreeing to the eventual outcome. This insight, known as the 
‘Hicks paradox’, has been the driving force of virtually all theoretical development on 
this subject within economics. Hicks’ own solution to the paradox was twofold. Some 
conflicts, according to Hicks, arise simply because unions wish to maintain their 
organizational capacity to inflict costs on employers and to occasionally reassert 
their power. However, Hicks argues, much more importantly, the majority of conflicts 
are a result of the negotiators’ failure to correctly assess the relative costs of conflict 
and concession. Hence, Hicks contends that ‘the majority of actual strikes are 
doubtless the result of faulty negotiation’ (Ibid., p. 146) and that ‘adequate knowledge 
will always make a settlement possible’ (Ibid., p. 147). Conflict is thus predominantly 
seen by Hicks as a result of negotiators’ inadequate information, which leads them to 
misinterpret their opponents’ position. In his view, considerations of the need to 
maintain bargaining power through organizational capacity play only a limited role. 
 In contrast, Rees (1952) explained variations in labor conflict as resulting from 
changes in bargaining power. He based this explanation on the commonly observed 
8 i.e. the trade union and the firm. 
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unison movement of strike activity and the business cycle. Rees argued that rises in the 
business cycle imply increased employment and market expansion, which shifts the 
relative bargaining power toward unions. When unions have more bargaining power, 
strikes are more likely to be successful. Therefore, conflict is more likely when conditions 
favor unions. From the perspective of mainstream economics theory, however, changes 
in bargaining power by themselves can offer no explanation for conflict. Any such 
change should result only in different but peaceful settlements that are more favorable 
to the party that sees his or her power over the other increase (Mauro, 1982; Cousineau 
and Lacroix, 1986; Gramm, 1986; cf. Martin, 1992). Thus, changes in bargaining power 
leave Hicks’ paradox unsolved, and such theoretical explanations gained limited 
traction within economics. Consequently, the empirical analysis of conflict in collective 
bargaining within economics was mostly based on the Hicksian framework; that is, it 
developed and tested bargaining theories that sought to explain why conflict occurs 
despite its implied irrationality by reference to inadequate information. 
 A highly influential study in this vein was conducted by Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969), who analyzed strike activity with aggregate US industry data and were the first 
to employ sophisticated econometric models. Ashenfelter and Johnson proposed 
that although union and firm negotiators are rational and fully informed and hence are 
able to avoid conflict, the union’s rank-and-file lacks adequate information about the 
firm’s ability to meet their demands, which pressures unions into calling strikes. Thus, 
although Ashenfelter and Johnson assume fully informed rational negotiators, their 
theory can solve Hicks’ paradox only by introducing a third actor, the union rank- 
and-file, which has incomplete information. However, this assumption of fully informed 
negotiators but uninformed rank-and-file workers has been criticized for being 
unrealistic (Shalev, 1980; Franzosi, 1989). A second point of criticism was Ashenfelter 
and Johnson’s use of aggregate data to test what are essentially micro-level theories 
(Stern, 1978; Mayhew, 1979; Shalev, 1980; cf. Wheeler, 1984; Gramm, 1986). 
 Subsequent studies turned to bargaining models that assumed that the union 
and firm negotiators themselves suffered from information problems and increasingly 
analyzed disaggregated (panel, i.e., longitudinal) data. These studies sought to 
develop (formal) bargaining models that specified how conflicts result from the 
bargaining process. The resulting bargaining models were then tested against the 
bargaining unit-level data that became available in this era, particularly for the US and 
Canada.9 For instance, Mauro (1982) analyzed a panel of US bargaining units. His 
bargaining model proposed that negotiators use information about external factors to 
improve their information. In this model, strikes occur when union and firm negotiators 
arrive at divergent bargaining positions because they are influenced by external 
9 For further related empirical studies, see also Gramm, 1986; Tracy, 1986; Gunderson, Kernan and 
Reid, 1986; Vroman, 1989.
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factors (e.g., price indexes, employment rates) to improve their information. Cousineau 
and Lacroix (1986) analyze a panel of Canadian bargaining units in manufacturing. 
Their model suggests that is not so much that negotiators use different external 
factors as it is the volatility, and hence the degree of uncertainty, that these factors 
exhibit that affects the extent of informational problems and, hence, strike activity.
 A somewhat different explanation for conflict is proposed by Reder and Neumann 
(1980). They argue that although information problems between negotiators indeed 
lead to conflict, these information problems can be prevented by establishing bargaining 
protocols. These bargaining protocols specify, to varying degrees, negotiation 
procedures, thus reducing information problems and allowing the negotiators to 
avoid conflict. The more elaborate a bargaining protocol is, the more costly it will be. 
Hence, Reder and Neumann argue that the level of specification of the bargaining 
protocol will be balanced against the joint cost of conflict.10 The higher the cost of 
conflict is, the more elaborate the level of specification (and, hence, the more costly) 
bargaining protocols will be. This argument yields the intuitively appealing prediction 
that conflict becomes more likely when the joint cost of conflict for both sides of the 
bargaining table decreases. Reder and Neuman find support for this prediction in an 
analysis of a panel of bargaining units in US manufacturing. 
 These two theoretical explanations for conflict, that information problems on the 
part of the negotiators and decreasing costs of conflict make conflict more likely, are 
integrated (cf. Card, 1990) in the asymmetric information bargaining models (Hayes, 
1984; c.f. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). The core reasoning 
in these models is that conflict in collective bargaining is rational when there is 
asymmetric information (cf. Akerlof, 1970). Most commonly, the model assumes that 
employers know their ability to pay but that employees and the trade union negotiators 
representing them do not know the employer’s ability to pay. Conflict is costly to both 
sides; hence, conflict can be used as a screening device. This is because employers 
would opt for conflict rather than giving in to demands only when the expected cost 
of conflict is smaller than the cost of giving in. Trade unions can thus use conflict to 
separate employers who are really unable to meet their demands from those who 
merely pose as being unable to meet their demands. The asymmetric information 
model, which is based on strictly rational actors in the presence of incomplete 
information, fits well with the game theoretic approach that has become common in 
economics and remains the central theoretical approach to labor conflict within this 
discipline (cf. Brunnschweiler, Jennings and MacKenzie, 2014). The implications that 
follow from the asymmetric information model have been extensively tested using a 
variety of bargaining unit-level data (e.g., Kennan and Wilson, 1989; McConnell, 
1989; Card, 1990, Cramton, 1992).
10 i.e. the combined cost of conflict for both sides of the bargaining table. 
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 A more recent development of the labor conflict literature within economics is the 
resurgence of what I will call the behavioral approach. General behavioral bargaining 
theories were developed decades ago (e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1969), but for a 
long time, their influence on economic bargaining theory was limited due to their 
deviations from strict rationality assumptions. In recent years, however, economic 
bargaining theory has increasingly recognized that negotiators’ bargaining behavior 
may indeed structurally deviate from strictly rational, self-interested actor models and 
may sometimes be better explained by actor models11 based on (social) psychological 
theory that assume cognitive biases and social preferences (cf. Rabin, 1993; 
Kahneman, 2003). This development has theoretical and methodological implications 
for studying conflict in bargaining. It implies that it can no longer be taken for granted 
that bargaining models that assume strictly rational negotiators and specify their 
strictly rational interaction will provide accurate predictions of observed bargaining 
outcomes at the bargaining unit level. This also means that it becomes vital to 
understand how negotiators will behave in reality under various conditions. Hence, 
although bargaining unit-level data have been seen as the appropriate micro level for 
testing traditional economic bargaining models, from the perspective of the behavioral 
approach, bargaining units actually represent aggregated data of individual negotiators 
and their interactions. Therefore, negotiator-level data, particularly questionnaire surveys 
and experimental analyses of bargaining behavior, are important for the behavioral 
approach. 
 Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) use bargaining experiments to study impasses 
in legal bargaining. Their theory is based on the assumption that negotiators are not 
simply rational maximizers but that they seek to obtain fair outcomes. What is judged 
to be fair, however, is subject to cognitive biases, in this case a self-serving bias. A 
self-serving bias entails that each negotiator tends to see outcomes as fair when the 
outcomes are favorable to herself or himself. This self-serving bias leads negotiators 
to develop incompatible views about what constitutes fair outcomes and creates 
conflict (see also Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995). 
 In summary, economists have predominantly sought to understand why conflict 
occurs between rational negotiators despite the obvious costs that are associated 
with it (Franzosi, 1989). Their main answer to this question is that conflict occurs 
because of inadequate information, but recent studies sometimes answer this 
question by proposing that negotiators are not perfectly rational because they have 
11 Assuming asymmetric information is itself already a relaxation of strict rationally assumptions as it 
departs from perfectly rational and fully informed actors. With asymmetric information however, the 
actors themselves are still assumed to be perfectly rational, only the (informational) conditions for 
rational action are allowed to be sub-optimal. The behavioral economics approach however relaxes 
the rationality assumptions about actors themselves, in this case particularly by introducing social 
preferences and cognitive biases. 
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social preferences and cognitive biases. In either case, economists have worked 
under the assumption that conflict in collective bargaining is costly and therefore 
fundamentally irrational. 
Sociology
The sociological literature on labor conflict is based on the Marxian assumption that 
there exists a pervasive discontent of employees due to their fundamentally 
antagonistic relationship with employers. This discontent will translate into manifest 
action whenever there is sufficient organization and resources available to the 
employees. Thus, whereas economists have been concerned with why conflict 
occurs, sociologists have seen conflict as inevitable and have been concerned with 
the question of how conflict can occur, that is, what conditions make conflict possible 
(Ibid, 1989). These differing approaches can be understood as the consequence of 
three related differences between the disciplines. 
 First, in contrast to mainstream economics theory, mainstream sociological 
theory does not conceive of conflict purely as something that imposes costs and that 
should therefore be rationally avoided. Rather, the short-term costs of conflict may be 
outweighed by the strategic, organizational and political gains (cf. Ross, 1948) from 
conflict in the long term. Thus, opting for conflict can be rational. 
 Second, economics is chiefly concerned with explaining labor conflict as it 
manifests in contemporary industrialized societies, where trade unions and employers 
meet as market actors within institutionalized bargaining contexts and conflicts are 
primarily related to workers’ compensation for their labor (e.g., wages) (cf. Dunlop, 
1944). Sociology, however, considers the political and socio-economic institutional 
context in which conflict takes place as changing and itself subject to contestation. 
 Third, whereas economists interpret conflict as a result of bargaining and 
consequently rely on bargaining theoretic approaches, sociology sees conflict as a 
collective action and hence is more concerned with theories that explain why 
individuals participate in it. In light of these differences, it makes sense that whereas 
economics has mostly shunned explanations of conflict purely as shifts in bargaining 
power, as proposed by Rees (1952; cf. Shalev, 1980: p. 137), such explanations are 
unproblematic from a sociological perspective. However, bargaining power in the 
sociological approach is not so much about economic factors such as employment 
as it is about labor’s capacity to act collectively. 
 One of the earliest and most influential studies on labor conflict in this sociological 
tradition is Shorter and Tilly’s (1974) analysis of mostly aggregated historical French 
strike data. Theoretically, these authors challenge explanations of conflict based on 
economic interest but conceive of conflict primarily as a type of collective action (cf. 
Olson, 1965) aimed at realizing political goals by pressuring employers and the 
government. This collective action will be successful if employees are sufficiently 
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organized, that is, when sufficient numbers of employees are members of a trade 
union and can be counted on to participate. Shorter and Tilly find substantial evidence 
that strike activity increases with trade union density (a finding that has since been 
repeated numerous times, e.g., Snyder, 1975; Skeels, 1982; Kaufman, 1982; Brandl 
and Traxler, 2010; Jansen, 2014) and that strike activity is related to national political 
change. In contrast with the labor conflict literature in economics, their findings also 
suggest that economic models are not able to account for variations in strike activity. 
 This apparent discrepancy is addressed by Snyder (1975), who undertakes a 
comparative time-series analysis of macro-level strike activity in France, Italy and the 
US. Snyder argues that the discrepancy arises because of differences in the 
institutional context. Economic bargaining theoretic approaches to labor conflict only 
apply when trade unions and collective bargaining are well established. Under these 
conditions, Snyder finds that conflict increases when the power of employees 
increases relative to the power of employers due to changing economic conditions, 
as previously argued by Rees (1952). However, when countries or historical periods 
preceding well-established trade unions and collective bargaining are analyzed, the 
logic of bargaining theory breaks down, and economic factors become less important 
than political factors in explaining variations in labor conflict. 
 Following a similar analytical strategy to analyze industrial conflict, Hibbs (1976) 
analyzes aggregate yearly variations in labor conflict in ten industrial countries in the 
post-war period, specifically, countries with established trade unions and collective 
bargaining. His analysis reiterates the importance of economically determined power 
as a predictor of conflict but also suggests that the political power of employees, 
indicated by the presence of socialist or labor parties in government, affects labor 
conflict. A similar argument is developed by Korpi and Shalev (1979), who argue that 
the political arena serves as a substitute for the employment relations arena as the 
locus for class conflict. With increasing organizational power, labor is assumed to 
gain more influence in national politics and to therefore be less likely to choose 
traditional expressions of labor conflict, such as strikes, to advance its interest. Korpi 
and Shalev offer strike data on several western countries, particularly Sweden, to 
support these claims. 
 A common feature of the sociological studies above is their emphasis on 
explaining the aggregate number of participants (e.g., strike volume) in labor conflict 
rather than the incidence of labor conflict. While the incidence of conflict received 
relatively more attention within economics, participation in conflict became the most 
important dependent variable in sociological studies of labor conflict. This focus on 
participation follows from the sociological conceptualization of labor conflict as 
principally a collective action problem. Subsequent studies of labor conflict within 
sociology have increasingly focused on explaining why individual employees choose 
to participate in industrial conflict events. Thus, both economics and sociology in the 
22
1980s increasingly undertook micro-level analyses. However, while the relevant micro 
level within economics was thought to be the bargaining unit, in sociology it was the 
individual employee. 
 Klandermans (1984) uses longitudinal questionnaire data on trade union 
members in the Netherlands to test resource mobilization theoretical explanations of 
members’ willingness to participate in collective industrial action. Theoretically, he 
frames this as a (rational) choice based on expectations about one’s own contribution 
as well as the expected contribution of others and the success of the action. 
Successful mobilization by the trade unions thus depends on establishing conditions 
that lead sufficient numbers of members to arrive at the choice to participate. A 
particularly important aspect of this study is the finding that an individual’s choice to 
participate in labor conflict is conditional on his or her expectations about other 
individuals’ participation, which ties the study of labor conflict to ‘structural 
embeddedness’ approaches (cf. Granovetter, 1978; 1985). Following this approach, 
current studies of labor conflict within sociology (e.g., Dixon and Roscigno, 2003; 
Akkerman, Born and Torenvlied, 2014) are increasingly concerned with the role of 
social influence and social networks in explaining participation in labor conflict. 
 In summary, sociologists have treated labor conflict as inevitable and potentially 
rational in the long term. They have mainly addressed the question of when it will be 
more or less intense, that is, when more people or fewer people will be involved in 
conflict action. Their answer to this question was that the intensity of conflict depends 
primarily on the power of trade unions and employees to achieve favorable results. 
This power, in turn, varies with long-term political and socio-economic changes as 
well as the organizational capacity of labor. Social structure, particularly the actions 
of others, is seen as an important determinant of organizational capacity and hence 
of bargaining power. Thus, sociological research recognizes the importance of social 
influence and embeddedness, which are also at the heart of the notion of spillovers. 
However, because sociologists see labor conflict predominantly as a collective action 
problem of employees, they have paid sparse attention to explaining conflict in the 
context of well-institutionalized and pacified employment relations. Hence, 
sociological theory offers explanations that appear particularly informative for (often 
historical) contexts wherein labor conflict is a manifestation of long-term class 
struggles and the institutions guiding employment relations are restricted (Cohn and 
Eaton, 1989). It remains unclear, however, how and to what extent sociological theory 
can be applied to well-developed collective bargaining systems where conflict is 
often about wages and results from bargaining processes and the decisions of 
collective bargaining negotiators. 
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1.2.2 Spillovers and conflict: previous research 
Studies on the impact of spillovers on conflict in collective bargaining are surprisingly 
scarce. Moreover, existing studies are poorly integrated and show limited progress. 
In the following section, I review the previous literature on spillovers and conflict. I 
distinguish between three theoretical viewpoints, which I refer to as 1) the mainstream 
economics approach; 2) the behavioral economics approach; and 3) the sociological 
approach. 
Spillovers and conflict: the mainstream economics approach
Early examples of research related to spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining 
emerged when compulsory arbitration, an alternative dispute resolution process to 
strikes for negotiations that faced an impasse, was installed in some (public) sectors 
in the US. A common policy concern was that this procedure would induce a ‘narcotic’ 
effect because bargaining units that would resort to arbitration would more easily do 
so in subsequent bargaining events. Although no clear theoretical explanations were 
developed for such an effect, a series of studies (Wheeler, 1975; Kochan and 
Baderschneider, 1978; Butler and Ehrenberg, 1981; Chelius and Extejt, 1985) 
attempted to establish the impact of past disputes on the probability of current 
disputes. Initial findings supported the assumption that conflict would be addictive. 
However, the methodological challenges associated with correctly identifying these 
effects soon became apparent. This resulted in a move from simple bivariate analyses 
of surveys of bargaining units toward much more elaborate econometric models for 
panel data of bargaining units. These more sophisticated analyses suggested that 
there may actually be a ‘negative narcotic effect’ in which bargaining units that had 
disputes in the past become less likely to have disputes again (e.g., Butler and 
Ehrenberg, 1981). Although theoretically the explanations for such effects remained 
relatively obscure in these studies, their findings formed an important precursor to 
subsequent studies of vertical spillovers and conflict. 
 The first of these studies was by Mauro (1982), who developed a bargaining 
theoretic model starting from the Hicksian notion that costly conflicts must arise from 
incomplete information. Negotiators use external information to improve their 
information. Conflicts arise when union and firm negotiators base their bargaining 
positions on different external factors. The model implies that past experiences of 
conflict within a bargaining unit offer negotiators opportunities to learn about their 
mistakes. Hence, vertical spillovers occur when negotiators use information about 
past strikes in their bargaining unit to improve the congruence of the external factors 
upon which they base their bargaining position. This model thus offers a theoretical 
account of why strikes in the past decrease a bargaining unit’s future strike probability. 
Mauro finds support for this hypothesis in panel data of a sample of US bargaining 
units observed over a 30-year period using fixed-effects logit models for the effect of 
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strikes in the previous negotiation on strike incidence in the current negotiation. This 
modeling approach, however, has some limitations12 that cast doubt on the 
robustness of this finding. Consequently, Schnell and Gramm (1986) re-estimate this 
effect, which they label the ‘teetotaler effect’, with a number of first-difference linear 
probability models for strikes in a panel of US manufacturing bargaining units in the 
1970s with (instrumented and non-instrumented) lagged dependent variables. They 
also find considerable evidence that negotiators learn to avoid strikes by using 
information obtained in past strike experiences. In contrast, Ingram, Metcalf and 
Wadsworth (1993) find no strong evidence in favor of any effect of past strikes on 
current strike incidence in their fixed-effects logit analysis of a panel of British 
manufacturing bargaining units in the 1980s. Further evidence for the teetotaler effect 
is found by Campolieti, Hebdon and Hyatt (2005) in a panel of Canadian bargaining 
units in the 1980s using fixed-effects logit and linear probability models for strike 
incidence. 
 The aforementioned literature on the effect of past strikes on current strikes 
assumes that rational negotiators learn from past conflict experiences when they 
have incomplete information. However, learning in this way is, according to Mauro’s 
(1982) model, limited to negotiators realizing that their bargaining positions are based 
on dissimilar external factors. In contrast, Kuhn and Gu (1999, cf. 1998) argue that 
rational negotiators can learn directly from the information contained in spillovers. 
They consider the case of horizontal spillovers. Assuming that conflict results from 
asymmetric information about firms’ ability to pay, they propose that the ability of 
different firms to pay can be similar, particularly when they operate in the same 
economic sector. If this is the case, trade unions can use information about the 
bargaining outcomes in other bargaining units to improve their information about the 
ability to pay of the firm with which they are bargaining (cf. Brugess, 1988; Hicks, 1932 
p.138). Because this process of rational learning implies that horizontal spillovers 
reduce information asymmetries, the implication is that they reduce conflict. Kuhn 
and Gu find support for this implication by regressing the number of previous contract 
negotiations within a sector in the preceding months on the duration and incidence 
of strikes in bargaining units in that sector with fixed-effect linear and probit models 
for a panel of Canadian manufacturing bargaining units (1960s-1980s). 
  In summary, mainstream economic bargaining theory sees conflicts as a result 
of inadequate information. However, the environment can offer clues about those 
aspects of the bargaining event on which negotiators lack adequate information. 
Hence, information about the context of the bargaining unit, also known as ‘external 
information’, may be used by negotiators to improve their knowledge. Other bargaining 
events represent a source of such external information provided they are somehow 
12 in particular, the incidental parameters problem
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related to the uncertain aspects of the own current bargaining event, particularly 
employers’ ability to pay. Because spillovers improve information and thus reduce the 
information problems that are the fundamental cause of conflict, the general 
implication of this approach is that spillovers tend to decrease conflict. At the same 
time, this implies that spillovers will only affect rational negotiators if these spillovers 
allow them to learn about aspects of the negotiation on which they have inadequate 
information. 
Spillovers and conflict: the behavioral economics approach 
Whereas the mainstream economics approach to spillovers sees negotiators as 
strictly rational maximizers, the behavioral economics approach sees negotiators as 
fundamentally concerned with achieving fair and equitable outcomes. The fairness of 
potential outcomes is assumed to always be judged relative to a reference point 
(Festinger, 1954; Adams, 1963; Frank, 1985; cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). The 
outcomes of past negotiations or negotiations in other bargaining units provide 
possible reference points against which fairness is judged. If negotiators use these 
reference points, their preferences become reference-dependent. However, this 
leads to the question of when and why particular negotiations are either used or 
ignored as reference points. Such questions are difficult to answer with the 
observational data of bargaining units that are commonly used for testing mainstream 
economics theories of spillovers and conflict. These data only allow for econometric 
estimation of spillovers from a priori identified sources; that is, they necessitate exact 
prior knowledge about which reference points negotiators will take into account and 
how this will influence their bargaining behavior. Moreover, whereas mainstream 
economic bargaining theory yields clear predictions about observations at the 
bargaining unit level, the behavioral approach questions the validity of the rationality 
assumptions underlying such predictions. Thus, a shift from bargaining units toward 
individual negotiators as the primary unit of observation is needed. This shift is 
reflected in two methodological developments. First, studies of spillovers increasingly 
rely on experimental evidence to better understand how negotiators will be affected 
by information about other negotiations, that is, to test the actor-assumptions 
underlying theories of spillovers (cf. Charness and Kuhn, 2011). Second, negotiator 
surveys that specifically ask about the influence of other negotiations on bargaining 
behavior are gaining importance, such as surveys that measure negotiators’ 
subjective evaluations of the relevance of potential reference points (see also 
McCarthy, O’Brien and Dowd, 1975; Blinder and Choi, 1990; Agell and Lundborg, 
1995, 2003, Bewley, 1999). 
 The relevant experimental literature uses economic bargaining experiments 
based on highly simplified bargaining contexts, particularly the ‘ultimatum game’. In 
its basic form, the ultimatum game consists of two persons bargaining over the 
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division of a sum of money, commonly referred to as ‘the pie’. One person (the 
‘proposer’) can propose a division; the other person (the ‘responder’) has to respond 
to this proposal by either accepting it or rejecting it. If accepted, each person receives 
the amount granted by the proposed division of the sum of money. If rejected, each 
person receives an alternative outcome, which is most commonly no money at all.13
 A number of ultimatum game bargaining experiments have analyzed the impact 
of providing information about other negotiations. For instance, Knez and Camerer 
(1995) implement an ultimatum game with three players in which one proposer make 
offers to two responders simultaneously and each offer pertains to the division of a 
separate sum of money. Responders are informed about the outcome of the game 
for the other responder. Knez and Camerer find that responders reject offers more 
frequently when they are offered less than the other responder, even though the 
offers to the other responder do not affect their own payoffs. Disagreement ensues 
because proposers fail to anticipate this behavior of responders. These findings are 
directly relevant to understanding spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining 
because they show that principally separate bargaining events affect each other 
through information spillovers. In this case, the responders’ preferences are affected 
by the outcomes achieved by other responders through ‘social comparisons’ (cf. 
Festinger, 1954) leading to conflicts in bargaining. 
 A similar finding is reached by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), who analyze 
ultimatum games in which only the proposer knows the pie size (i.e., bargaining with 
asymmetric information). In their study, the players are informed about the average 
offers across all participants observed in previous rounds of the bargaining game. 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser find that by providing information on the average offer, 
responders become more likely to reject any given proposal. This indicates that 
social comparisons across negotiations increase conflict. However, in contrast to 
Knez and Camerer (1995), Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) find that proposers 
increase their offers in anticipation of the impact of social comparisons on the 
responders. A potential explanation for this discrepancy is that because the pie size 
is fixed in Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s (2004) experiment, information about the average 
offers allows the responders to learn about the pie size. This would indicate that 
spillovers due to rational learning (c.f. Kuhn and Gu, 1999) and social comparisons 
occur simultaneously. 
13 One of the most well known and robust findings from ultimatum game experiments is that people 
structurally deviate from strict rationality assumptions (see Thaler, 1988; Güth and Tietz, 1990; Camer-
er and Thaler, 1995; Güth and Kocher, 2013). Instead, they strongly favor equal-splits (i.e. a 50-50 
division of the sum) and frequently do not propose or accept divisions that are too far from the equal-
split, even when this means that they will earn less money than they could. These findings suggest that 
achieving fair outcomes is indeed often more important in bargaining than simply maximizing one’s 
earning. 
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 Tournadre and Villeval (2004) find evidence for both rational learning and social 
comparisons. They implement an ultimatum game in which only the responder knows 
how much money there is, but the players are informed about the outcome of a 
similar ultimatum game of one other pair of players. Aiming to directly test Kuhn and 
Gu’s (1999) model of rational learning, Tournadre and Villeval (2004) explicitly 
incorporate a positive correlation between the amount of money in these ultimatum 
games and inform the players about this correlation. Their findings suggest that even 
though learning about the pie size by observing the outcomes of others leads to 
fewer rejections and hence less conflict, this pacifying effect of horizontal spillovers 
is offset by the simultaneous occurrence of social comparisons, which increase 
conflict. 
 A recent experimental study by McDondald et al. (2014) provides further clues to 
why social comparisons across negotiations lead to conflict. In their set-up, two 
players play the ultimatum game while a third person receives a fixed payment that is 
known to all three players. In line with previous experimental findings, social 
comparisons between the players and the third person increase conflict. However, 
McDonald et al.’s findings also indicate that whereas high payments to the third 
person lead the responders to raise their own minimum acceptable offer, low 
payments to the third person are ignored. This finding suggests that although 
negotiators can be affected by principally unrelated payments to others through 
social comparisons, this occurs only when such payments represent outcomes that 
are favorable to the negotiators themselves. 
 This selective impact of social comparisons is also found in actual collective 
bargaining by Babcock et al. (1996). They analyze survey responses and field data of 
teacher contract negotiators in school districts in Pennsylvania for 1983-1984 and 
1988-1989. In their questionnaire, they ask the negotiators to evaluate the impact of 
bargaining outcomes in other districts on their bargaining behavior. Their study yields 
two major findings. First, negotiators’ selection of relevant reference negotiations is 
subject to self-serving bias (cf. Frank, 1985; Babcock et al. 1995; Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock et al. 2005), with employee representatives choosing 
high-wage outcomes as references while employers choose low-wage outcomes as 
references (see also Rees, 1993 for anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon in wage 
bargaining). Second, analyzing strike propensity in the negotiators’ bargaining units 
with a tobit model, Babcock et al. find that the larger the discrepancy in the reference 
wages between the negotiators on either side of the bargaining table is, the larger the 
probability of a strike in that bargaining unit becomes. Thus, because negotiators 
exhibit a self-serving bias in their evaluation of information about the outcomes in 
other negotiations, horizontal spillovers due to social comparisons increase the 
divergence between them, leading to increasing conflict.
28
 Although it is principally concerned with the wage-setting process in general 
rather than explaining conflict specifically, another highly informative study is Bewley’s 
(1999) survey analysis of 374 businesspeople and trade unions involved in wage 
bargaining in the US in the early 1990s. Two of his findings are especially relevant for 
our understanding of spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining. First, employees 
and the trade union negotiators that represent them strongly judge the fairness of 
wage offers against their own past wages. Wage offers are only deemed to be fair if 
they exceed, or at least are not below, previous wages (cf. Blinder and Choi, 1990; 
Agell and Lundborg, 1995, 2003). If this expectation is violated, conflict ensues. 
Second, employers who seek to restrain wages because of economic set-backs can 
avoid conflict if they have a reputation for being fair. Both of these findings indicate 
how vertical spillovers can affect conflict in collective bargaining. In the first case, 
information about past bargaining outcomes within the bargaining unit in the form of 
wages creates reference points against which employees evaluate the fairness of 
new potential bargaining outcomes, thus creating expectation effects that lead to 
conflicts. In the second case, information about the behavior of the employer in past 
negotiations creates reputation effects that can make employees more willing to 
accept offers that they would not accept in the absence of such a reputation, that is, 
offers which would otherwise lead to conflict. 
 In summary, behavioral bargaining theoretic approaches to spillovers and 
conflict are based on (social) psychological theories of behavior. Negotiators are 
seen as fundamentally concerned with achieving fair outcomes. Fairness is always 
judged in relation to some reference point. Because the outcomes in other negotiations 
provide such reference points, information about them will influence the preferences 
of negotiators. Hence, spillovers, from this perspective, occur because negotiators 
and/or the people who they represent have reference-dependent preferences. By 
and large, spillovers that arise due to reference-dependent preferences increase 
conflict in collective bargaining because such spillovers increase the divergence 
between the negotiators. 
Spillovers and conflict: the sociological approach
Sociological research takes a different perspective on spillovers. Central notions in 
this perspective are that actors are fundamentally embedded in social networks 
(Granovetter, 1973; 1985), that it is rational for actors to base their actions on the 
observed actions of others (Hedstrom, 1998) and that this can lead to the diffusion of 
behaviors among actors (cf. Colemean et al. 1957; Burt, 1987; Strang and Tuma, 
1993). Coupled with the sociological concept of labor conflict as pervasive and 
potentially rational in the long term, this has led to the application of diffusion theory 
to labor conflict. 
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 The notion that societal conflict follows patterns of diffusion was first applied to 
labor conflict, specifically to strikes, by Connel and Cohn (1995). They argue that 
strikes lead to further strikes because they transmit information across workplaces. 
Workers are fundamentally uncertain about the cost and benefits of conflict. By 
observing strikes elsewhere, however, workers may rationally decide to strike because 
they learn about grievances, opportunities and the favorability of power relations. 
Connel and Cohn test this imitation model of strikes with an event-history analysis of 
strike incidence in Third Republic French coal mining departments and find strong 
evidence of the temporal clustering of strikes. Strikes, even unsuccessful ones, 
appear to lead to further strikes. This clustering, however, becomes less apparent 
with rising levels of unionization and increasingly institutionalized and pacified labor 
relations.
 The applicability of diffusion models to labor conflict for historical contexts is 
underlined by a series of studies by Biggs. Using statistics and qualitative evidence 
from the American Strike Wave of 1886, Biggs argues that successful strikes lead to 
further strikes (2002). This notion is further developed in his second analysis of these 
events (2003), in which he introduces two causal mechanisms, inspiration and inter-
dependence, as explanations for the diffusion of strikes. Inspiration implies that 
workers are fundamentally uncertain about the cost and benefits of striking but can 
reduce this uncertainty when they have information about others who are striking (cf. 
Connel and Cohn, 1995). Interdependence implies that workers will become more 
likely to participate in strikes when they know others are striking because the chance 
of success rises with an increasing number of strikers (cf. Klandermans, 1984), 
whereas retaliation becomes less likely. Using time-series analysis and qualitative 
evidence, Biggs finds that the (aggregate) number of strikers in a strike wave is 
positively affected by their lagged observations; that is, the larger the number of 
strikers is, the larger it will become subsequently. In a analysis of late nineteenth-cen-
tury strike waves in Chicago and Paris, Biggs (2005) finds that the aggregate 
observations of this variable follows power laws similar to those that describe the 
outbreak of forest fires. This finding further supports the notion that labor conflict 
follows patterns of diffusion. 
 To conclude, the sociological perspective suggests that latent conflict is 
pervasive, but the potential outcomes of actual conflict are uncertain. Manifest 
conflicts will erupt whenever workers and/or trade unions believe that they have 
sufficient bargaining power, particularly organizational resources, to realize their 
goals. Bargaining power is inherently uncertain ex ante. However, information about 
conflict in other negotiations, such as their success in mobilizing workers and 
achieving favorable results, can help reduce this uncertainty if the bargaining 
power is similar. Thus, as in the mainstream economic approach, information about 
other negotiations can be used to rationally learn about an unobservable part of 
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the bargaining relationship. However, this aspect is not the firm’s ability to pay but 
 organizationally determined bargaining power. 
Spillovers and conflict: one problem, three solutions? 
As discussed above, questions about how spillovers influence conflict in collective 
bargaining have receive quite different and seemingly contradictory answers depending 
on the theoretical viewpoint adopted. The two economic bargaining theoretic accounts 
share a view of conflict as the result of a bargaining process, and they are both based 
on the assumption that conflicts are fundamentally irrational in that they create costs 
for either side of the bargaining table. An integrated understanding of the influence of 
spillovers on conflict in collectives requires systematic testing of the validity of the 
divergent actor-assumptions on which the two approaches are based and the 
spillover mechanism that they imply. Research is currently moving in this direction, 
particularly through the analysis of bargaining experiments, but an integrated 
framework is still lacking. Such a framework ideally should not reduce explanations 
of the impact of spillovers on conflict to mechanisms taken from either approach but 
rather should clarify the conditions under which the mechanism proposed in both 
approaches will operate.  
 Nevertheless, even with the integration of the mainstream and behavioral bargaining 
theoretic accounts, current economic bargaining theory has a blind spot regarding 
the existence of spillover mechanisms based on the diffusion of information related 
to organizationally determined bargaining power. Such mechanisms are recognized 
in the sociological approach to spillovers. However, this sociological account is 
based on the assumption that conflict can be rational, an assumption that economic 
bargaining theoretic approaches have mostly dismissed. To integrate the economics 
and sociological approaches, it is necessary to assume at the outset that conflict is 
costly to either side and is irrational in some cases but also that the benefits of conflict 
can, under some conditions, outweigh its cost and make conflict rational. These 
different assumptions about the nature of the action problem associated with a 
choice for or against conflict make integrated experimental tests a difficult proposition, 
as does the difficulty of incorporating organizational bargaining power in bargaining 
experiments. Survey analyses offer a better way of simultaneously testing all three 
approaches to spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining. 
 The sociological literature thus far has largely avoided investigating whether and 
how the mechanisms for spillovers that it invokes operate in contemporary labor 
relations systems, particularly in collective bargaining. It is therefore necessary to 
further develop the theoretical account of spillovers and conflict in this literature in 
order for it to be applicable to such contemporary contexts. 
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1.3  Methodological challenges
Before I turn to the contribution I aim to make with this thesis of examining how 
spillovers influence conflict in collective bargaining, I will first briefly review the major 
methodological challenges associated with this aim in previous research. 
 Analyzing spillovers is complicated by a number of difficulties. First, because the 
pool of bargaining events that may potentially influence negotiators is virtually infinite, 
it is impossible to empirically analyze all potential spillovers. Hence, a priori limitations 
must be made on potential sources of spillovers. However, well-tested theories that 
detail how negotiators select which other negotiations to take into account and which 
to ignore are currently lacking. Researchers have thus either somewhat haphazardly 
selected other negotiations in their analyses or have chosen to analyze those that 
best fit their hypotheses. In both cases, findings may be severely misleading due to 
a biased selection of independent variables. 
 Second, specific spillovers resulting from different mechanisms can have 
different and potentially counteracting effects. The common practice of analyzing the 
impact of aggregated observations of potentially influential negotiations may therefore 
‘average out’ the true effects of specific spillovers. Analyses of aggregated data 
suffer doubly from this phenomenon because both independent and dependent 
variables can potentially be distorted by counteracting spillovers. 
 Third, in the case of horizontal spillovers, it is often difficult to separate true 
spillover effects from observed patterns of communality between bargaining units 
that actually result from similar contextual conditions. This problem is already well 
understood in wage spillover studies, where similar wages can result from spillovers 
but can also result from the bargaining units’ response to similar economic conditions. 
Despite promising advances in econometric modeling, analyses of spillovers with 
currently available observational data-sets are still severely hampered by this problem. 
 Fourth, a similar problem arises when one tries to identify vertical spillovers 
because the observed influences of past negotiations on present negotiations within 
a bargaining unit can also result from potentially unobserved characteristics of that 
bargaining unit that influence each negotiation (cf. Heckman 1991). 
 Fifth, studies of labor conflict have predominantly focused on conflicts that are 
readily observable in the available observational data, particularly strikes. In addition 
to well-known problems with existing strike data (Franzosi, 1989), this is problematic 
because conflict in collective bargaining does not necessarily take the form of strikes, 
which are commonly restricted by institutions and law. However, the absence of 
strikes does not imply the absence of conflict. It is thus necessary to also consider 
the impact of spillovers on more subtle manifestations of conflict in collective 
bargaining, both as a source of spillovers and as a potential outcome. 
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1.4  The contribution of this study  
In this study, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the impact of spillovers on 
conflict in collective bargaining. I aim to further develop and integrate the currently 
isolated approaches to spillovers and conflict in the disciplines of economics and 
sociology. In this way, I work toward a coherent understanding of the impact of 
spillovers on conflict that takes advantage of the insights of current economic 
bargaining theory, both the mainstream and the behavioral types, and of sociological 
diffusion theory. 
 Furthermore, I test the causal mechanisms that are implied in the various 
approaches by collecting two types of primary data. First, I undertake bargaining 
experiments that allow me to critically evaluate the different actor assumptions in 
economic bargaining theory and their implications for the influence of spillovers on 
conflict under various conditions. The experimental designs allow me to isolate 
specific spillover effects. Second, I collect questionnaire survey data on a representative 
sample of union and firm negotiators in the Netherlands. These data, the Dutch 
Negotiator Survey 2011, record negotiators’ self-reported influence of various types of 
information on their bargaining behavior, allowing me to directly measure such 
influences. Moreover, the data record whether the negotiators experienced conflict in 
the collective bargaining events, both in the form of strikes and in the form of 
bargaining impasses. 
1.5  Research questions 
1.5.1 Central research question 
As I have shown in section 1.2, different disciplines have developed various theoretical 
mechanisms that may explain how spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining. 
However, it remains unclear how and under what conditions spillovers lead to more 
or less conflict in collective bargaining due to a lack of integration and methodological 
difficulties in identifying spillovers. In this book, I will develop, integrate and test the 
different approaches using data and methods that allow for better identification of 
spillovers. In this way, I will address the following central research question: 
How and under what conditions do spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining, 
and to what extent can different theoretical mechanisms account for this? 
To address this question, I will investigate a number of interrelated specific sub- 
questions. I begin from the various extant bargaining theoretic approaches and the 
assumptions on which they are based, which I address in the first two sub-questions 
using bargaining experiments. Then, I integrate the bargaining theoretic and the 
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sociological approach and investigate these approaches using survey data on 
negotiators involved in collective bargaining.
1.5.2  Experimental analyses of spillovers and conflict in  
wage bargaining 
In the first two empirical chapters of this book, I present experimental studies on the 
impact of spillovers on conflict in bargaining. These studies aim to test the different 
behavioral assumptions in current bargaining theoretic approaches to the impact of 
spillovers on conflict. A major advantage of the experimental method is that it allows 
me to identify and fully control the spillovers that can occur in bargaining. The studies 
begin from a simple bargaining model and progressively add different types of 
spillovers to the analysis. In these two chapters, I focus on spillovers that consist of 
information about bargaining outcomes in other negotiations, in line with (economic) 
bargaining theoretic approaches. 
Chapter 2: Research question on mechanisms causing horizontal spillovers and their 
impact on conflict in bargaining 
In this chapter, the impact of horizontal spillovers on conflict in bargaining is studied 
with the aid of a bargaining experiment. This study contrasts the mainstream 
economics approach to spillovers with the (social) psychologically informed 
behavioral economics approach. Economic bargaining theory offers two theoretical 
mechanisms for horizontal spillovers based on these two approaches, ‘rational 
learning’ and ‘social comparisons’. The rational learning mechanism leads to the 
prediction that horizontal spillovers decrease conflict in bargaining, whereas the 
social comparison mechanism predicts that they increase conflict in bargaining. 
Hence, in Chapter 2, the following research question is addressed: 
RQ1: How do horizontal spillovers resulting from rational learning and social comparisons 
influence conflict in wage bargaining? 
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An asymmetric information two-person14 unstructured bargaining game with economic 
incentives is implemented in the experiment. This design is focused on the distributive 
aspect of collective bargaining, that is, wage bargaining.15 Horizontal spillovers are 
incorporated into the experimental design by providing the participants with 
information about the bargaining outcomes of other participants. The experiment 
compares bargaining with horizontal spillovers that result from social comparisons to 
bargaining with horizontal spillovers that allow for rational learning. Bargaining without 
spillovers is used as a control condition. 
Chapter 3: Specific research question on mechanisms causing vertical spillovers and 
their impact on conflict in bargaining 
Chapter 2 offers a first joint experimental test of the impact of two separate 
mechanisms for horizontal spillovers on conflict in wage bargaining. However, it does 
not consider that spillovers emanate not only from other bargaining units (horizontal 
spillovers) but also from the past of the bargaining unit itself (vertical spillovers). 
Chapter 3 develops an integrated theoretical framework based on economic 
bargaining theory within which to study the impact of horizontal and vertical spillovers 
on conflict in wage bargaining. Two mechanisms for vertical spillovers are introduced, 
‘reputation effects’ and ‘expectations effects’. As with the two mechanisms for 
horizontal spillovers discussed in Chapter 2, these two mechanisms for vertical 
spillovers lead to divergent predictions about the impact of spillovers on conflict in 
bargaining. The reputation effects mechanism suggests that vertical spillovers can 
decrease conflict, whereas the expectation effects mechanism suggests that vertical 
spillovers increase conflict in bargaining. Chapter 3 therefore addresses the following 
question: 
RQ2: How do vertical spillovers resulting from reputation effects and expectation 
effects influence conflict in wage bargaining? 
14 I focus on bargaining in its most simple form, i.e. involving only two actors: one union negotiator 
representing the interest of the employees and one firm negotiator representing the interest of the 
employer(s).
15 Collective agreements define the terms and conditions of employment in general, of which wages are 
a part. With wage bargaining, I focus on the aspect of collective bargaining where there is an obvious 
conflict of interest and bargaining is fundamentally distributive (c.f. Walton and McKersie, 1965). I 
use the expression ‘wage bargaining’ for this because it commonly known and signals that I am here 
dealing with this distributive aspect of collective bargaining. It should however be noted that many, 
perhaps most, issues in collective bargaining imply monetary costs or benefits to either side of the 
bargaining table and are treated as such in practice. Hence, the findings of my studies will have validity 
for many issues in collective bargaining besides wages.
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To address this question, the impact of vertical spillovers on conflict in bargaining is 
experimentally tested. This analysis supplements the experimental design and data 
on horizontal spillovers presented in Chapter 2 with new experimental treatments. 
The experimental design models vertical spillovers by providing the participants with 
information about the firm negotiators’ fairness in previous negations, allowing them 
to build reputations and analyzing past bargaining outcomes of the union negotiators 
that can induce expectations. 
1.5.3  Analyses of spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining 
using negotiator survey data 
The next two empirical chapters focus on the impact of spillovers on negotiators’ 
bargaining behavior, and subsequently on conflict, using observations from actual 
collective bargaining. Whereas Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyzed the assumptions 
of different (economic) bargaining theoretic approaches, this section of the book 
integrates these assumptions with the sociological approach to labor conflict. Thus, 
I will expand the notion of spillovers as purely related to bargaining outcomes to 
include spillovers that are related to strategic information about conflict, which have 
thus far been largely ignored in the (economic) bargaining theoretic approach but are 
crucially important from the perspective of the sociological approach. The different 
approaches are evaluated through analyses of the Dutch Negotiator Survey 2011.
Chapter 4: Specific research questions on the influence of external information on 
negotiators
The experimental analyses presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 allow for full control 
over what information is available to the negotiators that are analyzed. Although this 
a major methodological advantage because it offers the possibility to isolate specific 
spillover effects, in actual collective bargaining situations, many different types of 
information may affect negotiators’ bargaining behavior. It is therefore necessary to 
understand how various types of information influence bargaining behavior and how 
differences in this influence can be explained. These issues are addressed in Chapter 
4. The analysis of spillovers in this chapter is embedded within the larger question of 
how information that is not part of the negotiation process but is external to it affects 
bargaining behavior. In this way, the importance of spillovers relative to other 
influences of external factors can be evaluated. The study broadly distinguishes four 
types of external information: spillovers, information about the economic context, 
information about organizational power, and information about the institutional 
context. Each of these general types is subdivided into a number of relevant specific 
types of external information. Particular attention is paid to different types of spillovers. 
These may differ according to their source (i.e., according to the bargaining events to 
which they relate) or according to their informational content (i.e., according to what 
36
information they transmit). Informational content may refer to bargaining outcomes as 
well as conflict in other negotiations. The chapter first addresses a descriptive 
question about the impact of these different types of external information on the 
bargaining behavior of negotiators. 
RQ3a: To what extent are negotiators in collective bargaining influenced by different 
types of external information?
Second, it is important to understand when any type of external information has more 
or less influence on negotiators’ bargaining behavior. Influence may depend on the 
characteristics of negotiators, such as whether they are union or firm negotiators. It 
may also depend on the characteristics of the bargaining unit, such as whether it is a 
single firm or a whole sector. Finally, in the case of spillovers, influence may depend 
on their source, such as whether it is the past of the bargaining unit (i.e., vertical 
spillovers) or other bargaining units (e.g., horizontal spillovers). Therefore, theoretical 
explanations for variations in the influence of the different types of external information 
are developed and tested to answer a second research question:
 
RQ3b: To what extent can differences in the influence of external information between 
negotiators be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators, bargaining units 
and the type of information?
Both of these questions are addressed with a statistical analysis of the Dutch Negotiator 
Survey 2011. 
Chapter 5: Specific research questions on the influence of spillovers on conflict in 
collective bargaining 
Whereas Chapter 4 addresses the impact of spillovers on collective agreement 
negotiators’ bargaining behavior, Chapter 5 examines the resulting impact of 
spillovers on conflict. It develops and tests hypotheses about this impact based on 
the previously discussed and analyzed economic bargaining theories and on an 
application of sociological diffusion theory. In this chapter, I show that these different 
approaches lead to different predictions about the impact of spillovers on conflict in 
collective bargaining and critically evaluate each of these predictions against 
empirical reality. The analysis presented in this chapter differentiates spillovers from 
various sources and with different informational content and differentiates their 
influence on various types of negotiators. In this way, it addresses the following 
research question:
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RQ4: How and under what conditions does information about other bargaining events 
influence the probability of negotiators experiencing conflicts in collective bargaining?
To answer this question, further statistical analysis will be conducted on the survey 
data collected in 2011 on Dutch union and firm negotiators. 
1.6 Overview
The remainder of this book can be divided into three main sections. The first section 
includes Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, in which I examine the behavioral foundations of 
bargaining theoretic explanations for spillovers. These chapters report on experimental 
analyses of research questions RQ1 and RQ2. The second section of this book 
consists of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Here, I present analyses of the impact of 
spillovers on negotiators’ bargaining behavior and subsequently on conflict in 
collective bargaining in The Netherlands. In these chapters, I address research 
questions RQ3a, RQ3b and RQ4. These two main sections are followed by Chapter 6, 
in which I present the conclusions of the study and discuss the findings.

2
Horizontal spillovers and 
conflict in wage bargaining: 
experimental evidence16
16 A slightly different version of this chapter has been submitted for publication in Journal of Behavioral 
and Experimental Economics (current status: revise and resubmit). An earlier version of this chapter 
was presented at the Tinbergen workshop on Economic Theory and Game Theory in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, April 2013; at the European Sociological Association Conference in Turin, Italy, August 
2013; and at the HRM Research Seminar University of York, York, United Kingdom, February 2014. 
Co-authors are Jana Vyrastekova, Agnes Akkerman and René Torenvlied. 
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Abstract 
We investigate how information spillovers from other negotiations affect conflict in 
bargaining. Two theoretical mechanisms are studied: 1) social comparisons, which 
are hypothesized to increase conflict due to self-serving biases, and 2) rational 
learning, which is hypothesized to decrease conflict by reducing information 
asymmetries. Our experimental design allows for an interactive bargaining process 
and offers full control over the information available to negotiators. Consistent with 
studies of one-shot games, we find that spillovers resulting from social comparisons 
increase conflict; however, the bargaining process mitigates this effect. In bargaining 
situations in which spillovers also allow for rational learning, the conflict-increasing 
effects of spillovers are prevented. 
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2.1 Introduction
Conflicts that arise during wage bargaining in firms are influenced by information 
about negotiations in other firms (Babcock et al. 1996; Babcock et al. 2005; Kuhn 
and Gu, 1999). We refer to this influence as ‘horizontal spillovers’. The economics 
literature proposes two mechanisms that explain these spillovers: social comparisons, 
which stem from fairness and equity considerations (Babcock et al., 1996; Babcock 
et al., 2005), and rational learning, which results from the revelation of private 
information about the firm’s ability to pay (Kuhn and Gu, 1998, 1999). Social 
comparisons are thought to increase the level of conflict in wage bargaining, whereas 
rational learning is thought to reduce the level of conflict. 
 Experimental research offers valuable insights into spillovers in bargaining (cf. 
Falk and Fehr, 2003; Charness and Kuhn, 2011) because it allows the researcher to 
manipulate the availability of information to bargaining parties to isolate spillover 
effects.17 Existing experimental studies predominantly model wage bargaining as a 
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ (ultimatum) game. Such a representation does not allow 
negotiators to actively coordinate and, consequently, may overstate the influence of 
spillovers. To overcome this shortcoming, we implement an experimental design that 
allows two subjects (a trade union negotiator and a firm negotiator) to exchange 
proposals, a representation that more closely mimics real-world wage bargaining 
contexts. With this experimental analysis, we address the following research question: 
how do horizontal spillovers resulting from rational learning and social comparisons 
influence conflict in wage bargaining?
 Our experimental design contrasts a control condition (bargaining without 
spillovers) with two treatment conditions allowing for spillovers. One treatment 
condition provides information about the outcomes of other negotiations but does 
not reveal the other firm’s ability to pay (stimulating subjects to make social 
comparisons). The second treatment condition provides information about the 
outcomes of other negotiations and reveals that the other firm’s ability to pay is 
identical (allowing subjects to learn rationally). We study the impact of spillovers on 
conflict in an interactive bargaining process by analyzing (1) trade union negotiators’ 
initial demands, (2) the level of divergence between trade union negotiators’ and firm 
negotiators’ proposals during the bargaining process, and (3) the likelihood of 
reaching no agreement. 
17 In natural data the isolation of ‘true’ influences is often problematic, due to spurious correlations and 
the measurement of appropriate reference points (Mitchell, 1982; Manski, 1993). 
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2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Theory 
The two theoretical mechanisms that explain spillovers in wage bargaining, social 
comparisons (cf. Festinger, 1954) and rational learning (Kuhn and Gu, 1999; Burgess, 
1988), both predict that demands are affected by information about the (observed) 
outcomes of other negotiations. However, the two mechanisms produce competing 
predictions about the level of conflict resulting from spillovers. 
 The core assumption in the social comparisons mechanism is that labor relations 
are affected by concerns about fairness and equity (cf. Adams, 1963; Frank, 1984; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Rees, 1993). Specifically, it assumes that the preferences of 
negotiators (and the individuals they represent) are influenced by the incomes and 
relative standings of others (e.g., Babcock et al., 2005). Consequently, the outcomes 
of other negotiations may become reference points for demands. Given that many 
other negotiations take place and all produce outcomes, a key question is which of 
these outcomes will be used as a reference point (cf. Clark and Senik, 2010). Studies 
show that the choice of a particular reference point is often subject to self-serving 
biases (Babcock et al. 1995, 1996; cf. Rees, 1993). Hence, trade unions formulate 
their wage demands on the basis of relatively high wages negotiated elsewhere, 
whereas firms formulate their wage offers on the basis of relatively low wages 
negotiated elsewhere. Consequently, spillovers that arise from social comparisons 
will increase the level of conflict between union negotiators and firm negotiators, as 
reflected in their proposals. 
 Kuhn and Gu (1998, 1999) propose rational learning as an alternative explanatory 
mechanism for spillovers in wage bargaining. This mechanism is based on the 
assumption that the firm has private information about its ability to pay wages. Costly 
conflicts, such as strikes, serve as devices to reveal a firm’s true ability to pay (e.g., 
Hayes, 1984; Kennan and Wilson, 1989; McConnell, 1989; Card, 1990; cf. Cramton 
and Tracy, 2003). Kuhn and Gu (1999) further assume that the ability to pay is 
correlated between specific firms, for instance, when they operate in the same sector 
and are subject to similar product market conditions and technological shocks. Kuhn 
and Gu (1999) develop a two-state bargaining model in which firms know their state 
(either ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and unions know the state of a firm only with some probability. 
Based on this probability, a union will make either a high or a low wage demand, 
which a firm can either accept or reject. Low wage demands will never result in a loss 
for the firm. High wage demands will leave firms in a ‘bad’ state with a loss exceeding 
the costs of a strike, whereas firms in a ‘good’ state are better off accepting the high 
demand. Hence, a firm negotiator will always accept a low demand and will accept a 
high demand only when the firm is in a ‘good’ state. 
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 Kuhn and Gu (1999) show that union negotiators are able to learn by observing 
other negotiations. On the basis of these observations, union negotiators update their 
prior belief that their own (similar) firm is in a ‘good’ state and adjust their demands 
accordingly. A crucial but implicit assumption of the model of Kuhn and Gu (1999: 
122) is that union negotiators are strictly rational in their evaluation of reference points, 
meaning that they only take into account other wage bargaining events that reduce 
uncertainties about the state of the firm. Spillovers resulting from rational learning thus 
reduce the information asymmetries that cause conflicts in wage bargaining to arise. 
Hence, contrary to the prediction of the social comparison mechanism, the rational leaning 
mechanism predicts that spillovers reduce the level of conflict in wage bargaining.
2.2.2 Evidence
Empirical evidence on the basis of natural data provides mixed evidence. A study of 
social comparisons in wage bargaining by Babckock et al. (1996) reports increasing 
strike probabilities with increasing distance between negotiators’ reference points, 
providing support for the social comparison mechanisms. By contrast, Kuhn and Gu 
(1999) report decreasing strike probabilities with an increasing number of observable 
negotiations in an industry, providing support for the rational learning mechanism. 
 Experimental studies provide support for the social comparisons mechanism; it 
is sufficient to induce spillovers (Knez and Camerer, 1995; Alewell and Nicklisch, 
2009) and, in conjunction with self-serving biases, increases the level of conflict (cf. 
McDonald et al. 2013). Experimental studies provide less conclusive evidence about 
rational learning. An experimental test of Kuhn and Gu’s (1999) bargaining model by 
Tounadre and Villeval (2004) finds limited evidence for the predicted conflict- 
decreasing effects of rational learning.18 It appears that the mechanism of social 
comparisons offsets the effects of rational learning. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) 
experimentally study the effects of information about the average offer in repeated 
ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric information and a fixed pie size. Their study 
suggests that social comparisons increase conflict and that social comparisons are 
reinforced when rational learning is possible. To our knowledge, no experimental 
study isolates the impact of rational learning on bargaining from social comparisons.19 
18 Evidence for conflict decreasing learning is found only with the introduction of additional information 
about the first unions beliefs about the size of the pie. Unions were otherwise unable to distinguish 
 between outcomes in other negotiations that signal that the firm is in a bad state and outcomes 
 resulting from a violation of social preferences. 
19 It is relatively straightforward to isolate social comparisons from rational learning by studying the impact of 
information about outcomes of other negotiations that do not have correlated private information. However, if 
private information is known to be correlated, i.e. if learning is possible, it cannot be ruled out that information 
about other negotiation outcomes also triggers social comparisons. The impact of learning must therefore 
be inferred from observed difference between situations that only allow for social comparisons and situa-
tions that allow for both mechanisms to operate. Note however that this corresponds to real world bargaining 
situations where every potential reference point could induce spillover via social comparisons. 
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2.2.3 The model
We model wage bargaining as a two-player unstructured bargaining game in which the 
firm player has private information about the value of a common surplus that is to be 
divided. The union player knows only a set of possible values of the common surplus. 
In this way, we capture the asymmetric information between the union and firm 
negotiator about the firm’s ability to pay. The value of the common surplus for each 
negotiation is drawn randomly from a set of possible values, reflecting that the firm’s 
ability to pay varies with economic circumstances. The union player is the first mover; 
(s)he makes an initial proposal that starts a time-limited bargaining process. This is 
analogous to the common practice of starting negotiations with union wage demands. 
During the bargaining process, each player can make an unlimited number of proposals 
or accept the other player’s most recent proposal. Proposals are discrete, positive 
numbers with a maximum value restricted to the highest possible value of the common 
surplus, representing the union player’s pay-off if accepted (i.e., the potential wage 
rate). The firm player’s pay-off is determined by subtracting the accepted proposal from 
the value of the common surplus. Proposals that exceed the value of the common 
surplus and hence leave the firm player with a loss are possible. 
 If no proposal is accepted, both players receive a non-agreement payoff, which is 
zero points. This fall-back position is common knowledge. The non-agreement payoff 
may be interpreted as the cost of not reaching an agreement. In real wage bargaining, 
this cost would arise from strikes, lock-outs or termination of the bargaining unit. The 
time-limited bargaining structure reflects that wage bargaining is an interdependent 
concession process wherein the unions and firms attempt to find a mutually acceptable 
agreement. However, bargaining cannot continue endlessly, and the longer it takes for 
the negotiators to make a sufficient concession, the greater the probability of suffering 
the cost of not reaching an agreement (cf. Roth et al. 1988: 820). The model does not 
allow for either player to withdraw from bargaining before the deadline. This assumption 
is grounded in common practice; spontaneous strikes or lockouts rarely occur in most 
contemporary wage bargaining contexts and are often prohibited by labor law. 
2.2.4 Experimental design
In our experiment, the value of the common surplus to be divided is 24 points plus a 
variable number of additional points, which takes any of the following possible values: 
{-12, -10, -8, -6, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12} with an equal probability. Nature draws a 
number from the set of additional points, and only the firm player is informed about 
this value. The union player knows only that the common surplus is 24 points plus 
one of the possible number of additional points.
 Bargaining takes place by making proposals representing the number of points 
earned by the union player if accepted. The proposals can be any whole number 
between 0 points and the maximally possible common surplus of 24 + 12 = 36 
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points. Bargaining starts with the (uninformed) union player making an opening 
proposal. Once this opening proposal is made, both players can make any number 
of proposals or accept the other player’s most recent proposal. The history of 
previous proposals is visible to both players throughout the negotiation. Bargaining 
time is limited to 60 seconds. If a proposal is accepted, the negotiation is finished. 
The union player receives the number of points that the specific proposal represents. 
The firm player earns 24 points plus the additional number of points minus the points 
reflected by the proposal (i.e., the residual common surplus). If no proposal is 
accepted within 60 seconds, each player receives the non-agreement payoff of zero 
points. After the bargaining game, the payoff screen informs both players about their 
own payoffs. Participants play this bargaining game for 15 periods.20 In each period, 
each participant is randomly matched to another participant in the session. 
 In the CONTROL condition, the bargaining game is played as described above. 
Thus, the union players know the possible values of the additional points and the 
probability that they are realized, and the firm players know the actual value of the 
additional points. No additional information is provided. 
 The two treatment conditions differ from the CONTROL condition in that they 
provide additional information in the form of a ‘reference outcome’ to the players. The 
reference outcome is an actually observed bargaining outcome of one other 
bargaining pair in the CONTROL treatment. The reference outcome either reports the 
number of points of the accepted proposal or, in the case of non-agreement, reports 
that no agreement was reached.21 The reference outcome is updated in each period. 
We truthfully inform the participants that the reference outcome is obtained from 
other participants who were subject to the same bargaining protocol. 
 The two treatment conditions differ in one important respect. In the UNCORRELATED 
treatment, the reference outcome is taken from a negotiation in which the variable 
number of additional points can take any of the possible values with equal probability. 
In the CORRELATED treatment condition, the reference outcome is taken from a 
negotiation where the additional number of points is identical to that in the subject’s 
own negotiation. The subjects are informed which situation applies via a statement 
that appears on the bargaining screen just above the reference outcome. In the 
UNCORRELATED treatment, the statement reads, ‘The number of additional points in 
this other pair was one of the numbers {-12,-10,-8,-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}, all equally 
likely.’ In the CORRELATED treatment, the statement reads, ‘The number of additional 
points in this other pair was EXACTLY THE SAME as it is now in your pair.’ 
20 To enable a comparison of datasets across treatments, we drew a one set of 15 variable surplus values 
before the first experimental session and used the same set of values in all sessions.
21 Reference outcomes that are non-agreements are included in order to provide a truthful and realistic 
presentation of the other players negotiating outcomes. We do not test specific hypotheses about the 
non-agreements but will control our analyses for their presence.    
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 Thus, the CONTROL condition differs from the treatments only in that there is no 
reference outcome presented to the players. All other information is identical. This 
condition therefore provides a baseline of the bargaining game with no spillovers. 
The UNCORRELATED treatment condition provides reference outcomes but informs 
the players that the variable number of points and hence the common surplus that 
the other pair divided could take any of the possible values with equal probability; 
that is, it is uncorrelated with the common surplus of the players. The CORRELATED 
treatment condition provides reference outcomes and informs the players that the 
value of the common surplus that the other pair divided is identical (i.e., perfectly 
correlated) to the common surplus of the players. 
2.2.5 Hypotheses
The bargaining process
Regardless of the experimental condition, we expect that any bargaining process will 
be characterized by proposals that—in terms of their pay off to the players—will 
initially exceed the players’ expected outcome and are revised downward over time, 
reflecting the union and firm players’ concession curves (cf. Hicks, 1932). Thus, union 
players will start by making relatively high proposals, and firm players will start by 
making relatively low proposals. Players’ proposals are subsequently expected to 
converge during the bargaining process.
 Rational players would aim for proposals that maximize their pay-off but are 
feasible to reach agreement, avoiding the pay-off of zero points. The union player 
does not know the value of the common surplus, but (s)he is aware that the firm 
player does. While anticipating that proposals that exceed the common surplus will 
not be accepted by the firm, union players will use the bargaining process to assess 
the highest acceptable proposal given the value of the common surplus. The firm 
player, in contrast, will use the bargaining process to convince the union player to 
make or accept the smallest possible proposal. 
 However, we know that observed bargaining behavior does not conform to the 
predictions based exclusively on the assumptions of rationality. Rather, there is a 
clear tendency toward an equal division of the common surplus (cf. Güth and Tietz, 
1990; Camerer and Thaler, 1995). If that tendency holds, our bargaining game turns 
into a coordination problem between two players who must divide a common surplus 
equally under the condition of asymmetric information about the size of the surplus. 
We propose that the initial salient focal point (Schelling, 1960) for the union player is 
a proposal of 12 points, which represents half of the expected value of the total 
surplus (24). Moreover, both players know that a proposal of 12 points reflects the 
highest possible proposal that never leaves the firm player with a loss. 
 We first develop hypotheses from the perspective that spillovers arise from social 
comparisons exclusively. Subsequently, we develop hypotheses from the perspective 
47
Horizontal spillovers and conflict in wage bargaining
2
that spillovers can also arise from rational learning provided that the common surplus 
is correlated. In both cases, we first evaluate the relationship between the reference 
outcomes and the opening proposals in the two treatment conditions to establish the 
initial impact of spillovers, followed by hypotheses about differences in the level of 
conflict between all three conditions. 
Social comparison hypotheses
Opening proposals
The social comparison mechanism assumes that reference outcomes become 
salient regardless of their association with the actual total surplus. Hence, spillovers 
are expected to occur under both the UNCORRELATED and the CORRELATED 
treatment conditions. 
 The impact of reference outcomes through social comparisons is determined by 
the salience a negotiator attaches to them relative to the initial salient focal point. 
Taking into account that players have a self-serving bias, we may well assume that 
the salience of the reference outcome depends on its favorability to the player. For 
union players, reference outcomes lower than 12 points are always unfavorable 
compared to the initial salient focal point, whereas reference outcomes exceeding 12 
points become increasingly favorable. We expect that the presence of a favorable 
reference outcome induces a frame switch from the initial focal point (12 points) to the 
value of the reference outcome. Hence, we expect the value of the reference outcomes 
to positively affect trade union negotiators’ opening proposals, but only for reference 
outcomes with a value larger than 12. 
 
In the UNCORRELATED and CORRELATED treatment conditions, higher values of the 
reference outcome are associated with higher values of the union player’s opening 
proposals. This positive association only exists for values of the reference outcome 
exceeding 12 points. (Hypothesis 1) 
Conflict in bargaining
In the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, reference outcomes have no bearing 
on the value of the common surplus, and spillovers can only result from social 
comparisons. Due to self-serving biases, union players increase their demands in the 
presence of high reference outcomes but ignore low reference outcomes. In contrast, 
firm players attach salience to relatively low reference outcomes to exploit their 
presence to achieve agreements that are more favorable to them while not responding 
to relatively high and therefore unfavorable reference outcomes. As a result, the 
self-serving biases of both players result in a divergence in proposals between the 
two players. Hence, the level of conflict in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition 
will be higher than that in the CONTROL condition, indicated by the difference 
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between their proposals. In addition, the probability of non-agreement will be higher 
because higher divergence will make it more difficult to find a mutually acceptable 
proposal before the deadline. 
The divergence in proposals is higher for negotiations in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition than in the CONTROL condition. (Hypothesis 2a)
The probability of non-agreement is higher for negotiations in the UNCORRELATED 
treatment condition than in the CONTROL condition. (Hypothesis 2b)
Rational learning hypotheses
Opening proposals
Contrary to social comparisons, rational learning will only take place when the 
reference outcome is correlated with the true value of the common surplus and the 
players are aware of this. In the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, the common 
surplus in the negotiation yielding the reference outcome is not known to the players 
and can be any even value between 12 and 36 with equal probability. 
 By contrast, in the CORRELATED treatment condition, the correlation of firm 
states is perfect, and this is common knowledge. Thus, the union player may rationally 
learn about the feasibility of the proposals in this treatment condition. We assume 
that the union player holds the belief that firm players will never make or accept a 
proposal exceeding the value of the common surplus (leaving the firm with a loss).22 
When firm states are perfectly correlated, the reference outcome reveals the minimum 
value of the common surplus. In the extreme case of an accepted proposal of 36 points, 
the common surplus is revealed to be 36. For lower reference outcomes, the common 
surplus is revealed to be in the range between the reference outcome and 36. 
 If union players expect that the players in other negotiations behave strictly 
rationally, they cannot improve their information about the common surplus with 
reference outcomes smaller than or equal to 12 points (the smallest possible value of 
the common surplus). However, we have already noted that players use fairness 
considerations as a heuristic in bargaining, anticipating that negotiations will move 
toward outcomes that represent an approximately equal division of the common 
surplus. In this case, union players will interpret the reference outcome as representing 
approximately half of the total surplus and condition their proposals on this 
information. Consequently, all reference outcomes in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition are evaluated by the union player as being relevant for ascertaining the 
22 This assumption is supported by our experimental findings. Out of 403 observed accepted proposals, 
only three exceeded the value of the surplus. 
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common surplus.23 As a result, the value of the reference outcome should be linearly 
related to the union player’s opening proposals. This leads to the following hypothesis:
In the CORRELATED treatment condition, higher values of the reference outcome are 
associated with higher values of the union player’s opening proposal over the whole 
range of observed reference outcome values. (Hypothesis 3) 
Conflict in bargaining
With the introduction of reference outcomes that reveal information about the state of 
the firm (in the CORRELATED treatment condition), the information asymmetry 
between the two players is reduced. This has consequences for the level of conflict 
in bargaining. Players now know that the reference outcomes hold information about 
the common surplus, and they know that the other player knows this. Rather than 
either side attaching salience to ‘irrelevant’ reference outcomes in a self-serving 
fashion, as is expected to occur in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, rational 
learning implies that the salience of the reference outcomes is dictated by their 
relevance to the common surplus. Thus, union players’ proposals will increase with 
increasing reference outcomes, but increasing reference outcomes themselves are 
associated with higher actual values of the common surplus. Moreover, union players 
are expected to moderate their proposals in the presence of low, unfavorable 
reference outcomes. For firm players, it will be more difficult to selectively ignore high 
reference outcomes and hide behind proposals that are far below the equal split of 
the common surplus. This is a consequence of the union players’ knowledge of the 
correlation between the reference outcome and the value of the common surplus. 
Compared to the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, self-serving biases are less 
likely to occur in both players in the CORRELATED treatment condition. We therefore 
expect less conflict in the latter condition.24 
The divergence in proposals is lower for negotiations in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. (Hypothesis 4a) 
23  Reference outcomes that are lower than half of the lowest possible total surplus (<6) would reveal 
‘greedy’ firm players but may still be indicative of low surplus values if union players expect limited 
greed. This situation was rare in our experiment, with only 4.7% of the negotiations in the CORRELAT-
ED and UNCORRELATED treatments receiving a reference outcomes that took the lowest observed 
value of 5 points. 
24 Note that if spillovers would only result from rational learning, conflict should also be lower in the COR-
RELATED treatment condition than in the CONTROL condition due to the reduced information asym-
metry. In this case, reference outcomes would not affect bargaining in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition at all because there exists no opportunities for learning. Given the well documented effects 
of social comparisons in previous studies, we do not here formulate these specific hypotheses. 
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The probability of non-agreement is lower for negotiations in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. (Hypothesis 4b) 
2.3 Procedure
We collected our data in October 2012 in the NSM Decision Lab at Radboud University 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. The experiment was programmed and implemented in a 
computerized environment using ‘z-Tree’ (Fishbacher, 2007). A total of 70 students 
participated in the experiments, and none participated in more than one session. 
Each session lasted approximately 1.5 hours excluding the payment of the 
participants, yielding 14 periods of interaction that will be analyzed in this paper.25 
 Upon entering the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned to a 
computer cubicle. The computer program assigned half of the participants in a 
session to the role of the firm (referred to as PLAYER A in the experiment) and half to 
the role of the union (referred to as PLAYER B in the experiment). In the first session, 
the CONTROL condition was implemented (see Appendix A1.1 for the full instructions 
and screens used in this condition). In the following sessions, the computer program 
assigned each participant to either the CORRELATED treatment condition or the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition (see Appendix A1.2 for the full instructions and 
screens used in these conditions). Participants remained in the same role and 
condition throughout. After each period, the participants were randomly re-matched 
to a different opponent. We collected data on 20 participants in the CONTROL condition, 
26 participants in the CORRELATED treatment condition and 24 participants in the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition 
 Participants earned points during the experiment. The exchange rate for these 
points was 1 point = 6 Euro cents. On average, the participants earned 13.88 Euro 
(σ=1.56) in the experiment, including the show-up fee of three Euro.26
 Written instructions for the main experiment were read aloud by one of the 
experimenters. All of the participants’ questions were subsequently answered privately by 
the experimenters. The participants were then asked to answer a set of test questions 
to ensure that every participant fully understood the rules of the game and the payoff 
25 The players interacted for 15 periods, but due to a software glitch, the variable surplus in the final 
period of interaction (period 15) did not take the correct value in the CONTROL treatment. As this 
would eradicate the perfect correlation between the surplus in the reference outcome and the actual 
surplus in the CORRELATED treatment, we decided not to include the data from this final period in our 
analyses.
26 The payment also includes small fee for a pen-and-paper pre-experiment unrelated to this study, 
distributed in all treatments. This pre-experiment lasted a few minutes, and subjects received no feed-
back about its outcomes before participating the our bargaining game in order to avoid any cross- 
effects.
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structure. All participants passed this test without difficulty. The experiment began 
with two unpaid trial periods. All participants were paid their earnings in cash 
immediately after the experiment. 
2.4 Experimental evidence
In this section, we first present a graphic representation of the bargaining process for 
the control condition and the two treatment conditions. Subsequently, we provide a 
more detailed analysis of the impact of spillovers on the bargaining process, starting 
with an analysis of the opening proposals and followed by an analysis of the 
divergence in proposals during bargaining and the probability that non-agreement 
will occur. Because the values of the common surplus and reference outcomes vary 
across individual negotiations within the treatments, an aggregate analysis would 
produce biased results. Therefore, we introduce multivariate analyses that control for 
these variations as well as for potential biases arising from repeated observations 
within participants. 
2.4.1 The bargaining process: an illustration
Figure 2.1 summarizes all observed union and firm player proposals (N=5,635) 
during the 60-second bargaining time in the experimental conditions. For each 
condition, two (loess regression) lines are drawn: one representing the union player’s 
Figure 2.1 Union and firm player proposals over time, loess regression lines
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proposals (as expected with a high average starting value and downward slope) and 
another representing the firm player’s proposals (as expected with a low average 
starting value and an upward slope). Figure 2.1 clearly shows that in all three 
conditions, the union player’s and the firm player’s proposals converge during the 
bargaining process. This finding supports our behavioral assumption that players will 
converge during bargaining. Figure 1 also provides some initial, preliminary insights 
into our theoretical expectations. First, we observe that the evolution of union and firm 
players’ proposals is virtually identical in the CORRELATED and CONTROL conditions. 
In the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, union proposals are noticeably higher 
early in the bargaining process, resulting in a higher level of divergence. However, the 
rate at which union proposals decrease and hence the rate at which proposals 
converge is also higher, resulting in increasingly similar levels of divergence in the 
three conditions as the deadline approaches. On the aggregate, social comparisons 
in isolation appear to increase initial conflict, but the bargaining process mitigates 
this effect. 
2.4.2 Multivariate analyses
Opening proposals 
Opening proposals are limited to a maximum of 36 points, and this value is dispro-
portionally often chosen. We fit tobit regression models that take into account this 
censoring with a subject-specific random effect for each union player to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The period of interaction is also controlled by including a 
continuous period-effect in each model.27
 The results are presented in Table 2.1. Models 1a and 1b estimate the linear 
effects of the value of the reference outcomes on the opening proposals in the 
UNCORRELATED and CORRELATED treatment conditions, respectively. For non- 
agreement reference outcomes, this variable is set to zero. A dummy variable for 
these non-agreements is included in all models to control for their potentially 
differential impact. For Models 2a and 2b, a dummy indicating that the reference 
outcome exceeds 12 points and its product with the value of the reference outcome 
are added. In this way, the effect of the reference outcome is conditioned on its 
position vis-à-vis the hypothesized initial focal point of 12 points, allowing us to test 
whether the effect of the reference outcome changes when reference outcomes 
exceed 12 points. 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that in both treatment conditions, higher reference outcomes 
are associated with higher opening proposals, but only when the reference outcome 
exceeds 12 points. In the UNCORRELATED treatment conditions, there is no 
27 Alternative model specifications using a full set of period dummies for all analyses presented in the 
manuscript did not change our findings.
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significant linear effect of the reference outcomes (Model 1a). However, Model 1b 
shows that there is, in fact, a non-linear, V-shaped effect28, showing that union players 
significantly increase their opening proposals the more the reference outcomes 
deviate in either direction from the hypothesized initial focal point of 12 points. In line 
with hypothesis 1, reference outcomes thus lead to higher opening proposals only 
once they exceed 12 points. However, although no effect was expected for reference 
outcomes < 12 under hypothesis 1, we find a significant negative effect with 
increasingly low reference outcomes associated with increasingly high opening 
proposals. No such non-linear effect is found in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition. Here, a significant linear effect is found (Model 1b), but there is no evidence 
that this effect changes when reference outcomes fall below 12 points (Model 2b).29 
This finding supports hypothesis 3, which states that in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition, the reference outcome value is linearly related to the opening proposals 
over the whole range of observed outcome values. In this condition, every increase 
in the reference outcome increases the predicted opening proposal. 
Divergence 
Divergence is measured by subtracting the current firm proposal from the current 
union proposal for every proposal made in a negotiation by either player. The resulting 
value is the difference between union demands and firm offers for every given 
proposal. The variable measuring divergence is not afflicted by censoring, allowing 
us to fit linear models. However, each negotiation can have multiple observations 
(10.8 on average) and is nested within the randomly rematched union and firm 
players. The data structure is thus observed as divergences nested in negotiations, 
which are cross-classified in players. Random effects were estimated to account for 
this data structure. All models include control variables for the period of interaction, 
the value of the variable surplus and the time within the 60-second bargaining 
process at which divergence was observed. 
 In Table 2.2, three models are presented that analyze the level of divergence 
throughout the bargaining process. By including time as an independent variable, 
the timing of the observed divergences in the bargaining process is controlled for. 
The (negative) coefficient of this variable captures the decrease in divergence during 
the bargaining process, that is, the rate of convergence per second. Model 1 pools 
all treatments and includes treatment dummies and their interaction with time. In this 
way, the initial differences in divergence between the conditions are estimated, given 
28 The addition of the > 12 dummy and its interaction improves model fit in the UNCORRELATED 
 treatment (LR χ2 = 18.49; p=0.0001). The effect of the reference outcomes when they are =<12  is 
given by the b of the main effect (-0.566). For reference outcomes > 12, the effect is given by adding 
the b’s of the main effect and the interaction effect (-0.566+1.612=1.046).
29 The addition of the > 12 dummy and its interaction does not improve model fit (LR χ2 = 0.58; p=0.7486).
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by adding the coefficients of the treatment dummies to the intercept. The rate of 
convergence in each condition is also estimated, given by adding the coefficients of 
time to the coefficient of the respective interaction term. The (nonlinear) impact of the 
value of the reference outcomes on divergence during the bargaining process is 
estimated for the UNCORRELATED treatment condition in Model 2, whereas Model 3 
estimates their (linear) impact in the CORRELATED treatment condition.30  
 Divergence is, at least initially, higher in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition 
than in the CONTROL condition, supporting hypothesis 2a. It is also higher in the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition than in the CORRELATED treatment condition, 
as predicted under hypothesis 4a. However, the rate of convergence is also 
significantly higher in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition than in the other two 
conditions. 
 At values =< 12 points, decreasing reference outcome values lead to increasing 
divergence in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. During the bargaining 
process, this increase in divergence is mitigated. For reference outcomes >12, there 
is no significant effect.31 In the CORRELATED treatment condition, divergence linearly 
increases (decreases) with higher (lower) references outcomes. Here too, the effect 
is mediated during the bargaining process. Figure 2.2 illustrates the marginal effects 
and the associated 95% confidence intervals of the value of the reference outcomes 
on divergence during the bargaining process, taking into account all interaction 
effects. The upper graph shows the marginal effect in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition, which is initially positive but decreases over bargaining time and becomes 
insignificant later in the bargaining process. The lower graph show the marginal 
effects for reference outcomes =< 12 (dashed line) and for reference outcomes > 12 
(tight dotted line). The former is initially negative but increases toward zero over 
bargaining time and becomes insignificant later in the bargaining process, whereas 
the latter never reaches significance.
Non-agreements and agreements
Non-agreements are analyzed using logistic regression models, presented in Table 2.3. 
All models incorporate crossed subject-specific random effects and control for the 
period of interaction and the value of the variable surplus. In Model 1, all conditions 
are pooled, and differences in the probability of non-agreement between the 
conditions are estimated by including dummy variables for the CONTROL condition 
and the CORRELATED treatment condition, with the UNCORRELATED treatment 
30 Additional analyses confirmed that these are the appropriate specifications. Both models were esti-
mated for both treatments and the three-way interaction in Model 2 was omitted in favour of separate 
estimations for reference outcomes =< 12 and > 12 in the UNCORRELATED treatment.
31 Additional analyses show that divergence is however also higher in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
than in the CORRELATED treatment for reference outcomes>12.
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Figure 2.2 Marginal effect of reference value on divergence (95% CI) Ta
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condition serving as the reference category. The effect of the reference outcome 
value on the probability of non-agreements is estimated for the CORRELATED 
treatment condition in Model 2 and the UNCORRELATED treatment condition in 
Model 3. This effect is modeled, following the functional form established in the 
previous analyses, with a linear effect in Model 2 and a non-linear effect that changes 
at 12 points in Model 3. 
 The estimates for the CONTROL and CORRELATED dummies in Model 1 are not 
significant, indicating that there are no differences in the probability of non-agreement 
between the UNCORRELATED treatment condition and the other two conditions. 
This finding refutes hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 4b, which predict a higher 
probability of non-agreement in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition than in the 
CONTROL condition and the CORRELATED treatment condition, respectively. Model 2 
and Model 3 show that the value of the reference outcome does not significantly 
affect the occurrence of non-agreements in either of the treatment conditions. 
 We also estimate the impact of the reference outcome value on the agreements, 
that is, the value of the accepted proposals (Appendix A2, Table A2.4), in both 
treatments, testing for a linear effect as well as a non-linear effect that changes when 
reference outcomes exceed 12 points. The findings show that accepted proposals 
linearly increase with the value of the reference outcome in the CORRELATED 
treatment condition. In the UNCORRELATED treatment, accepted proposals also 
increase with the value of the reference outcome but only when it exceeds 12 points, 
whereas there is no significant relationship with the accepted proposals when the 
reference outcomes are below 12 points.  
2.5 Conclusion
We aimed to investigate how information about other negotiations influences conflict 
in bargaining under conditions that only allow for social comparisons and conditions 
that also allow for rational learning. Six hypotheses were tested with the aid of a 
bargaining experiment. An overview of our findings is presented in Table 2.4. 
 The social comparison mechanism is sufficient to induce spillovers. These 
spillovers result in increased levels of conflict as measured by the divergence of 
union and firm proposals compared to bargaining without spillovers. However, the 
nature of spillovers changes when rational learning is possible, such that conflicts 
resulting from social comparisons and self-serving biases are prevented. Learning 
itself is facilitated by the union’s anticipation of the impact of equity and fairness on 
observed outcomes in other negotiations, which are interpreted as equal splits. 
 When learning is possible, union demands and the level of conflict decrease with 
lower reference outcomes. However, when spillovers result from social comparisons 
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exclusively, increasingly low and unfavorable (i.e., below the initial salient focal point) 
reference outcomes lead to higher union demands and more divergence. This latter 
finding may be attributable to unions’ escalation of their demands when confronted 
with reference outcomes that are increasingly unfavorable to them but are 
fundamentally irrelevant to the firm’s ability to pay in an effort to prevent the potential 
self-serving exploitation of such reference outcomes by the firm. 
 As a caveat to the interpretation of studies relying on one-shot games, our findings 
suggest that the impact of spillovers on conflict is strongly mitigated when negotiators 
are allowed to bargain interactively. However, higher reference outcomes translate into 
more eventually accepted proposals, both when learning is possible and when spillovers 
result from social comparisons. In the latter case, this effect only holds for reference 
outcomes that are favorable to the union compared to the initial salient reference point. 
 Previous studies of the impact of spillovers on conflict in wage bargaining yielded 
conflicting results. A potential explanation is that social comparisons and rational 
learning are theoretically and empirically intertwined. Spillovers do not occur only 
when they provide information relevant to firms’ ability to pay. Comparisons matter 
and can lead to conflicts. Where opportunities for learning are relatively abundant, 
however, conflicting interpretations of reference outcomes may be reduced. The 
presence of conflict-decreasing spillovers could consequently result from the mitigation 
of social comparisons rather than being indicative of conflict-decreasing effects in 
their own right.
 One might argue that learning does not take place at all and that conflict reduction 
simply results from increasing the salience of potential reference points for social 
comparisons. However, in our design, this increase in salience would be due to 
informing the players of the identical surplus value, that is, making learning possible. 
This raises the question of whether salience can be boosted for a similar effect 
without creating possibilities for learning; this is a question that future research should 
address. Moreover, our study raises the question of whether and how the relative 
impact of social comparison effects and rational learning could be varied when both 
mechanisms can operate. Furthermore, additional treatments may be explored that 
incorporate reference outcomes from negotiations with an unknown range and 
probability of common surplus values of the other pair or with information about the 
exact common surplus value of the other pair.  
 Another potential extension of this research is the incorporation of spillovers that 
reveal information about the costs and benefits of conflict (see also Chapter 5) by 
modeling correlations between the outside options in different bargaining units. 
Empirical research using natural data may benefit from recognizing that average 
effects may capture different and potentially counteracting spillover effects. Survey 
data of negotiators may help to systematically identify salient reference points (e.g., 
Babckock et al. 1996; Bewely, 1999).
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3
Horizontal and vertical 
spillovers in wage bargaining: 
experimental evidence32
32 A slightly different version of this chapter has been submitted for publication in Group Decision and 
Negotiation (current status: under review). An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the IREC 
– ESA-RN 17 Joint Conference in Dublin, Ireland, September 2014. Co-authors are Jana Vyrastekova, 
Agnes Akkerman and René Torenvlied. 
66
Abstract 
Conflict in wage bargaining is affected by information about other bargaining units 
and information about the past of the bargaining unit. We develop a theoretical 
framework for such spillovers and detail four distinct mechanisms. Rational learning 
and social comparisons are reviewed as mechanisms for the influence of information 
about other bargaining units, and reputation and expectation effects are reviewed as 
mechanisms for the influence of information about the past of the bargaining unit. 
Building upon a previous experimental study, we implement an unstructured, time- 
limited, two-person bargaining game with asymmetric information and investigate 
the impact of reputation and expectation effects. The experimental treatments vary 
with respect to spillover-inducing information available to the participants. The results 
suggest that reputation effects decrease conflict, whereas expectation effects tend to 
increase conflict. Moreover, reputation effects diminish the influence of social 
comparisons but can augment the effects of rational learning.
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[An employee] ‘…feels, not only that his interests have been damaged […] but also 
that he has been cheated of a legitimate expectation […] if […] an employer merely 
refuses a demand for an advance made on the ground of fairness – because wages 
in similar firms, or associated trades, are rising.’ (Hicks, 1932: 138) 
‘If an employer cuts wages too far [...] He will get the reputation of standing out for the 
last penny when he gets the chance […]. “Bad employers”, it appears to the workman, 
are people who seize every chance of cutting rates; “good” employers have not this 
bad habit, and consequently maintain better relations.’ (Hicks, 1932: 55) 
3.1 Introduction
In his seminal work The Theory of Wages, Hicks (1932) explicitly recognized that 
conflict in wage negotiations is affected by the negotiations’ social and historical 
context. However, in most models of wage bargaining offered by the scholars that 
followed in Hicks’ footsteps, negotiations were treated as independent events (see 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969 and the ensuing literature). In recent decades, 
however, mounting empirical evidence for patterns of influence between negotiations 
in different bargaining units has emerged (e.g., Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein, 
1996; Babcock Engberg and Greenbaum, 2005; Gu and Kuhn, 1998; Kuhn and Gu, 
1998, 1999; Lehr et al., 2014, 2015). There is also growing empirical evidence that 
there exist patterns of influence between past and present negotiations within the 
same bargaining unit (e.g., Mauro, 1982; Schnell and Gramm, 1987; McConnell, 
1989; Campolieti, Hebdon and Hyatt, 2005, Lehr et al., 2014, 2015; c.f. Blinder and 
Choi, 1990; Agell and Lundborg, 1995, 2003; Bewely, 1999). We refer to patterns of 
influence between negotiations as ‘spillovers’. If spillovers occur between different 
bargaining units, we refer to them as ‘horizontal spillovers’. If spillovers occur between 
past and present negotiations within the same bargaining unit, we refer to them as 
‘vertical spillovers’.33 This paper studies the impact of these spillovers on conflict as 
indicated by the divergence between union demands and firm offers in wage 
bargaining. 
 Even though conflict in wage bargaining is known to be subject to both horizontal 
and vertical spillovers, very little is known about the joint impact of these different 
spillovers. Moreover, various theoretical mechanisms have been proposed as 
explanations for either type of spillover. These mechanisms are based on one of two 
core assumptions. One of these assumptions is that that spillovers occur because 
33 We borrow this terminology from evolutionary medicine and memetics, where diseases, ideas or be-
haviour may spread across members of the same species (horizontal transmission), or over succes-
sive generations within the same family (vertical transmission). 
68
information about other negotiations allows principally rational negotiators to reduce 
their uncertainty about private information aspects of their own current negotiations. 
The alternative assumption relaxes rationality assumptions and states that spillovers 
occur because information about other negotiations changes the preferences of 
negotiators in their own current negotiations. 
 The theoretical mechanisms based on these different assumptions yield contradictory 
predictions about the impact of spillovers on conflict in wage bargaining. Moreover, 
the different spillover mechanisms have predominantly been studied separately 
without taking into account their joint impact and potential interactions. What is 
lacking is 1) a coherent framework within which to study the horizontal and vertical 
spillovers resulting from different mechanisms and 2) adequate knowledge of the 
impact of spillovers resulting from different and possibly simultaneously operating 
mechanisms on conflict. This knowledge gap is aggravated by empirical difficulties 
in adequately identifying spillovers using traditional econometric data34 related to the 
inherently ambiguous choice of appropriate reference negotiations to investigate and 
the potential for spurious correlations due to environmental factors. 
 In this study, we present a theoretical framework for studying horizontal and 
vertical spillovers, each resulting from different mechanisms. Building on a previous 
study of horizontal spillovers (Chapter 2) taken in isolation, we study the impact of 
vertical spillovers in an environment that also allows for horizontal spillovers using a 
bargaining experiment. Two causal mechanisms for vertical spillovers are investigated: 
reputation effects and expectation effects. We thus address the following research 
question: how do vertical spillovers resulting from reputation effects and expectation 
effects influence conflict in wage bargaining? 
 The experimental method allows for complete control over the information available 
to the negotiators and therefore offers three important benefits: 1) the choice of 
investigated reference negotiations becomes unambiguous; 2) spurious correlations 
due to environmental factors are prevented; and 3) the ability to manipulate the 
information available to the negotiators enables us to identify different mechanisms 
as causes of spillover. 
 We implement a two-person (union and firm negotiator) unstructured bargaining 
game with asymmetric information using a 2x2 treatment design and a control condition. 
The treatment conditions provide subjects with information about the negotiations of 
others. One treatment condition varies whether the firm negotiator in the other negotiation 
34 Establishing horizontal spillovers is complicated by the necessarily a priori and to some extent arbi-
trary choice of investigated reference negotiations, and sensitive to spurious correlations (c.f. Mitchell, 
1982; Manski, 1993). For vertical spillovers, the appropriate reference negotiation less ambiguous 
but the separation of ‘true’ influences from the past (i.e. state dependence) from the influences of 
unobserved variables affecting repeated bargaining events (i.e. population heterogeneity) is often 
problematic (c.f. Heckman, 1991). 
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has an unknown ability to pay or the other firm negotiator has an identical ability pay. 
The other treatment varies whether subjects receive information about the firm 
negotiator’s relative earnings in the previous negotiation. We analyze the impact of 
the resulting horizontal and vertical spillovers on the level of conflict between the 
union and firm negotiators as indicated by the divergence between their proposals 
during the bargaining process.35 
3.2 Theoretical framework
3.2.1 Basic assumptions
The theoretical framework presented here is based on a number of assumptions. 
First, we assume that wage bargaining can be modeled as the division of an economic 
surplus (Abowd, 1989)36, the value of which is known to the firm but not to the union.37 
This information asymmetry entails that only a firm knows about its own state, that is, 
how much is ‘on the table’ in the negotiation.38 There is abundant empirical evidence 
that this fundamental information asymmetry in wage bargaining is one of the chief 
causes of conflict (Hayes, 1984; Kennan and Wilson, 1989; McConnell, 1989; Card, 
1990; cf. Cramton and Tracy, 2003). Second, we assume that in addition to uncertainty 
about the state of the firm, wage bargaining is characterized by negotiators’ 
uncertainty about the type of their opponent, who may be ‘greedy’ or ‘fair’. Thus, 
wage bargaining takes place in a context of ‘state uncertainty’ and ‘type uncertainty’ 
due to private information about these aspects. Third, we assume that negotiators will 
use information that allows them to reduce each of these uncertainties. This entails 
that spillovers can result from a process of uncertainty reduction about private 
information aspects through the use of information about other negotiations. Fourth, 
35 We do not analyze potential differences in the probability of non-agreements occurring. Our previous 
findings (Chapter 2) strongly suggest spillover effects on conflict do not persist throughout the  bargaining 
process and consequently do not change non-agreement rates in this experimental  design. Additional 
analyses confirmed this pattern for the effects studied here. 
36 I.e. we consider the distributive rather than the integrative aspect of bargaining (c.f. Walton and  
McKersie, 1965). 
37 Although popularized in the game theoretic bargaining literature of the 1980’s, the notion that workers 
and their representatives are at an information disadvantage compared to employers regarding the 
latter’s ability and willingness to bear the cost of labor, and that this information asymmetry leads to 
conflict, can be traced back as far as the work of Hicks (1932: 139) and Marx ([1853]in Lapides 1987: 47). 
38 It may be argued that wage bargaining is about the division of an economic surplus that will be realized 
in the future and, as the future is uncertain, firm’s do not posses perfect information about the size of 
the surplus. The information asymmetry in this case is about the firm’s willingness to pay rather than 
about its ability to pay. It is however reasonable to assume that firms do hold superior information 
about their future state and that their expectations about their future ability to pay are major determinants of 
their current willingness to pay. Consequently, whether information asymmetry is viewed as relating to their 
‘willingness to pay’ or ‘ability to pay’ is not crucial for the theoretical considerations presented here. 
70
we assume that negotiators’ preferences are reference-dependent (cf. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979). Consequently, comparisons to reference points affect negotiators’ 
preferred outcomes. This entails that spillovers can result from negotiators’ reference- 
dependent preferences, which are affected by information about other negotiations. 
The third and fourth assumptions are the underpinnings of two mechanisms for 
horizontal spillovers and two mechanisms for vertical spillovers. These mechanisms 
are summarized in Table 3.1 and will now be discussed in more detail. 
3.2.2   Uncertainty reduction about private information:  
rational learning and reputation effects 
The assumption that spillovers take place because negotiators use information about 
other negotiations to reduce uncertainty about private information is the basis for two 
mechanisms: 1) rational learning, which causes horizontal spillovers, and 2) reputation 
effects, which cause vertical spillovers. 
 Horizontal spillovers due to rational learning occur when the ability of different 
firms to pay wages is positively correlated, such as when these firms operate in the 
same sector and therefore face identical product market conditions or technological 
shocks. When such a correlation is present, unions can reduce their uncertainty 
about the state of the firm they are bargaining with by observing negotiations in 
similar firms (Burgess, 1988; Kuhn and Gu 1999). Unions then base their demands 
on the observed settlements (or strikes) in other bargaining units. Note that in this 
case, unions are only affected by information about other bargaining units because 
this allows them to reduce their uncertainty about the firm’s ability to pay; that is, the 
use of this information is strictly rational. This mechanism for horizontal spillovers may 
consequently be referred to as ‘rational learning’. Because the initial information 
asymmetry between the union and the firm about the firm’s ability to pay is an 
important cause of conflict, the rational learning mechanism leads to the prediction 
that horizontal spillovers reduce the level of conflict in bargaining.
 Vertical spillovers due to reputation effects occur when negotiators have information 
about the past behavior of the opposing negotiator. Under the assumption that 
Table 3.1  Four mechanisms of spillovers 
Type of spillover Basic assumption
Uncertainty reduction  
about private information
Reference-dependent  
preferences
Horizontal Rational learning Social comparisons
Vertical Reputation effects Expectation effects
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behavioral types are stable, this information allows negotiators to reduce their 
uncertainty about the behavioral type of the opposing negotiator, which is strictly 
rational in this sense. The effect of information about these stable behavioral patterns, 
or reputations (cf. Roth and Schoumaker, 1983, Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Abreu and 
Gul 2000), on other negotiators’ bargaining behavior thus constitutes a mechanism 
for vertical spillovers. Reputation effects become especially important when there 
exists some information asymmetry between actors that interact repeatedly (cf. 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1981). These conditions are clearly present in wage bargaining, 
which occurs at regular intervals for any bargaining unit and in which firms know their 
behavioral type and their ability to pay, whereas unions are uncertain about these 
aspects of the negotiation. Conversely, firms are uncertain about the behavioral type 
of the union; hence, both sides of the bargaining table may build reputations. 
However, it is particularly the firm’s reputation that is of interest. The firm’s reputation 
not only conveys information about its behavioral type to the union but indirectly also 
conveys information about the firm’s state, namely, its ability to pay. Thus, ‘type 
uncertainty’ is not independent from ‘state uncertainty’ here. Although a firm’s offers 
may reveal its state to the union, the credibility that unions assign to these offers will 
depend on the type of firm it believes it is negotiating with based on the firm’s 
reputation. 
 We argue that the reputation mechanism offers a way of reducing the level of 
conflict in bargaining. In principle, firms can abuse their informational advantage by 
convincing unions to accept relatively low wages even when the firm’s ability to pay is 
actually high. However, at some time after the wage agreement is signed, the firm’s 
true ability to pay will be revealed, such as through accounting information in financial 
statements. Unions are then able to ascertain the fairness of past wage offers. The 
firm would consequently enter future negotiations with a reputation for greediness, 
and the union would no longer interpret the firm’s wage offers as an accurate 
representation of its ability to pay. However, when firms make wage offers or accept 
wage demands that represent a fair share of common economic surplus, they create 
a reputation that credibly signals their fairness to the unions. This reputation insures 
that the unions will continue to take firms’ wage offers in future negotiations as 
reflections of the firms’ ability to pay and mitigate their demands or lowest acceptable 
offers in response to the firms’ bargaining behavior. Especially when economic 
circumstances adversely affect firms’ ability to pay, their reputations may help 
convince unions to accept a low offer or to lower their demands. The unions then 
interpret the firms’ offers as a credible signal of a low ability to pay rather than 
posturing. In the organizational literature, it is particularly well recognized that firms 
can benefit from investing in positive reputations (Lange, Lee and Dai, 2011), including 
reputations for being good employers (e.g., Turban and Cable, 2003). Indeed, a 
qualitative analysis of wage setting in the US (Bewley, 1999) suggests that reputations 
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that inspire trust in management among unions and employees are highly beneficial 
for firms seeking to peacefully restrain wage increases or even cut wages when they 
face economic adversity. 
3.2.3  Reference-dependent preferences: social comparisons  
and expectation effects
The assumption that spillovers take place because negotiators’ preferences are 
 reference-dependent is also the basis for two mechanisms: 1) social comparisons, 
which cause horizontal spillovers, and 2) expectation effects, which cause vertical 
spillovers. 
 Horizontal spillovers due to social comparisons occur when individuals compare 
themselves to relevant others39 (cf. Festinger, 1954). In the wage bargaining context, 
such comparisons entail that the wage rate in one firm influences what workers in 
another firm consider acceptable wages (Rees, 1993; Bewely, 1999; Babcock et al. 
2005). Thus, bargaining outcomes in other firms become reference points (cf. Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1979) for the workers. Because union negotiators represent the 
interests of these workers, the result is that the union negotiators’ preferences in 
bargaining will be affected by information about bargaining outcomes in other firms.
Firm negotiators are less susceptible to making comparisons due to their superior 
information about their own ability to pay (see also Chapter 2). However, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that the firm negotiators are immune to making comparisons. 
However, union and firm negotiators are likely to take different negotiations as salient 
reference points. Although the union will perceive relatively high wages achieved 
elsewhere as more attractive reference points, the firm negotiator will prefer to be 
guided by relatively low wages elsewhere. This ‘self-serving bias’ in the evaluation of 
reference points (Babcock et al. 1995, 1997) will increase the divergence between 
the union negotiators’ preferences and the firm negotiators’ preferences and hence 
the level of conflict in bargaining. 
 Vertical spillovers due to expectation effects occur when individuals compare 
their potential future outcomes to their past outcomes. In the wage bargaining 
context, past wage agreements become reference points against which workers and 
negotiators evaluate potential future wages. In this way, information about past 
negotiations and their outcomes leads to expectation effects. 
 As with social comparisons, there is no a priori reason to believe that firm 
negotiators are immune to expectations, but their knowledge of their own ability to 
39 Note that social comparisons could also be interpreted as a way of reducing uncertainty. However, 
it is not uncertainty about fundamental aspects of the bargaining situations and that are subject to 
private information that is reduced, but rather the uncertainty an actor experiences about his own 
opinions and evaluations. Under strict rationality assumptions, these uncertainties are irrelevant and 
consequently would not result in spillovers. 
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pay limits the impact of such expectations. As with social comparisons, it is also 
important to recognize that the way negotiators evaluate past wages as reference 
points is guided by bias. The guiding bias in this case is loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991), or the predisposition of human beings to avoid outcomes that 
entail a loss when compared to another situation deemed relevant. The importance 
of expectation effects is highlighted by empirical research. Wages are found to be 
history-dependent (Card, 1990); past wages are an important determinant of future 
wages. Extensive qualitative research (Bewley, 1999) indicates that workers have 
strong preferences to retain at least their previous wage level under a new contract. 
Previous wage levels thus become workers’ initial minimum acceptable new wage 
levels, and this is echoed by the union negotiators. These expectation effects lead to 
increasing levels of conflict in bargaining when firms are not able to meet expected 
wages due to economic setbacks.
3.2.4 The model
We model wage bargaining as a two-person unstructured bargaining game with 
asymmetric information. The common surplus to be divided has a value that is 
randomly drawn for each negotiation from a uniformly distributed set of possible 
values (see Chapter 2). Firm players know the exact value of the common surplus; 
union players only know the set of possible values and that each value has equal 
probability of being realized. Bargaining starts with a proposal by the union player, 
analogous to trade unions’ initial wage demands in wage bargaining. The bargaining 
process is time limited, and bargaining time is common knowledge. At any moment 
within the allotted bargaining time, both players are free to either wait, make (an 
unrestricted number of) proposals, or accept the other player’s most recent proposal. 
Proposals are bound between zero and the highest potential surplus value, and they 
represent the union players’ earnings if accepted (i.e., the ‘wage rate’). The firm 
players’ earnings are defined as the common surplus minus the accepted proposal 
(i.e., the residual profit after the cost of labor is deducted). Bargaining ends if a 
proposal is accepted or if the allotted bargaining time expires. If no proposal is 
accepted before the deadline, the two players earn the non-agreement payoff of zero 
points. The value of the non-agreement payoffs is common knowledge. 
 The bargaining model captures wage bargaining as an interactive process of 
decision making with a time-increasing risk of suffering the cost of not reaching an 
agreement. This reflects that in wage bargaining, both sides of the bargaining table 
have incentives to aim for the highest possible outcome for themselves but evaluate 
this outcome against the cost of potential conflict (such as strikes, lockouts, or the 
termination of the bargaining unit). The model makes a number of simplifying 
assumptions, most importantly the following: 1) either side of the bargaining table is 
treated as a unitary actor (cf. Ross, 1948; Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969); 2) outside 
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options are equal and common knowledge, which means that either side suffers 
identical costs from not reaching an agreement and knows that these costs are the 
same for their bargaining partner; 3) players cannot withdraw from bargaining before 
the deadline; there are no spontaneous strikes or lockouts. 
 
3.2.5 Experimental design
We implement a repeated bargaining game over the division of a common surplus 
that is defined as 24 points plus a number of additional points. The number of 
additional points can be any even number between -12 and 12 with equal probability 
and is randomly selected from the set of possible values in each period. The common 
surplus could consequently be as low as 12 points or as high as 36 points in any 
given period. The union player only knows that the total surplus will be 24 points plus 
the variable surplus. The firm player knows the number of additional points and 
therefore the actual value of the common surplus. 
 Each pair of players bargains by making proposals that represent the number 
of points that, if accepted, the union player will receive. Negotiations start with an 
opening proposal by the union player, after which both players are free to either make 
any number of proposals in the 0-36 range or accept the other player’s most recent 
proposal. Bargaining time is limited to 60 seconds. During bargaining, the history of 
proposals can be seen by both players. When a proposal is accepted, the union 
player earns the number of points represented by that proposal, whereas the firm 
player earns 24 points plus the additional number of points minus the proposal. After 
each completed negotiation, the players are privately informed about their own 
payoffs. There is no communication between the players other than through the 
proposals that they make. 
 The bargaining game is repeated for 15 periods. One set of 15 values for the additional 
points is randomly drawn before the first experimental session and subsequently 
used for all bargaining units in all sessions. The participants are randomly matched 
to a different opponent in each period. 
 We implement 2x2 experimental treatment conditions and a control condition. 
In the CONTROL condition, which was administered in the first session, the bargaining 
game is executed as described above. In the treatment conditions, which were 
administered in the subsequent sessions, the identical bargaining protocol is implemented 
but with additional information for the players. This additional information is used to 
induce horizontal and vertical spillovers. The complete experimental instructions and 
bargaining screens are reported in Appendix A1.1 for the CONTROL condition, in 
Appendix A1.2 for the CORRELATED and UNCORRELATED treatment conditions, 
and in Appendix A1.3 for the CORRELATED/REPUTATION and UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment conditions. An overview of the conditions is provided in 
Table 3.2.
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Horizontal spillovers 
We induce horizontal spillovers that do not allow for rational learning in the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition. We induce horizontal spillovers that allow for 
both rational learning and social comparisons in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition. In both treatment conditions, we provide the two players with information 
about a negotiation outcome of one other pair, which we refer to as the ‘reference 
outcome’. Both players receive the same reference outcome. This reference outcome 
informs players about the accepted proposal in one other negotiation (i.e., the 
number of points earned by the union player) or that there was no agreement if there 
was no proposal accepted in the other negotiation. The participants are truthfully 
informed that the reference outcomes are actually observed outcomes under the 
same bargaining protocol.40 The reference outcome appears on the screen below a 
statement reading ‘Information about negotiation outcome of one other pair’ and is 
visible throughout the bargaining process. 
 For the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, the reference outcome is taken 
from a negotiation in which the number of additional points was unknown to the 
negotiators receiving the reference outcome. The players received a statement below 
the reference outcome saying, ‘The number of additional points in this other pair was 
one of the numbers {-12,-10,-8,-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}, all equally likely.’ In this 
treatment condition, the players cannot rationally improve their knowledge about the 
size of the common surplus with the aid of the reference outcomes. Horizontal 
spillovers are consequently assumed to be attributable to social comparisons 
exclusively in this treatment. 
 For the CORRELATED treatment condition, the reference outcome comes from 
a negotiation with an identical number of additional points. We inform the participants 
about this via a statement above the reference outcome that says, ‘The number of 
additional points in this other pair was EXACTLY THE SAME as it is now in your pair.’ 
Because firm states are correlated in this treatment and the players are aware of this, 
40 The reference outcomes were in fact selected from the observed outcomes in the CONTROL treatment. 
Table 3.2  Overview of conditions
Information about firm players previous share earned
Reference outcomes No Yes
No CONTROL
From negotiations with 
identical common surplus
CORRELATED CORRELATED/REPUTATION
From negotiations with 
unknown common surplus
UNCORRELATED UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION
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the reference outcomes can inform about the size of the common surplus and thus 
enable rational learning. 
 In each treatment session, half of the players are randomly assigned to the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition and the other half to the CORRELATED 
treatment condition. In both treatments, two randomly selected bargaining pairs in 
each period receive a non-agreement as a reference outcome, indicated by the 
statement, ‘There was DISAGREEMENT’. The remaining pairs receive information 
about an agreed outcome. To identify the impact of the value of the reference 
outcomes within each treatment, we systematically vary this value in both treatments 
by selecting the highest appropriate observed reference outcome for half of the pairs 
and the lowest appropriate observed reference outcome for the other half of the 
pairs.
Vertical spillover
Establishing the precise impact of expectations and reputations necessitates careful 
isolation of the impact of these mechanisms from confounding factors that would 
arise from repeated interactions between the same subjects, such as emotional 
dynamics. We therefore implement a random re-matching procedure after each 
period. In this way, the anonymously interacting subjects repeat the same bargaining 
game in every period but do not have a history with their opposing subject. This 
design departs from the stable bargaining units common in real wage bargaining but 
offers a superior means to analyze the impact of information about previous 
bargaining periods on the behavior of individual subjects. 
 To incorporate the reputation mechanism, we provide the players with information 
about the firm player’s past behavior, specifically the percentage share of the 
common surplus the firm player earned in the previous period. If no proposal was 
accepted in the firm player’s previous negotiation, the information showed that there 
was disagreement. This information was provided in an otherwise identical replication 
of the UNCORRELATED and CORRELATED treatment conditions, yielding the 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions.
 Expectation effects may occur in all five experimental conditions. This is because 
all union players bargain repeatedly (15 times in total), and thus the outcome of each 
negotiation may become a reference point against which subsequent outcomes are 
compared. It must be noted that the value of the additional number of points, and 
thus the value of the common surplus, is independently and randomly chosen for 
each period. Consequently, the union players cannot rationally improve their 
knowledge of the value of the common surplus with information about their outcomes 
in previous periods. If past outcomes have an influence on subsequent bargaining 
behavior, this is exclusively attributable to the reference-dependent preferences of 
the players. 
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3.2.6 Summary of previous findings
This study builds upon a previous study (see Chapter 2) on the impact of horizontal 
spillovers on conflict using data from the CONTROL, UNCORRELATED and 
CORRELATED treatment conditions. We first summarize the findings of that study 
and then discuss the hypotheses about vertical spillovers we test with the current, 
more elaborate set-up. 
 In the previous study, we found that conflict, as measured by the level of 
divergence between union and firm players’ proposals, is increased by horizontal 
spillovers resulting from social comparisons in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition. In particular, the union players, who do not know the value of the common 
surplus, adapt their behavior in response to the reference outcomes. The nature of 
this effect takes two distinct forms depending on the favorability of the value of the 
reference outcome vis-à-vis the initial focal point (cf. Schelling, 1960) of 12 points.41 
First, in the case in which reference outcomes exceed 12 points, the higher the value 
of the reference outcomes is, the higher the union players’ proposals are. Second, in 
the case in which reference outcomes are lower than 12 points, the lower the value of 
the reference outcomes is, the higher the union players’ proposals are. This second 
effect is likely a consequence of the union players’ attempts to prevent increasingly 
unfavorable reference outcomes from gaining salience in the negotiation by increasing 
their demands. Because firm players do not respond to the reference outcomes 
regardless of their value, divergence increases in both cases. As a result of these 
conflict-increasing influences of social comparisons, divergence is much higher on 
average in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition than in the CONTROL condition.
 In the CORRELATED treatment condition, the common surplus values in the 
negotiations under analysis and the negotiations from which the reference outcomes 
are taken are perfectly correlated. Hence, union players can rationally learn about the 
value of the common surplus by observing the reference outcomes. Assuming that 
union players interpret reference outcomes as approximate equal splits42 of the 
common surplus, they reveal a lower bound on the current common surplus value. 
Thus, in addition to social comparisons, horizontal spillovers can occur due to rational 
learning in the CORRELATED treatment conditions. As a result of the feasibility of 
rational learning, there is much less conflict as measured by divergence in the 
41 12 points is the initial focal point in our bargaining game because it represents exactly the equal split 
of the the expected value of the common surplus (24 points) and because it represents the highest 
proposal that, if accepted, would never result in losses for the firm player. As a consequence, refer-
ence outcomes that are larger than 12 points can be considered favourable to the union player, while 
reference outcomes that are smaller than 12 points can be considered unfavourable.
42 A less far reaching assumption would be that union players assume that firm players would not accept 
proposals that exceed the common surplus, i.e. leave them with a loss. In this case, learning can still 
take place, but only when proposals exceed the lowest possible value of the common surplus (12 
points). Our previous study however suggests that the equal split heuristic is used. 
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CORRELATED treatment condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. 
However, we also find that conflict is not lower in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition then in the CONTROL condition, even though theoretically, rational learning 
implies that the information asymmetry between the union and firm players is reduced 
in the CORRELATED treatment condition. This finding is in line with the previous 
findings of Tournadre and Villeval (2004), who show that although horizontal spillovers 
that allow for rational learning decrease conflict, this decrease of conflict is less than 
what would be predicted if horizontal spillovers resulted from rational learning 
exclusively (cf. Kuhn and Gu, 1999). Rather than decreasing conflict in its own right, 
making rational learning possible appears to prevent the conflicts that arise from 
horizontal spillovers driven by social comparisons.
3.2.7 Hypotheses
We expect that the bargaining process will reflect the players’ incentives such that 
initially, union players will make relatively high proposals and firm players will make 
relatively low proposals. This initial conflict, expressed by the divergence of union and 
firm proposals, will decrease over time as the bargaining deadline and the non- 
agreement payoff of zero points draw closer and proposals consequently converge. 
 A particularly robust finding in the experimental literature analyzing structured 
games such as the ultimatum game is that subjects tend to deviate from the sub-
game-perfect equilibrium strategy (i.e., offer/accept the smallest possible amount) by 
settling on approximations of the equal split of the common surplus value (see Thaler, 
1988; Güth and Tietz, 1990; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Güth and Kocher, 2013). We 
assume that the tendency toward the equal split will also feature in our unstructured 
bargaining game. This tendency may be less prevalent when there is private 
information about the pie size (e.g., Straub & Murnighem, 1995; Rapoport et al., 1996; 
Croson, 1996), as is the case in our experiment. In contrast, the equal split tendency 
is reinforced when subjects’ fairness is visible to others because fairness is socially 
desirable (cf. Hoffman et al., 1994; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009). Visible ‘fairness’ is 
clearly a feature in our experiment under conditions in which firm players’ relative 
earnings in the previous period are known to the union player, namely, in the 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment 
conditions. As we will show in the analyses of the data, the assumption that outcomes 
will tend to be equal splits of the pie is in fact strongly justified for all treatments by the 
observations in our experiment. 
Reputation effects 
The introduction of reputations by providing information about the firm players’ 
relative earnings in the previous period affects the level of conflict in bargaining. The 
assumption that accepted proposals will approximate the equal split implies that firm 
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players’ visible reputations tend to show that they have agreed to proposals that 
reflect approximately half of the common surplus. In this way, they are signaling that 
they are fair and do not use their information about the common surplus to gain dis-
proportionately large shares. This information allows the union players to reduce their 
uncertainty about the type of firm player they are bargaining with provided that they 
interpret the firm players’ fairness as stable over time. Firm players that are known to 
have been fair previously would be expected to be fair in the current negation and 
less likely to ‘hide’ behind proposals that are far below the equal split of the current 
surplus. Union players are then more likely to consider the firm player’s offers to 
reflect the true state of the firm and more readily lower their proposals during the 
bargaining process. This reduces the divergence between the union and firm players’ 
proposals. 
 Further reasons to expect a reduction of conflict are related to the presence of 
horizontal spillovers. In the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, such horizontal 
spillovers are driven by social comparisons and increase conflict. The introduction of 
firm players’ reputations in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition 
has two consequences. First, the relative salience of the reference outcomes that do 
not allow for any reduction of uncertainty is diminished by the availability of additional 
information in the form of reputation, which allows union players to reduce uncertainty 
about the type of firm player. Second, union players that believe that the opposing 
firm negotiator is fair are less likely to believe that firm players would abuse the 
presence of unfavorable (low) reference outcomes. Consequently, the union players 
are less likely to respond to such reference outcomes by raising their initial demands, 
which is a major source of increased divergence in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition. Hence, we expect that the introduction of information about firm players’ 
share earned in the previous period reduces conflict when reference outcomes are 
uncorrelated to the value of the common surplus. 
Divergence is lower in negotiations in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment 
condition than in negotiations in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. (Hypothesis 1) 
In the CORRELATED treatment condition, horizontal spillovers can also result from 
rational learning and, as a result, do not increase conflict. Rational learning takes 
place because the value of the common surplus in the negotiation yielding the 
reference outcome is identical to the value of the common surplus in the players’ own 
negotiation. Union players may interpret the reference outcomes as equal splits of the 
common surplus, thus learning its value. Lower reference outcome values imply a 
lower value of the common surplus and should therefore lead to lower proposals by 
union players. However, unions cannot ascertain whether the reference outcome 
really reflects an equal split of the common surplus or whether the other union actually 
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earned less than the equal split. Hence, some uncertainty about the value of the 
common surplus persists. Union players that lower their demands in response to low 
reference outcomes risk earning less than their ‘fair share’ if the firm is willing to ‘hide 
behind’ reference outcomes that are less than the equal split. When firm reputations 
are known, the union players are better informed about the firms’ willingness to be 
fair. Thus, whereas we expect horizontal spillovers due to social comparisons to 
diminish when firm players’ reputations are introduced, we expect horizontal spillovers 
due to rational learning to be augmented when firm players’ reputations are 
introduced. Therefore, union players’ proposals will be more closely conditioned on 
the reference outcome value in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition 
than in the CORRELATED treatment condition, resulting in less divergence of 
proposals. Hence, we expect that the introduction of information about firm players’ 
share earned in the previous period reduces conflict when reference outcomes are 
correlated to the value of the common surplus. 
Divergence is lower in negotiations in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition 
than in negotiations in the CORRELATED treatment condition. (Hypothesis 2)
So far, we have assumed that firms’ reputations tend to show that they have made or 
accepted proposals that approximate half of the common surplus in the previous 
period. However, there will be some variance associated with the accepted shares. 
Thus, the level of ‘fairness’ of the firm players will vary. The higher the share, the 
greedier the firm players’ reputation in the next period is. Conversely, the lower the 
share, the more fair or benevolent43 the firm players’ reputation in the next period is. 
We propose that firm players that are known to have agreed to higher shares of the 
common surplus for the union player previously will face less resistance in the form 
of high union proposals in the following period. Union players that believe that the 
firm is willing to offer them relatively large shares are expected to lower their own initial 
proposals and be more responsive to the initial (low) proposals of the firm. This 
decreases the divergence between the union players’ and firm players’ proposals. 
Hence, we expect that when the firm player’s share earned in the previous period is 
known to the union player, lower values for this share indicate fairer firms and, all else 
equal, are consequently associated with less conflict. 
43 Assuming that approximately even splits of the surplus are considered the fairest outcomes, shares 
that are higher than the even split indicate greediness (the firm player, who knows the surplus value 
did not make or accepted a proposals that represents an even split), while shares that are lower than 
the even split could be interpreted as benevolence (firm players that are willing to give more than half 
of the surplus to the union player) or weakness (firm players agreed to a proposals that exceeded half 
of the surplus for fear of not reaching an agreement otherwise). Union players cannot not distinguish 
between benevolence and weakness. 
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In the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition and the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition, the lower the share earned by the firm player in the 
previous period is, the lower divergence is. (Hypothesis 3)
Expectation effects 
In all experimental conditions, the players bargain for 15 consecutive periods and 
know their earning in previous periods. Under the assumption that the players are 
loss averse, expectations effects will occur even though the value of the common 
surplus varies randomly in each period. In this case, earnings in one period will 
become reference points in the next period. These expectation effects are particularly 
significant for union players, who, unlike firm players, cannot readjust their preferences 
to match the value of the common surplus in the current period because they do not 
know its value. Thus, we expect that higher earnings in one period will cause union 
players to make higher proposals in the next period and increase their minimum 
acceptable proposal. Hence, all else equal, we expect that the divergence between 
the union players’ and firm players’ proposals increases and that achieving 
convergence of the proposals will be more difficult, resulting in more conflict in 
bargaining. 
The higher the number of points earned by a union player, the more divergence he/
she will experience during the following period. (Hypothesis 4) 
 
3.3 Procedures 
Our data collection took place in October 2012 in the NSM Decision Lab at the 
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. We made use of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007) to program the experiment. In this study, 148 students participated in one of six 
experimental sessions. Each session consisted of 15 periods of interaction44 and 
lasted approximately 1.5 hours, excluding the time needed to pay the participants.
 All participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle when they entered the 
laboratory. The computer cubicles were associated with either the role of a firm 
(referred to as PLAYER A) or union player (referred to as PLAYER B) in the context-free 
experiment. In the treatment sessions, each computer cubicle was associated with 
44 In the first session which served as the CONTROL treatment, the variable surplus did not take the 
correct value in the final period of interaction due to a software glitch. This would eradicate the per-
fect correlation between pie sizes of the negotiation and the reference outcome in the CORRELATED 
(REPUTATION) treatments. We therefore decided to exclude the final period from our analyses. For the 
two treatments that allow for reputations, this choice also precludes ‘endgame effects’ in the analyzed 
data. 
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either the UNCORRELATED (UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION) or CORRELATED 
(CORRELATED/REPUTATION) treatments. 
 All participants received written instructions for the experiment, which were read 
aloud by one of the experimenters at the beginning of the session. Following this, the 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions for clarification. These 
questions were answered privately by the experimenters. After all questions were 
answered, the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire to ensure that all 
participants fully understood the rules and payoff structure of the bargaining game. 
These test questions were answered by all participants without difficulty. Prior to the 
15 periods of interaction, 2 unpaid trial periods were used to ensure that all participants 
were fully acquainted with the procedure. 
 The participants were paid their earnings in cash immediately following the 
experiment. For each point earned by the participants during the experiment, they 
were paid 6 Euro cents. Average earnings in all experimental sessions combined, 
including the 3 Euro show-up fee and payment for a short pen-and-paper experiment 
unrelated to the present study, were 14.00 Euro (σ=1.66).
3.4 Experimental evidence 
We first analyze whether the assumption that accepted proposals will approximate 
the equal split of the common surplus is justified. Second, we present a graphic 
representation of the development of union and firm proposals during the allocated 
bargaining time to illustrate the nature of the bargaining process in the different 
treatments. We then proceed to statistically test our hypotheses using multivariate 
analyses. The methods and specific estimated models are chosen in such a way that 
findings are controlled for all potentially confounding factors, particularly changes in 
the bargaining context and the repeated observation of the same participant. 
3.4.1 Testing the equal split assumption
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics on the share of the common surplus 
represented by the accepted proposals for each experimental condition as well as for 
the pooled observations. These statistics strongly support the assumption that 
accepted shares approximate the equal split of the common surplus. We find that the 
modal accepted share is exactly 0.50 (50%) throughout. The mean and median 
shares also clearly show the equal split as the center of the distribution of accepted 
shares. Pooling all treatments, the interquartile range amounts to 16%, with similar 
distributions found in the five experimental conditions separately.
 A related issue is our expectation that union players will assume that firm player 
types are stable, such that information about the share agreed to in the previous 
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period by the firm player (i.e., its reputation) offers information about the firm player’s 
current willingness to settle on fair outcomes. To assess to what extent this assumption 
is justified, we graph the evolution of shares represented by the accepted proposals 
for each firm player in over the 14 periods under analysis for the UNCORRELATED/
Table 3.3  Accepted shares of the common surplus
Mean Mode  
(% of cases)
Median Standard 
deviation
Interquartile 
range
All treatments 0.4873 0.5000 (18.01) 0.4677 0.1682 0.1611
CONTROL 0.4973 0.5000 (16.81) 0.4688 0.2185 0.1566
UNCORRELATED 0.4972 0.5000 (19.12) 0.5000 0.1658 0.1604
CORRELATED 0.5067 0.5000 (14.29) 0.5000 0.1619 0.1944
UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION
0.4645 0.5000 (18.30) 0.4472 0.1469 0.1213
CORRELATED/
REPUTATION
0.4859 0.5000 (20.08) 0.5333 0.1640 0.1444
Figure 3.1  Accepted proposal as share of the common surplus over 14 periods for 
each firm player
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REPUTATION and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions in Figure 3.1. 
Although most firm players show some variation in the accepted share from period to 
period, there are few cases of truly erratic behavior. By and large, the accepted shares 
hover around the equal split throughout, with one firm player (identification number 
4173252) even settling on the exactly equal split in every period. This finding suggests 
that union players would be justified in assuming reasonably stable firm types. 
3.4.2 The bargaining process
Figure 3.2 illustrates how union and firm proposals change at the aggregate during 
the 60-second bargaining process in the five experimental conditions. Loess 
regression lines summarize the observed proposals, differentiating between union 
proposals (the downward-sloping lines) and firm proposals (the upward-sloping 
lines). To offer a fixed reference, both panels include these lines as observed in the 
CONTROL condition. The left-hand panel adds a depiction of the UNCORRELATED 
and UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions, whereas the right-hand 
Figure 3.2   Union and firm player proposals over time, loess regression lines
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panel adds a depiction of the CORRELATED and CORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment conditions. 
 The process of convergence during the 60-second bargaining time is clearly 
visible in all conditions. Union proposals start high and are gradually revised downward 
over time. Firm proposals start low (just over zero points) and gradually increase as the 
deadline draws closer. Toward the end of the bargaining time, proposals approximately 
converge toward a five-point range centered at approximately 12 points, the equal 
split of the average expected common surplus value of 24 points. 
 Comparing the two panels, divergence between the players’ proposals increases 
as a result of inflated union proposals with the introduction of horizontal spillovers due 
to social comparisons (UNCORRELATED treatment condition) but not from horizontal 
spillovers that also allow for learning (CORRELATED treatment condition) (see Chapter 2). 
The introduction of reputation initially appears to have little impact when learning is 
possible, as evidenced by the similarity of the CORRELATED and CORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment conditions. However, a comparison of the UNCORRELATED 
and UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions suggests that divergence 
decreases substantially when reputations are introduced into an environment where 
horizontal spillovers arise purely from social comparisons.
3.4.3 Multivariate analyses
The unstructured bargaining design offers the important benefit of allowing the 
subjects to arrive at a bargaining outcome via a truly interactive decision-making 
process. This design more adequately reflects real-world bargaining situations than 
ultimatum bargaining, which is ubiquitous in experimental research but restricts 
‘interaction’ to two and sometimes only one action. Importantly, the unstructured 
bargaining design reveals how the impact of spillovers on initial decisions, and 
consequently on initial conflict, is transformed by the process of interactive bargaining. 
However, this also entails that levels of conflict in the unstructured bargaining 
environment cannot simply be inferred from observed non-agreements (which would 
be referred to as ‘rejections’ in the ultimatum game). Rather, the analysis of conflict in 
unstructured bargaining must take into account that the level of conflict will differ at 
different points in time during the 60-second bargaining process. 
 Our analysis, presented in Table 3.4, therefore centers on the level of divergence 
between the union and firm players’ proposals during different stages of the 
bargaining process. Divergence is measured by subtracting the current firm proposal 
from the current union proposal for every proposal made in a negotiation by either 
player. The resulting value is the difference between union demands and firm offers 
for every given proposal, where each proposal may have been made at any time 
during the bargaining process. The observed divergences are subsequently analyzed 
in a multivariate model. To account for the timing of the divergences within each 
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negotiation, we include a linear time effect45 on the right-hand side of the equation. 
The coefficient of this effect can be interpreted as the estimated rate of convergence 
expressed as a point decrease in divergence per second.
 Two problems must be addressed. First, because there are multiple observations 
of divergences within each negotiation (12.66 on average), they are not independent. 
Moreover, the negotiations themselves are not independent. Due to the observation 
of the same randomly re-matched subjects over multiple periods, the negotiations 
are cross-classified within combinations of different union and firm players. To account 
for these dependencies, negotiation and crossed subject-specific random effects 
are estimated. Furthermore, we control for the period of interaction by including a 
linear period effect.46 Because the value of the common surplus randomly varies from 
period to period, we also control for this value by including a linear effect for the 
number of additional points in the negotiation. Model 1 estimates conditional average 
differences in divergence between the five conditions by adding a dummy variable 
for each treatment condition. Model 2 interacts these dummies with the bargaining 
time effect. This allows us to establish the rate of convergence in each experimental 
condition.
 Under hypothesis 1, we expect that divergence will be lower in the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported by our findings. The predicted average 
divergence at the beginning of a negotiation is much lower in the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. 
Divergence was also hypothesized to be lower in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment condition than in the CORRELATED treatment condition (hypothesis 2). We 
find that divergence is identical in these two conditions, offering no support for this 
hypothesis. Model 2 shows that although divergence is initially high in the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition, the rate of convergence, represented by the 
marginal effect of bargaining time on divergence, is also much steeper in this 
treatment. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3 by the larger negative coefficient for 
bargaining time in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. Thus, although there is 
more conflict at the beginning of the negotiations due to social comparisons in the 
UNCORRELATED experimental condition, which does not allow for visible firm 
reputations, the bargaining process ‘washes out’ the difference between this 
condition and the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition. 
45 A linear effect yields the best fit for the observed development of divergence over bargaining time, 
even though Figure 2 may suggest a logarithmic transformation. The apparent discrepancy is however 
due to fact that number of proposals increases as the deadline approaches. This leads to a larger 
number of observed divergences later in the bargaining process, where the decrease of divergence is 
more closely represented by a linear trend.  
46 The findings regarding the effects of interest are robust to alternative model specifications with peri-
od-specific fixed effects. We therefore chose to present the more parsimonious specification.  
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Table 3.4   Linear regression estimates of the effects on the divergence between 
union and firm proposals during bargaining, crossed subject-specific 
random effects and negotiation specific random effects (14 Periods) 
Model
1 2
Fixed effects b b
Intercept 18.517*** 18.268***
(1.379) (1.383)
Period -0.140*** 0.139***
(0.026) (0.026)
Variable surplus -0.142*** -0.142***
(0.013) (0.013)
Time (seconds) -0.328*** -0.317***
(0.002) (0.005)
Treatment (dummy)
CONTROL Reference Reference
UNCORRELATED 4.050* 5.103**
(1.847) (1.852)
CORRELATED 0.159 0.289
(1.814) (1.820)
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION -0.345 -0.174
(1.169) (1.690)
CORRELATED/REPUTATION 0.588 0.613
(1.671) (1.676)
Interaction
Time*UNCORRELATED -0.044***
(0.007)
Time*CORRELATED -0.006
(0.007)
Time*UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION -0.008
(0.006)
Time*CORRELATED/REPUTATION -0.002
(0.006)
Model summary
Wald χ2 (df) 31520.51(7)*** 31791.42(11)***
Log likelihood -29813.066 -29779.867
N observations 11066
N negotiations 1023
Estimated random effects are omitted from the table and can be found in Appendix B, Table B 1.1
Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; two-tailed; only reported for fixed effects
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In Table 3.5, we present estimates of the impact of the specific horizontal and vertical 
spillovers on divergence during the bargaining process. All treatment conditions 
feature horizontal spillovers in the form of reference outcomes. The effect of the value 
of these references outcomes is linearly modeled for the CORRELATED, CORRELATED/
REPUTATION and UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions. In line with 
our previous findings (see Chapter 2), the effect is allowed to vary depending on its 
position relative to the initial focal point 12 in the UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition. This non-linearity initially manifests in the union players’ opening proposals 
as a v-shaped relationship between the reference outcome value and the value of 
the opening proposal with a kink at 12 points, and carries over to the divergence 
during the bargaining process.47 A dummy signifying that reference outcomes are 
47 Additional statistical analyses confirmed that this non-linearity in the opening proposals only exists 
in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. Hence the effect of the reference outcome value is lin-
early modeled in all other treatment conditions. Further analyses also indicated that, although the 
union players’ opening proposals are not affected by the reference outcomes in the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition, there may be a non-linear effect on divergence. This effect would 
indicate that divergence decreases with increasing reference outcome values if they exceed 12 points. 
Absent theoretical expectations for such an effect we opt to present the linear model here in order to 
avoid capitalization on chance findings
Figure 3.3   Marginal effects of bargaining time on divergence (rate of convergence 
per second) in five experimental conditions (95% CI)
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non-agreements is included in all models. To account for the dynamics of spillovers 
with the bargaining process itself, each model interacts the modeled spillover effects 
with bargaining time.
 For each experimental condition, we estimate the effect of the union player’s 
earnings in the previous round (i.e., the ‘expectations-effect’) and the firm’s share of 
the common surplus earned in the previous period (i.e., the ‘reputations-effect’). A 
dummy variable controls for non-agreements in both cases. The effect of the share of 
the common surplus earned by the firm player in the previous period is estimated in 
all conditions to prevent the attribution of potentially spurious effects to the impact of 
reputation. The control variables are identical to those included in Table 2.4. For ease 
of interpretation, the evolution of the marginal effects of all spillovers during the 
bargaining process is graphically represented in Figure 3.4 – Figure 3.6.
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment 
condition and the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition, the lower the share 
earned by the firm player in the previous period, the lower divergence will be. The 
results, illustrated in Figure 3.4, support this hypothesis, but only for the UNCORRELATED/ 
REPUTATION treatment condition. Strikingly, the impact of reputation in this treatment 
only manifests in the second half of the bargaining process, with increasingly greedy 
firms facing increasingly high levels of divergence.
 We hypothesized that high union expectations would increase conflict, resulting 
in an increase in divergence with higher union player earnings in the previous period 
(hypothesis 4). Our analyses, illustrated in Figure 3.5, suggest that absent any other 
spillovers in the CONTROL condition, this is indeed the case. However, the initial 
increase in divergence is transformed by the bargaining process, even to the point of 
the effect changing signs as the deadline approaches. The introduction of horizontal 
spillovers in the UNCORRELATED and CORRELATED treatment conditions prevents 
any impact of union expectations on divergence. However, when firm reputations are 
also present, the effect re-emerges. Especially in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment condition, high union expectations have a lasting escalating impact on the 
bargaining process. 
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 Our reasoning for the existence of conflict-decreasing effects of reputations is 
partly based on the expectation that reputations alter the impact of horizontal 
spillovers. Specifically, we argue that social comparisons diminish and are less likely 
to lead to escalating union player demands when the reference outcome is 
unfavorable, whereas rational learning is augmented. We find support for both of 
these arguments. The impact of horizontal spillovers on divergence changes with the 
introduction of firm reputations, as seen in Figure 3.6. Comparing the UNCORRELATED 
treatment condition with the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition, we 
find that the escalating effects of reference outcomes that are increasingly unfavorable to 
the union (=<12 points) are indeed prevented in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment condition. Moreover, although the effect of horizontal spillovers is very 
similar in the CORRELATED and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions 
in terms of effect size, this effect is much less diminished during the bargaining 
process in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition. 
Figure 3.4   Average marginal effects of the share earned by the firm player in the 
previous period on divergence during the bargaining process (95% CI)
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Figure 3.5   Average marginal effects of the points earned by the union player in the 
previous period on divergence during the bargaining process (95% CI)
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Figure 3.6   Average marginal effects of the value of reference outcome on 
divergence during the bargaining process (95% CI)
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the impact of spillovers on conflict in bargaining. The 
theoretical framework developed in our study distinguishes between two sources of 
spillover: information about other bargaining units (horizontal spillovers) and 
information about the past of the bargaining unit (vertical spillovers). The framework 
also distinguishes between two fundamental theoretical assumptions about the 
causes of spillovers. One states that spillovers occur because they allow for a 
reduction of uncertainty about private information, leading to rational learning as a 
mechanism for horizontal spillovers and reputation effects as a mechanism for 
vertical spillovers. The other states that spillovers occur due to reference-dependent 
preferences, leading to social comparisons as a mechanism for horizontal spillovers 
and expectation effects as a mechanism for vertical spillovers. We study the impact 
of reputation and expectation effects on conflict in bargaining in an environment that 
allows for horizontal and vertical spillovers. Four hypotheses were tested using a 
two-person, asymmetric information, unstructured bargaining experiment. Table 3.6 
presents an overview of our findings. 
 Our analysis offers two general insights. First, spillovers that allow for a reduction 
of uncertainty about private information tend to decrease conflict in bargaining, 
whereas spillovers that result from reference-dependent preferences tend to increase 
conflict in bargaining. Second, different sources and different mechanisms of 
spillovers can interact and may strengthen or weaken each other.
 The findings suggests that allowing firms to build reputations by offering unions 
information about the fairness of firms’ past bargaining behaviors decreases conflict 
in bargaining when horizontal spillovers arise exclusively from social comparisons. 
Two complementary processes explain this finding. First, ‘good reputations’, 
evidenced by firms offering or agreeing to larger shares for unions in the past, help to 
reduce conflict in current negotiations, whereas more ‘greedy’ firms face more 
conflict. Second, when firm reputations are known, the impact of horizontal spillovers 
resulting from social comparisons is altered. Without knowledge about a firm’s past, 
unions anticipate the firm’s potentially self-serving use of reference outcomes and 
respond to unfavorable reference outcomes with escalating demands (see Chapter 
2). Knowing that the firm is fair based on its reputation prevents such escalation. We 
find that knowledge about the fairness of firms’ past bargaining behavior does not 
decrease conflict in bargaining where horizontal spillovers can be caused by rational 
learning. However, the evidence suggests that firms’ reputation may augment the 
impact of rational learning by decreasing the risk of concession making for the union 
players. Furthermore, we find that the unions’ expectations based on their previous 
bargaining outcomes under some conditions affect bargaining, with high expectations 
leading to more conflict. Somewhat surprisingly, these expectation effects are 
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particularly pronounced when the firms’ past behavior (i.e., their reputations) is 
known. A potential explanation for this finding is that horizontal spillovers by 
themselves shift the union’s focus to the present, whereas information about the 
firm’s reputation, and therefore its past, makes the union’s own past a salient reference 
point again.  
 In short, our study suggests that the past can play an important role in wage 
bargaining conflicts. Managing reputations and expectations can have direct 
influences and can affect how bargaining units respond to information about what 
happens in other bargaining units. 
 A number of limitations of this study should be addressed in further research. 
First, we only investigated union expectation-driven vertical spillovers based on the 
assumption that a firm would be less susceptible to expectations due to its knowledge 
of its ability to pay. The validity of this assumption deserves further scrutiny. Second, 
we only investigated firm reputation-driven vertical spillovers based on past fairness. 
Future studies should also investigate union reputations and reputations based on 
either side’s willingness to engage in conflict.

4
The Influence of External Information 
on Collective Bargaining: 
Survey Evidence of Union and Firm 
Negotiators in the Netherlands48
48 A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in Relations Industrielles/Industrial 
 Relations (Lehr, Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2015). An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 
IFSAM conference, Limerick, Ireland, June 2012. 
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Abstract 
External information is generally assumed to greatly affect collective bargaining, yet 
rigorous empirical investigations of the influence of this information on union and firm 
negotiators are surprisingly scarce. Comprehensive standardized survey data 
measuring the influence of external information on negotiators in the Netherlands 
were analyzed to reveal the extent to which negotiators were influenced by different 
types of external information and how differences in these influences could be 
explained by the characteristics of negotiators and bargaining units. The findings 
indicate that the influence of external information a) increased with proximity of the 
information source, b) was usually greater for union negotiators than for firm 
negotiators; and in some cases c) modestly increased with negotiator experience 
and d) was greater in company bargaining than in sector bargaining.
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4.1 Introduction
Theories explaining the outcomes of and conflicts in labour contract negotiations 
commonly model the behaviour of actors that have the power to take decisions at the 
bargaining table, i.e., the negotiators, as a function of their knowledge and evaluation 
of various types of information (e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 44, 61-63; 
Dunlop, 1957). Such information may either be internal (characteristics of the 
bargaining event itself), or external (contextual characteristics of the bargaining event) 
(c.f. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Abowd, 1989). Despite the central role attributed 
to the influence of information on negotiators, rigorous empirical analyses of this 
influence are scarce. Many studies instead rely on anecdotal evidence or opt to 
simply build on a priori assumed influences. To the extent that direct empirical 
evidence of the influence of information on negotiators does exist, it is usually limited 
to one side of the bargaining table, ignoring that bargaining is a joint decision-making 
process. In this paper, we present a systematic study of the influence of different 
types of external information on union and firm negotiators in collective bargaining in 
the Netherlands, and offer explanations for the variation in this influence. 
 Our first goal was to answer the following question: to what extent are negotiators 
in collective bargaining influenced by different types of external information?
 We developed a questionnaire survey measuring self-reported influences of 
different types of external information on union and firm negotiators. A particular 
strength of our survey is that it offers an extensive, standardized analysis of the direct 
impact of spillovers from the past and from other bargaining units on negotiators, 
circumventing identification problems associated with establishing such effects (c.f. 
Mitchell, 1982; Heckman, 1991; Manski, 1993). 
  The extent to which external information affects bargaining behavior is likely to 
vary across different types of negotiators, different types of bargaining units and 
different types of information (c.f. Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969, Mauro, 1982; 
Cousineau and Lacroix, 1986), The second goal of our study was therefore to shed 
light on a second question: to what extent can differences in the influence of external 
information between negotiators be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators, 
bargaining units and the type of information?
 To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of variations 
in the influence of external information on negotiators in collective bargaining. 
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4.2 Theory and hypotheses
Bargaining theory typically assumes that negotiators do not have complete 
information on critical aspects of the bargaining event they are involved in. In collective 
bargaining, these critical aspects are bargaining power (Leap and Grigsby, 1986; 
Svejnar, 1986; Cousineau and Lacroix, 1986; Martin, 1992), employers’ ability to pay 
(Hayes, 1984; Cramton and Tracy, 2003) and norms concerning fair outcomes 
(Hyman and Brough, 1975; Frank, 1984; Rees, 1993). As negotiators aim to overcome 
their uncertainty regarding such aspects, they turn to external information that may 
serve as a proxy. We distinguish four types of external information: 1) economic 
information, 2) information on organizational power, 3) institutional information, and 4) 
information spillovers. 
 In the following section, we explain our selection of the types of external 
information in our analysis, based on common assumptions and findings of labor 
relations research. Because we aim to provide standardized measurements, this 
selection is by necessity not exhaustive and we recognize that other relevant 
indicators may be suggested. Following the presentation of the chosen types of 
external information, we develop testable hypotheses concerning the influence of 
external information from extant theory, common assumptions and empirical findings. 
4.2.1 Types of external information
Empirical studies consistently find a relationship between economic factors and 
collective bargaining outcomes and conflicts, as bargaining strategies are shaped by 
negotiators’ perceptions of these factors. The economic indicators most commonly 
found to affect collective bargaining are prices and employment (Franzosi, 1989; 
Card, 1990; Kaufman, 2002; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). Therefore, we investigated 
the influence of information on employment and pricing developments on negotiators. 
We distinguished between different levels at which these developments operate and 
analyzed those that were most pertinent for each type of factor within our empirical 
context. For employment, this entailed differentiating between national, sectoral and 
local developments. For pricing, we focused on international, national and sectoral 
developments.
 Organizational power also substantially affects collective bargaining (Franzosi, 
1989; c.f. Shorter and Tilly, 1974). At the macro level, unionization is the primary factor 
of interest, as it reveals crucial information on unions’ ability to mount collective 
action. However, as we were concerned with factors that affect the behavior of 
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individual negotiators, there may be more informative indicators of power.49 The first 
indicator we considered was militancy, defined as the readiness of employees to 
partake in industrial action.50 If employees are more willing to partake in industrial 
action, the ability of a union to inflict costs upon the firm through strike action will 
increase, giving them relatively more leverage. Similarly, strike funds determine the 
power of the union vis-à-vis the firm (Clegg, 1976; Skeels and McGrath, 1997). Public 
opinion can also influence bargaining power, as the public’s reaction to a firm’s 
behavior during collective bargaining may hurt sales while unions may depend on 
public support to mobilize workers (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1986: 189-191). We 
therefore studied the influence of information on three organizational power factors: 
a) workers’ readiness for industrial action, b) union strike funds and c) public opinion. 
 The third type of external information we considered was related to institutional 
factors. Here, it was important to consider the specifics of the Dutch case. In the 
Netherlands, collective bargaining occurs at both the company and sector level, with 
the sector level being dominant and sector level contracts sometimes setting a 
framework for company level bargaining (EIRO, 2008). Moreover, collective bargaining 
is multileveled, as central agreements of labor and employer peak organizations 
provide a non-legally binding benchmark for both company and sector level 
agreements (Akkerman and Torenvlied, 2002). Through ILO conventions, the 
European Social Charter, and a more general trend towards Europeanization of 
employment relations (Brandl and Traxler, 2009; EUROFOUND, 2012), collective 
bargaining is also affected by international developments. Given this complex 
context, we chose the focus our analyses of external information on developments 
related to collective agreements on five levels: a) international, b) national, c) sectoral, 
d) local, and e) comparable companies.
 External information related to collective agreement developments may not only 
reflect institutional aspects. Although pattern bargaining, i.e., reiterated, long-term 
stable and explicit co-ordination (c.f. Traxler et al., 2008) does not feature prominently 
in the Netherlands (Van Rij and Rojer, 1998), different collective agreements are not 
independent of each other. Information on other bargaining events affects negotiators 
through spillovers. Traditionally, spillovers have been associated with the influence of 
49 In the Netherlands, union density is comparatively low, yet collective agreement coverage is high. 
The consequences of bargaining thus extend beyond union members (Hartog, Leuven and Teulings, 
2002). Moreover, in the case of industrial action, participation is not limited to union members. In fact, 
it may be used as a tool to attract new members (Akkerman, 2008). The readiness of employees to 
participate may therefore be considered a better indicator of bargaining power than unionization.
50 Information on militancy may be considered internal rather than external. We chose to include it never-
theless. In contrast to the other factors we analyzed, this factor was not by definition contextual but was 
also an attribute of the bargaining unit. Presumably, the militancy of the employees within a bargaining 
unit is likely to be considered of more importance than that of employees elsewhere.
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specific information on bargaining outcomes, i.e., wages, across different bargaining 
units (e.g., Christofides et al. 1980; Babcock et al., 2005). However, spillovers may 
also occur over time within bargaining units, for instance, because past settlements 
affect future settlements directly, leading to history-dependence (Card, 1990, Bewley, 
1999). Moreover, spillovers across and within bargaining units are not limited to 
outcomes. Negotiators also take into account information on conflicts and conflict 
potential (e.g., Mauro, 1982; Schnell and Gramm, 1987; Campolieti et al., 2005; Kuhn 
and Gu, 1999). We investigated this complex array of spillovers by measuring the 
influence of information on: a) outcomes, b) employees’ readiness for industrial 
action and c) the success of industrial action. We differentiated each of these types 
of informational content according to the following three potential sources: a) the 
same bargaining unit in the past, b) other bargaining units in the same sector and c) 
other sectors. 
4.2.2 Spillovers and proximity
Spillovers from different sources are likely to have different relevance. Wage spillovers 
have traditionally been considered to be a phenomenon that occurs within sectors. 
The implicit argument is that for spillovers to occur, information must be sufficiently 
relevant. For instance, spillovers driven by social comparisons (e.g., Babcock et al, 
2005) arise because workers take the wages of workers in other bargaining units as 
relevant reference points (c.f. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) if these other workers 
closely resemble themselves (c.f. Festinger, 1954). Alternatively, spillovers may also 
be driven by a process of rational learning (Kuhn and Gu, 1999), which can only 
occur if the outcomes and conflicts of bargaining in one bargaining unit reveal private 
information in other bargaining units because this information is correlated within 
sectors. Spillovers within sectors may thus be expected to have more influence than 
spillovers across sectors. However, the most important reference point for current 
wages are past wages within the bargaining unit (Bewley, 1999). Similarly, past 
conflict (potential) in a bargaining unit is presumably the best indicator for future 
potential outcomes of conflict. Ordering sources of spillovers by their proximity to the 
current bargaining event, we expected that information on the past experience of the 
bargaining unit would have the most influence on negotiators, followed by information 
on the past experience of other bargaining units within the same sector, while 
information on the past experience of other sectors would have the least influence 
(Hypothesis 1). 
4.2.3 Union and firm negotiators 
A common assumption in bargaining theory is that one bargaining party will have 
better information than the other, i.e., information is asymmetric. Asymmetric 
information models became a standard solution to the Hicks (1932) bargaining 
105
The Influence of External Information on Collective Bargaining
4
paradox in the 1980s, and remain highly influential. Bargaining is thought of as the 
division of an economic surplus between the firm(s) and workers represented by their 
union(s) (Cramton and Tracy, 2003). The critical aspect of the bargaining event is the 
firm’s ability to pay, which is commonly assumed to be known to firms but can only 
be estimated by unions (Hayes, 1984). Alternatively, it has been argued that it is 
actually the employer’s willingness rather than ability to pay that characterizes wage 
bargaining (Bewley, 1999). Regardless of this distinction, unions are generally thought 
of as being at an informational disadvantage. 
 Moreover, through their actions in the bargaining process, negotiators reveal 
information on their willingness to concede. In practice, trade unions formulate a 
demand that firms can respond to by acceptance or a counteroffer. This allows firms 
to learn about the union’s willingness to concede before revealing their own, adding 
to the uncertainty that unions face relative to the uncertainty that firms face. Therefore, 
the need to reduce uncertainty by using external information should be higher among 
union negotiators than among firm negotiators and we expected that external 
information would have more influence on union negotiators than on firm negotiators 
(Hypothesis 2). 
4.2.4 Experience
There are two different possible accounts of the relationship between negotiator 
experience and the influence of external information. Montgomery and Benedict 
(1989) argue that more experienced negotiators are less likely to experience strikes 
because experienced negotiators are better able to ascertain the true value of the 
unobservable aspects critical to reaching an agreement. Similarly, Reder and Neuman 
(1980) propose that bargaining units consisting of more experienced negotiators are 
less likely to strike because negotiators learn to anticipate each other’s behavior. It 
may therefore be argued that experience reduces negotiators’ uncertainty, which in 
turn limits their need for external information. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
the more experience negotiators have, the less they are influenced by external information 
(Hypothesis 3a).
 However, it is equally plausible to argue the reverse. Reder and Neuman (1980) 
maintain that in bargaining units that bargain repeatedly, negotiators learn from past 
bargaining events. This may be interpreted as spillovers within the bargaining unit 
over time. Anecdotally, Rees (1993) illustrates how, through his repeated personal 
involvement in wage setting, he became aware of the importance of external wage 
comparisons. More generally, it may be argued that, as negotiators become more 
experienced, they learn to use external information and consequently face less 
uncertainty. We therefore propose the alternative hypothesis that the more experience 
negotiators have, the more they are influenced by external information (Hypothesis 
3b).
106
4.2.5 Bargaining level
In the Netherlands, there is a mix of single and multi-employer bargaining. Following 
Olson’s (1982) idea that organized interest is most disruptive to society when it is strong 
enough to have considerable impact without being so encompassing that it substantially 
bears the costs it creates, Calmfors and Driffhill (1988) argue that there is a hump-shaped 
relationship between the level of bargaining centralization and economic performance. 
Their theory yields predictions for comparisons of different industrial relations systems, 
however, it may also yield propositions for within-country comparisons. Calmfors and 
Driffhill argue that that decentralized, i.e. company level bargaining, is largely subject 
to market forces, while intermediate levels of centralization, i.e. sector level bargaining, 
can operate in relative independence from its economic environment. Assuming perfect 
product-market competition, a single company in isolation cannot raise wages without 
incurring decreased competitiveness and employment. Sector-level bargaining, on the 
other hand, allows negotiators to pass on negative externalities because they can 
jointly raise prices. We may thus expect that, compared to company-level bargaining, 
sector-level bargaining is primarily concerned with developments within the sector and 
takes place under relative autonomy from its economic environment. Therefore, we 
tested the hypothesis that information on international, national and local economic 
developments will have less influence on negotiators in sector agreements than on 
negotiators in company agreements (Hypothesis 4). 
 Sector-level bargaining is dominant in the Netherlands and sector agreements 
often set the framework for company level bargaining. Moreover, company bargaining 
is prevalent in particular branches and regions, such as transport and storage in the 
Rotterdam harbor. This induces direct labor-market competition among these 
bargaining units as well as a high level of interdependence of organizationally derived 
bargaining power, e.g., correlated militancy and strike funds. Hence we expected that 
local collective agreement developments, collective agreement developments in 
comparable companies and spillovers across bargaining units would have more 
influence on negotiators in company agreements than on negotiators in sector 
agreements (Hypothesis 5). 
4.3 The empirical context
The Netherlands features state-sponsored coordination (Traxler, 2003) with bipartite 
and tripartite consultation. Non-binding central agreements that serve as benchmarks 
for lower level bargaining (Akkerman and Torenvlied, 2002) are negotiated in the 
bipartite Labour Foundation (Stiching van de Arbeid). Tripartite processes take place 
in the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad), which advises on 
general social economic decisions (EIRO, 2008). 
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 Approximately 1000 collective agreements are in effect and roughly one fifth of 
these are sector agreements. Approximately 84 percent of the labour force is covered 
by a collective agreement (EIRO, 2008), four fifths of which through sector agreements. 
In some sectors, there are both company and sector level agreements. High collective 
bargaining coverage is maintained despite the trade union density being comparatively 
low at approximately 24% (EIRO, 2008) because collective agreements apply to both 
unionized and non-unionized workers in a workplace and because the extension of 
collective agreements to whole sectors is common (c.f. Rojer, 2002). The three major 
Dutch trade union federations are divided by religion, ideology and occupational 
status. Collective bargaining often involves more than one union (Akkerman, 2000). 
 Overt industrial conflict in the Netherlands is rare. According to official statistics, 
between 2005 and 2011 there were between 17 and 31 strikes annually, only about 
half of which were the result of conflicts in collective bargaining (CBS, 2012). The 
number of working days lost in this period was generally lower than that in most other 
European countries, peaking at 120.600 in 2008 and dropping as low as 4.600 in 
2009 (Ibid, 2012). However, compared to other countries, industrial action in the 
Netherlands is often prevented by court rulings, which frequently appeal to potential 
harm to third-party interests (EIRO, 2002; EUROFOUND, 2012). 
4.4 Data and measurements
4.4.1 Sample
We gathered questionnaire survey data among negotiators involved in collective 
bargaining in the Netherlands (2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey). The data collection 
took place between October 2011 and January 2012. One hundred and fifty (150) 
collective agreements were selected via randomization from all existing Dutch 
collective agreements. The sampling frame was limited to agreements with starting 
dates from 1 January 2009 to 1 April 2011. This interval was chosen to minimize the 
risk of introducing retrospective bias while simultaneously minimizing the risk of 
selecting agreements for which negotiations were still in progress.51
 We used all available documents related to the selected collective agreements to 
compile a list of contact data for the negotiators involved in the collective agreements. 
This initial list comprised 302 negotiators, who were invited via email to fill out an 
online questionnaire. For negotiators who had been involved in more than one of the 
51 Holdouts, i.e. continued negotiation over a new agreement after the old agreement has expired, are 
common in the Netherlands. During holdouts, the old agreement remains intact, while the eventual 
new agreement is usually backdated to coincide with the end date of the old agreement (c.f. Ours and 
Wijngaert, 1996).
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selected collective agreements, we asked for information on only one of these 
agreements. A snowball question was included, asking for the names and contact 
information of the five most important other negotiators involved in bargaining for the 
agreement. These negotiators were subsequently also invited to participate. 
Combining these sampling methods, we were able to ask 409 negotiators to 
participate in our study, of which 58.1% were union representatives and 41.9% were 
firm representatives. 123 negotiators representing 73 of the 150 agreements 
completed the questionnaire.52 The distribution of union and firm negotiators and the 
representation of company and sector agreements in this sample were highly 
comparable to the sampling frame, and there were no indications of other sources of 
non-response bias. 
4.4.2 Measures
External information
We set out to investigate the influence on negotiators of information on economic, 
organizational power and institutional indicators, as well as the influence of spillovers. 
To this end, we created two sets of items in our questionnaire.
 As for the first set of items, we asked respondents whether the following types of 
information influenced them in general during collective bargaining: (1) ‘national 
employment levels,’ (2) ‘local employment levels,’ (3) ‘employment in the relevant 
sector,’ (4) ‘international pricing developments,’ (5) ‘national pricing developments,’ 
(6) ‘pricing developments in the relevant sector,’ (7) ‘international collective agreement 
developments,’ (8) ‘national collective agreement developments,’ (9) ‘collective agreement 
developments in the relevant sector,’ (10) ‘collective agreement developments in 
comparable companies,’ (11) ‘local collective agreement developments,’ (12) 
‘employees’ readiness for industrial action,’ (13) ‘union strike funds’ and (14) ‘public 
opinion.’ When the response was positive, we asked the negotiators to rate how 
important that type of information was to them in general during collective bargaining, 
on a scale of ‘1’ = ‘not very important’ to ‘5’ = ‘very important.’ We then recoded each 
of these issues into a variable with a six-point scale, where ‘0’ represented ‘not 
mentioned as an influence,’ ‘1’ represented ‘mentioned but not very important,’ and 
the maximum value of ‘5’ represented ‘mentioned and very important.’
 The second set of items specifically examined the influence of information 
spillovers from other bargaining events. We asked the respondents to rate how 
strongly they agreed with nine statements. Three statements referred to information 
on the outcomes of other bargaining events. The other six items referred to information 
on conflict, divided into: a) the readiness for industrial action and b) the success of 
52 Two negotiators were involved in a public sector agreement. As a robustness check, all findings reported 
here were replicated with these negotiators excluded from the sample.
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industrial action. Furthermore, we differentiated each type of information according to 
three different possible sources: a) the past experience of the bargaining unit, b) that 
of other companies in the same sector and c) that of other sectors. This yielded nine 
unique statements (see Table 4.1) for the measurement of spillovers, with possible 
answers ranging from ‘1’= ‘not at all’ to ‘5’= ‘very much.’
Independent variables
To test for differences between union and firm negotiators in the reported influence of 
external information, we created a variable with dummy coding for ‘union negotiator’ 
(reference ‘firm negotiator’). To measure experience, for each negotiator, we 
calculated the number of years that he or she was active in collective bargaining. As 
we asked the negotiators to report the influence that various types of external 
information had on them in general during collective bargaining, the measurement of 
bargaining unit characteristics was less straightforward. Negotiators in the 
Netherlands, especially union representatives, are often professionals who negotiate 
multiple collective agreements. We used the characteristics of the collective 
agreement for which the negotiators were selected into the sample as proxies and 
created a dummy variable for sector agreements, with company agreements as the 
reference category. This was based on the assumptions that negotiators will generally 
bargain for similar types of collective agreements.
Table 4.1   Overview of Measurements of the Influence of Information on  
Other Bargaining Events
In general, during collective bargaining, I am influenced by information on…
Outcomes for the same collective agreement in the past
Outcomes for collective agreements in other companies in the same sector
Outcomes for collective agreements in other sectors
Past readiness for industrial action of the employees covered by the collective agreement
Readiness for industrial action of employees in other companies in the same sector
Readiness for industrial action of employees in other sectors
The success of industrial action for the same collective agreement in the past
The success of industrial action in other companies in the same sector
The success of industrial action in other sectors
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Control variables 
Little is known about possibly confounding factors that may affect the analysis of the 
influence of external information on negotiators. We proposed four, namely, age, 
gender, coverage of the agreement and the economic sector. Age is presumably 
positively associated with experience. Therefore, a tests of the relationship between 
experience and the influence of external information should control for potential 
life-cycle or cohort effects. Research suggests that there are gender differences in 
information processing (e.g., Graham, Myers and Stendardi, 2010). Consequently, we 
controlled our findings using a dummy variable for ‘female’ (reference ‘male’). 
Because sector agreements generally cover a greater number of workers than 
company agreements, we also controlled for coverage using a variable that counted 
the number of workers to which the agreement applied. To account for different 
economic contexts, we included a categorical economic sector control with four 
categories; ‘primary,’ ‘secondary’ (reference), ‘tertiary’ and ‘quarternary.’ 
4.5 Analyses
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Characteristics of the collective agreements and the negotiators
The 123 negotiators included in our sample represented 73 unique collective 
agreements. 53 (72.6%) of these were company agreements, while 20 (27.4%) were 
sector agreements. The distribution of the number of employees covered by these 
agreements was right skewed, with the first three quartiles consisting of agreements 
covering fewer than 5000 employees, while the largest agreements covered several 
hundred thousand employees. The median number of employees covered was 820. 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics on the negotiators. 62% of the respondents 
were union negotiators, which does not deviate significantly from the proportion of 
union negotiators invited to participate. One fifth of the negotiators were female. The 
mean age was approximately 50 and on average the negotiators had 13 years 
experience with collective bargaining. One third of the negotiators were selected 
through a sector agreement. The median coverage of the agreements across the 
individual negotiators was 1500 employees.
The influence of economic, organizational power, and institutional information
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics on the reported influence of information 
on employment developments, pricing developments and collective agreement 
developments on various levels, as well as the reported influence of information on 
militancy, strike funds and public opinion. 
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4 Regarding employment information, the highest mean was found for the influence 
of information on employment levels in the relevant sector. Lower values were found 
for information on national or local employment. We also found relatively high averages 
for the influence of information on national and sector pricing developments, especially 
compared to international pricing developments. These findings suggest that, besides 
being the dominant bargaining level, sector level economic developments were also 
the most important economic external influence on collective bargaining. 
 Organizational power indicators influenced the negotiators less than the economic 
indicators. Information on militancy was moderately influential while information on 
union strike funds and public opinion had a very limited influence. The comparatively 
low impact of organizational power indicators may be explained by the low levels of 
overt industrial conflict in the Netherlands, which limits the strategic value of such 
information. 
 National and sectoral collective agreement developments were highly influential, 
clearly reflecting both the multileveled nature of bargaining as well as the importance 
of sector agreements. In the context of increasing Europeanization and the openness 
of the Dutch economy, international collective agreement developments may be 
Table 4.2  Descriptive Statistics on the Respondents
 
Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
deviation
Negotiator’s age 123 27 65 49.69 8.24
Negotiator’s gender female 
(ref. male)
123 0 1 0.20
Union negotiator
 (ref. firm negotiator)
123 0.00 1.00 0.62
Negotiator’s experience 123 2.00 32.00 12.91 7.50
Sector agreement 
(ref. company agreement)
123 0 1 0.33
Coverage 123 18 819500 17892.20 77157.53
Economic sector (ref. 
secondary)
Primary 123 0 1 0.08
Tertiary 123 0 1 0.41
Quarernary 123 0 1 0.07
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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expected to play a significant role. Indeed, 63.41% of the negotiators reported that 
they were influenced by them. However, they were on average rated to be considerably 
less influential than national and sectoral developments. Local developments were 
also reported to have a rather modest influence, which suggests that, possibly related 
to the small country size, no substantial geographical dynamics were at play in the 
collective bargaining. However, we did find a very high mean value for the influence 
of information on collective agreement developments in other, comparable 
companies. Despite the lack of formal pace-setting, this suggests that there was a 
substantial amount of spillovers across different bargaining units. A more detailed 
analysis of what these spillovers entailed is presented in the next section.
The influence of spillovers
We measured the influence of spillovers containing information on: 1) outcomes, 2) 
the readiness of employees for industrial action and 3) the success of industrial 
Table 4.3   Reported Influence of Economic, Organizational and  
Institutional Information
 
Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
deviation
Employment developments
National 123 0 5 2.20 1.63
Sector 123 0 5 3.39 1.56
Local 123 0 5 2.03 1.68
Pricing developments
International 123 0 5 1.84 1.62
National 123 0 5 3.02 1.70
Sector 123 0 5 3.14 1.74
Organizational indicators
Militancy 123 0 5 2.52 1.78
Strike funds 123 0 5 1.07 1.19
Public opinion 123 0 5 1.56 1.43
Collective agreement developments
International 123 0 5 1.41 1.41
National 123 0 5 3.66 1.15
Sector 123 0 5 3.64 1.37
Local 123 0 5 1.88 1.77
Comparable companies 123 0 5 3.34 1.71
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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action, with each relating to: 1) the past experience of the same bargaining unit, 2) 
that of other companies in the same sector or 3) that of other sectors. The item 
nonresponse for these measurements varied between 6% and 21%. Additional 
analyses of the missing cases did not indicate any obvious non-response bias. 
Descriptive statistics for the nine measurements are presented in Table 4.4. 
 Overall, information on outcomes had more influence than information on the 
readiness for, and success of industrial action. The level of influence also increased 
with proximity of the source of information, i.e., the past experience of the bargaining 
unit was rated to be more important than that of other companies in the same sector, 
while that of other sectors had the least impact. Paired t-tests indicated that these 
differences were all statistically significant (p<0.01, two-tailed) with mean differences 
ranging between 0.5 and 0.8 points. This supports hypothesis H1, predicting that 
influence would increase with proximity. 
 We found the highest mean score for the reported influence of information on 
bargaining outcomes for the same collective agreement in the past with a mean value 
of almost four on a five-point scale. This finding strongly supports history-dependent 
wage theories. In line with theories of wage spillover, there was also substantial 
evidence for spillovers across bargaining units, especially within the same sector. 
However, the informational content of spillovers was not limited to outcomes. 
Information on conflict in other bargaining events also influenced the negotiators 
Table 4.4   Reported Influence of Spillovers from Other Bargaining Events 
Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
deviation
Outcomes same collective  
agreement past
116 1 5 3.97 1.08
Outcomes collective agreements  
other companies same sector
115 1 5 3.47 1.34
Outcomes for collective  
agreements other sectors
110 1 5 3.07 1.16
Past readiness for industrial action 108 1 5 3.38 1.32
Readiness for industrial action other 
companies same sector
111 1 5 2.57 1.35
Readiness for industrial action  
other sectors
101 1 5 2.07 1.06
Past success of industrial action 98 1 5 3.46 1.36
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
107 1 5 2.71 1.33
Success of industrial action  
other sectors
97 1 5 2.12 1.10
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considerably, as indicated by the mean values for the items measuring the influence 
of information on the employees’ readiness for, and the success of industrial action. 
Here too, the influence increased when sources were more proximate. These results 
lend empirical credence to theories that build on the assumption that conflicts in 
labor relations are interrelated, such as diffusion theory (c.f. Connel and Cohn, 1995; 
Biggs, 2002, 2003, 2005) and theories on learning from conflict (e.g., Mauro, 1982, 
Schnell and Gramm, 1987; Kuhn and Guhn, 1999).
4.5.2 Explaining differences in the influence of external information
To test our remaining hypotheses, we estimated (OLS) multivariate linear regression 
models for each of the external information models. Every model included main 
effects for the union negotiator dummy, negotiator experience, age, the female 
gender dummy, the sector agreement dummy, the log-transformed coverage variable 
and three dummies controlling for economic sector. We used standard errors that 
were robust to heteroscedasticity of the residuals (White, 1980) for significance tests. 
Given constraints on statistical power due to the sample size and the directed nature 
of our hypotheses, we took α=0.10 (two-tailed) as the critical value. 
 Prior to the model estimations, we analyzed the bivariate associations between 
all independent and dependent variables by calculating Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients and applying independent sample t-tests where appropriate. These 
statistics are not presented here in full but we report any statistically significant (based 
on a liberal one-tailed critical value of α=0.10) bivariate association between the 
dependent and independent variables that did not persist in the multivariate analyses 
(see Appendix C for a full report on these bivariate associations). In this way, we aim 
to provide both stringent hypotheses tests as well more tolerant descriptions of 
associations in our data. For the spillover measurements, the missing cases may 
reasonably be assumed to be missing at random and ignorable. As there were no 
missing cases on the independent variables, we used complete case analyses, 
which under these conditions can be considered to be unbiased and cannot be 
improved upon (Allison, 2001).
Explanatory analyses
Table 4.5 lists the estimates for the models explaining each of the general types of 
external information. Hypothesis H2 predicted that external information would have 
more influence on union negotiators than on firm negotiators. This hypothesis was 
partially supported by our findings. The reported influence of sectoral and local 
employment developments, and militancy were all higher for union negotiators. The 
effect was particularly large for militancy, where the predicted value on a six-point 
scale was 1.35 points higher for union negotiators than for firm negotiators. The 
bivariate analyses suggest that information on national employment developments, 
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strike funds, collective agreement developments in comparable companies also had 
more influence on union than on firm negotiators. 
 We tested competing hypotheses concerning the direction of the association 
between experience and the influence of external information (H3a/b). The results of 
the multivariate analyses indicate that experience had statistically significant but 
small positive effects on the reported influence of militancy and international collective 
agreement developments. Modest positive bivariate correlations between experience 
and the influence of local employment developments, as well as international and 
national pricing developments were found. These results run against the hypothesis 
that, as experience increases, the influence of external information decreases (H3a) 
but offer some support for the alternative hypothesis that this influence increases as 
negotiators become more experienced (H3b). 
 Within a single mixed bargaining system, we found very limited support for the 
proposition that sector bargaining is less influenced by its wider economic 
environment than company bargaining (H4). Controlling for other factors, negotiators 
in sector agreements were not found to be less affected by economic information 
than negotiators in company agreements. However, the mean of the reported 
influence of information on sectoral and local employment developments was found 
to be lower for sector bargaining than for company bargaining in the biviarate 
analyses.
 The influence of information on both international and local collective agreement 
developments was lower for negotiators in sector agreements than for negotiators in 
company agreements. These findings partially support hypothesis H5 and also 
suggest that, although the influence of international developments was limited, it was 
stronger for the generally more internationally exposed bargaining units that bargain 
individually. Also in line with hypothesis 5, the influence of collective agreement 
developments in comparable companies was also found to be lower for negotiators 
in sector bargaining, but only in our bivariate analyses.
 Table 4.6 shows the effects on our nine measures of spillovers as found in the 
multivariate analyses. On the whole, we found more support for the hypothesis that 
external information has more influence on union negotiators than on firm negotiators 
(H2), at least regarding conflict-related information on other bargaining events. In 
particular. the predicted influences of information on past readiness for, and the 
success of industrial action was higher for union negotiators by approximately one 
point on a five-point scale. Similarly, information on the readiness for, and success of 
industrial action in other companies in the same sector and in other sectors had more 
influence on union negotiators, although here the differences were less extreme. 
 Surprisingly however, the two types of negotiators did not differ significantly 
regarding the reported influence of information on outcomes in other bargaining 
events, controlling for other factors. This suggests that effects which are traditionally 
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Table 4.5   OLS regression estimates of the effects of negotiator and bargaining  
unit characteristics on the reported influence of different types of external  
information (N=123)
Dependent variable Employment developments Pricing developments Organizational indicators Collective agreement developments
National Sector Local International National Sector Militancy Strike 
funds
Public 
opinion
International National Sector Local Comparable 
companies
Intercept 2.18* 2.76** 3.24** 1.86a 2.30a 3.25* 3.57** 1.10 2.20* 1.62a 4.73*** 6.10*** 4.28*** 6.05***
(1.01) (1.00) (1.07) (1.02) (1.26) (1.24) (1.13) (0.78) (0.98) (0.83) (0.70) (0.84) (1.13) (0.95)
Firm negotiator (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Union negotiator 0.36 0.96** 0.58a -0.37 -0.02 -0.19 1.35*** 0.25 -0.09 -0.01 0.16 -0.02 -0.21 0.49
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.21) (0.27) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.33) (0.32)
Negotiator experience 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04a 0.00 0.02 0.04a -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03a -0.02 0.00 -0.05* -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Female -0.33 0.26 0.10 0.56 0.07 -0.19 -0.01 0.27 0.15 0.23 -0.31 -0.09 0.04 -0.12
(0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.29) (0.37) (0.40) (0.45)
Company agreement (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Sector agreement -0.31 0.41 -0.24 0.19 -0.42 0.11 -0.48 -0.37 -0.63 -0.62a 0.36 0.10 -0.73a -0.11
(0.43) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.43) (0.52) (0.43) (0.30) (0.42) (0.36) (0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.45)
Coverage (log) 0.14a 0.01 -0.14* -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.19* -0.24***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Economic sector 
(dummy)
Primary -0.18 0.59 -0.65 -0.57 -0.28 0.18 0.19 -0.36 -0.05 -0.53 -0.12 0.00 -0.51 -0.54
(0.61) (0.37) (0.56) (0.62) (0.62) (0.67) (0.55) (0.30) (0.49) (0.40) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52) (0.61)
Secondary (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Tertiary -0.04 0.08 -0.57a -0.21 0.34 -0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.62* -0.16 -0.35 -0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.23) (0.28) (0.35) (0.31)
Quarternary 1.51* 0.83 0.74 -1.41* -0.22 -0.05 0.65 0.44 0.79 -0.52 -0.47 0.23 -0.06 -0.57
(0.65) (0.58) (0.72) (0.58) (0.89) (0.86) (0.63) (0.53) (0.67) (0.49) (0.52) (0.60) (0.67) (0.95)
R2 0.11* 0.13* 0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.03 0.22*** 0.07 0.07 0.10a 0.10 0.07 0.20*** 0.20***
a Statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed);
* at the 0.05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table 4.5   OLS regression estimates of the effects of negotiator and bargaining  
unit characteristics on the reported influence of different types of external  
information (N=123)
Dependent variable Employment developments Pricing developments Organizational indicators Collective agreement developments
National Sector Local International National Sector Militancy Strike 
funds
Public 
opinion
International National Sector Local Comparable 
companies
Intercept 2.18* 2.76** 3.24** 1.86a 2.30a 3.25* 3.57** 1.10 2.20* 1.62a 4.73*** 6.10*** 4.28*** 6.05***
(1.01) (1.00) (1.07) (1.02) (1.26) (1.24) (1.13) (0.78) (0.98) (0.83) (0.70) (0.84) (1.13) (0.95)
Firm negotiator (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Union negotiator 0.36 0.96** 0.58a -0.37 -0.02 -0.19 1.35*** 0.25 -0.09 -0.01 0.16 -0.02 -0.21 0.49
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.21) (0.27) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.33) (0.32)
Negotiator experience 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04a 0.00 0.02 0.04a -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03a -0.02 0.00 -0.05* -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Female -0.33 0.26 0.10 0.56 0.07 -0.19 -0.01 0.27 0.15 0.23 -0.31 -0.09 0.04 -0.12
(0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.29) (0.37) (0.40) (0.45)
Company agreement (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Sector agreement -0.31 0.41 -0.24 0.19 -0.42 0.11 -0.48 -0.37 -0.63 -0.62a 0.36 0.10 -0.73a -0.11
(0.43) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.43) (0.52) (0.43) (0.30) (0.42) (0.36) (0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.45)
Coverage (log) 0.14a 0.01 -0.14* -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.19* -0.24***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Economic sector 
(dummy)
Primary -0.18 0.59 -0.65 -0.57 -0.28 0.18 0.19 -0.36 -0.05 -0.53 -0.12 0.00 -0.51 -0.54
(0.61) (0.37) (0.56) (0.62) (0.62) (0.67) (0.55) (0.30) (0.49) (0.40) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52) (0.61)
Secondary (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Tertiary -0.04 0.08 -0.57a -0.21 0.34 -0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.62* -0.16 -0.35 -0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.23) (0.28) (0.35) (0.31)
Quarternary 1.51* 0.83 0.74 -1.41* -0.22 -0.05 0.65 0.44 0.79 -0.52 -0.47 0.23 -0.06 -0.57
(0.65) (0.58) (0.72) (0.58) (0.89) (0.86) (0.63) (0.53) (0.67) (0.49) (0.52) (0.60) (0.67) (0.95)
R2 0.11* 0.13* 0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.03 0.22*** 0.07 0.07 0.10a 0.10 0.07 0.20*** 0.20***
a Statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed);
* at the 0.05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table 4.6   OLS regression estimates of the effects of negotiator and bargaining  
unit characteristics on the reported influence of different types of spillover
Dependent variable Outcomes Readiness for industrial action Success of industrial action
Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors
Intercept 3.16*** 4.67*** 3.15*** 3.32*** 3.01*** 1.96* 3.88*** 3.76*** 2.32**
(0.58) (0.89) (0.75) (0.72) (0.91) (0.84) (0.82) (0.83) (0.90)
Firm negotiator (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Union negotiator 0.20 0.43 0.38 1.11*** 0.53a 0.47* 1.01** 0.49a 0.60**
(0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.27) (0.22)
Negotiator experience -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03a -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Female 0.40a -0.60a 0.16 -0.26 -0.22 -0.43a -0.04 -0.34 -0.08
(0.23) (0.35) (0.26) (0.24) (0.37) (0.26) (0.35) (0.37) (0.27)
Company agreement (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Sector agreement -0.55a -0.23 0.14 -0.83* -0.46 -0.56 -0.94* -0.76* -0.27
(0.28) (0.36) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) (0.35) (0.41) (0.36) (0.32)
Coverage (log) 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.07 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary 0.38 -0.03 0.46 -0.10 -0.19 0.36 -0.13 0.08 0.85a
(0.30) (0.59) (0.41) (0.43) (0.38) (0.32) (0.57) (0.44) (0.43)
Secondary (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Tertiary 0.03 0.31 -0.27 0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.11 0.29 0.12
(0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30) (0.29) (0.25)
Quarternary 0.36 -0.42 0.59 1.14** 0.52 0.86 1.74*** 0.74 1.10a
(0.39) (0.66) (0.43) (0.41) (0.70) (0.56) (0.44) (0.68) (0.56)
N 116 115 110 108 111 101 98 107 97
R2 0.07 0.15* 0.13* 0.28*** 0.08a 0.12* 0.27*** 0.18** 0.16
a Statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed);
* at the 0.05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table 4.6   OLS regression estimates of the effects of negotiator and bargaining  
unit characteristics on the reported influence of different types of spillover
Dependent variable Outcomes Readiness for industrial action Success of industrial action
Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors
Intercept 3.16*** 4.67*** 3.15*** 3.32*** 3.01*** 1.96* 3.88*** 3.76*** 2.32**
(0.58) (0.89) (0.75) (0.72) (0.91) (0.84) (0.82) (0.83) (0.90)
Firm negotiator (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Union negotiator 0.20 0.43 0.38 1.11*** 0.53a 0.47* 1.01** 0.49a 0.60**
(0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.27) (0.22)
Negotiator experience -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03a -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Female 0.40a -0.60a 0.16 -0.26 -0.22 -0.43a -0.04 -0.34 -0.08
(0.23) (0.35) (0.26) (0.24) (0.37) (0.26) (0.35) (0.37) (0.27)
Company agreement (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Sector agreement -0.55a -0.23 0.14 -0.83* -0.46 -0.56 -0.94* -0.76* -0.27
(0.28) (0.36) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) (0.35) (0.41) (0.36) (0.32)
Coverage (log) 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.07 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary 0.38 -0.03 0.46 -0.10 -0.19 0.36 -0.13 0.08 0.85a
(0.30) (0.59) (0.41) (0.43) (0.38) (0.32) (0.57) (0.44) (0.43)
Secondary (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Tertiary 0.03 0.31 -0.27 0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.11 0.29 0.12
(0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30) (0.29) (0.25)
Quarternary 0.36 -0.42 0.59 1.14** 0.52 0.86 1.74*** 0.74 1.10a
(0.39) (0.66) (0.43) (0.41) (0.70) (0.56) (0.44) (0.68) (0.56)
N 116 115 110 108 111 101 98 107 97
R2 0.07 0.15* 0.13* 0.28*** 0.08a 0.12* 0.27*** 0.18** 0.16
a Statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed);
* at the 0.05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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often ascribed to the formation of reference points by workers and unions, i.e., wage 
spillovers and state-dependency of wages, may actually have affected both sides of 
the bargaining table equally. This may be because employers correctly anticipate the 
importance of such reference points to their counterparts (c.f. Bewely, 1999), but it 
may also be the case that firm negotiators themselves are guided by external 
reference points rather than strictly by internal information on viable outcomes. 
However, it must be noted that bivariate tests did point towards more influence on 
union negotiators compared to firm negotiators for information on outcomes in other 
companies in the same sector and in other sectors.
 We found no further evidence of the hypothesis that the influence of external 
information increases with experience (H3b) in our multivariate analyses, while bivariate 
tests even hinted at a negative correlation between the influence of the success of 
industrial action in other sectors and negotiator experience.
As predicted in hypothesis H5, spillovers had less influence on negotiators in sector 
bargaining than in company bargaining. The multivariate analyses suggested that 
this was the case for the influence of past outcomes, as well as past readiness for, 
and the success of industrial action, and the success of industrial action in other 
companies in the same sector. However, the bivariate analyses did not show a 
uniform pattern. While the influence of outcomes in the same sector was lower in 
company bargaining than in sector bargaining, the influence of outcomes in other 
sectors and the readiness for industrial action in the same sector was actually higher. 
4.6 Conclusion and discussion
The impetus for this research was the surprising lack of comparable empirical data 
on the influence of external information on union and firm negotiators, given the 
importance attributed to this information in theories explaining the outcomes and 
conflicts in collective bargaining. Using a standardized survey questionnaire measuring 
the influence of external information in the Netherlands, we sought to address two 
research questions: 1) to what extent are negotiators in collective bargaining influenced 
by different types of external information? and 2) to what extent can differences in the 
influence of external information between negotiators can be explained by character-
istics of the negotiators, of bargaining units and the type of information?
 Our analyses revealed a multifaceted picture of the influence of external information 
on collective bargaining. Economic indicators (i.e., employment and pricing developments), 
particularly those operating at the sector level, had substantial influence on negotiators. 
Information on national and sectoral collective agreement developments was also 
very influential, while indicators reflecting organizational power, i.e., militancy, strike 
funds and public opinion, were less important. 
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 Another major influence on negotiators was information on other bargaining 
events, i.e., spillovers. We differentiated spillovers according to their source and 
informational content and found that information on outcomes had more influence 
than information on the readiness for, and success of industrial action. The hypothesis 
that influence increases with the proximity of the source of spillovers was also strongly 
supported, with information on the past experience of the bargaining unit having 
more influence than information on other bargaining units within the same sector, 
while information on other sectors had the least influence. These findings provide 
empirical underpinnings for theories assuming that bargaining events influence each 
other, but also highlight the importance of distinguishing between sources and types 
of information spillover. 
 We found considerable evidence in favor of the hypothesis that union negotiators 
are generally more influenced by external information than firm negotiators. Union 
negotiators appeared to be particularly more concerned with information on local 
and sectoral employment, and militancy. They were also more influenced by spillovers, 
particularly when the content of these was related to conflict. 
 It was not a priori clear what type of relationship between experience and influence 
of external information to expect. Our findings suggest that more experienced 
negotiators were more influenced by some types of external information, i.e., militancy 
and international collective agreement developments, but the associations were of 
rather modest size.
 We found little evidence suggesting that sector bargaining was less affected by 
its wider economic environment than company bargaining. However, negotiators in 
sector bargaining were less affected by international and local collective agreement 
developments and some types of spillovers than those in company bargaining, 
suggesting that sector bargaining operates with relatively more autonomy. 
 Recent studies have documented that across European countries, specific 
sectors are converging (Bechter et al., 2012) and appear to be affected by transnational 
wage coordination (e.g Traxler and Brandl, 2009; Ramskogler, 2012; Glassner & 
Pusch, 2013). Our findings suggests that the impact of international collective 
agreement developments in the Netherlands is still modest compared to the impact 
of developments within the country, but the sample did not allow for a sufficiently 
fine-grained sector-classification to identify particular sectors that were more interna-
tionally influenced. However, our findings of modest international spillovers, coupled 
with substantial within-country spillovers, suggest that it may be important to consider 
indirect effects that may result when influential wage leaders within a country are 
themselves affected by international developments.   
 Our analyses of the questionnaire survey data yielded an empirical basis for a 
number of assumptions and tacit understandings commonly found in employment 
relations literature. The cross-sectional analysis of a single country presented here 
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shows that obtaining information from negotiators directly offers interesting insights 
into collective bargaining. Some of our findings seem to reflect the specific national 
context in which we collected our data, i.e., dominant sector bargaining, a multileveled 
collective bargaining system and relatively low levels of industrial conflict. Hence, 
analyses of the influence of external information in different institutional and economic 
settings may provide important additional insights. It is therefore our hope that future 
research will replicate our analyses in different periods and contexts and that 
large-scale country comparative surveys will incorporate our design. Future research 
should also consider the effects of external information on the outcomes of, and 
conflicts in collective bargaining.
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Spillovers and conflict in collective 
bargaining: evidence from a survey of 
Dutch union and firm negotiators53
53 A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in Work, Employment and Society (Lehr, 
Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2015). An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the IREC, Bucharest, 
Romania, September 2013. 
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Abstract 
With unique survey data of Dutch collective agreement negotiators, the authors 
model how information about other collective bargaining events influences the 
probability of negotiators encountering bargaining impasses or industrial action 
during collective bargaining. Competing hypotheses about this influence, derived 
from mainstream and behavioral economic bargaining theory, and from sociological 
approaches are tested. The findings indicate that information about bargaining 
outcomes elsewhere has no significant effect on the occurrence of conflict. However, 
if the information content of spillovers refers to the conflict potential in other bargaining 
events and the sources of information are proximate, it increases the probability of 
conflict. This suggests that sociological mechanisms offer a compelling alternative to 
those invoked in economics for explaining the relationship between spillovers and 
conflict.
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5.1 Introduction
This study investigates the impact of information spillovers in collective bargaining, 
taking the perspective of individual negotiators. Empirical research indicates that 
spillovers about bargaining outcomes (e.g., wages) and conflicts (e.g., strikes) from 
past bargaining events and bargaining events in other firms influence the occurrence 
of conflict in current bargaining events. Several confounding theoretical mechanisms 
for such spillover effects have been proposed. The central tenet of mainstream 
economic bargaining theory is that spillovers affect negotiators when the information 
allows them to reduce uncertainty regarding critical private information aspects of the 
bargain, consequently reducing conflict. Social psychologically inspired behavioral 
economic bargaining theories argue that spillovers are driven by social comparisons 
and increase the divergence of preferences at the bargaining table, thereby leading 
to more conflict. Moreover, sociological theories of diffusion stress the role of spillovers 
as potentially conflict-increasing. 
 Empirical studies on information spillovers and conflict produce mixed and partially 
contradictory results (e.g., Schnell and Gramm, 1987; Ingram et al., 1993; Babcock 
et al., 1996; Kuhn and Gu, 1999; Campolieti et al., 2005; c.f. Conell and Cohn, 1995; 
Biggs, 2002, 2005). Moreover, these studies suffer from two methodological drawbacks. 
First, with the exception of Babcock et al. (1996), the proposed mechanisms in these 
studies are not tested directly. Second, influence is inferred from observed correlations 
between different bargaining events, while such correlations could just as well be 
caused by unobserved variables affecting these bargaining events simultaneously 
(cf. Mitchell, 1982; Manski, 1993).  
 Thus it remains unclear how conflict in one bargaining event is affected by other 
bargaining events. This study aims to shed new light on this relationship. Using information 
from Dutch collective agreement negotiators, it addresses the following research question: 
how and under what conditions does information about other bargaining events influence 
the probability of negotiators experiencing conflicts in collective bargaining?
 Negotiator surveys proved successful in wage determination studies but have 
rarely been used to analyze conflict in collective bargaining. However, such an 
approach helps to overcome many limitations of official strike statistics (c.f. Franzosi, 
1989) and provides important information about key actors determining collective 
agreements (c.f. Kaufman, 2002). Especially the analysis of spillovers benefits 
considerably from self-reports of negotiators because they measure the influence of 
information about other bargaining events directly. For instance, Babcock et al. 
(1996) study the relationship between spillovers and conflict using a survey of union 
and firm negotiators of teachers’ salaries. They, however, employ considerable a 
priori limitations on potential reference points (c.f. Mitchell, 1982; Manski, 1993) and 
types of information spillover. 
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 This study moves beyond the analysis of a single profession and extends the 
range of potential reference points and types of spillovers under analysis. To this end, 
a representative sample of Dutch collective agreements was compiled and the 
negotiators involved were surveyed. Spillover measurements distinguished between 
different information sources and different informational content of spillover. Moreover, 
the data recorded not only the occurrence of manifest conflicts such as strikes, but 
also bargaining impasses, thus uncovering conflicts that remain latent due to 
organizational and institutional constraints, which are not taken into account in 
traditional strike statistics. This is important because the absence of manifest conflict 
(strikes) does not negate the existence of conflict (c.f. Hebdon, 2005; Dix et al., 2008) 
and impasses impose costs on employers and employees much like strikes do 
(Kaufman, 1981: 336-337).54
 Despite declining unionization, collective bargaining still prominently governs 
many aspects of working life, with an average of 62 percent of all workers in OECD 
countries covered by a collective agreement (Visser, 2011). In addition, the Global 
Financial Crisis and its aftermath once more made clear that peaceful labor relations 
must never be taken for granted. Worsening employment relations have increased 
the risk of social unrest in the world’s advanced economies (ILO, 2013) and prominent 
scholars argue that the ‘long wave’ of economic development is returning to a state 
that will lead to a revival of labor conflict (e.g., Kelly, 1998). The first studies asserting 
that strikes appear to be resurgent are now emerging (e.g., Brym et al., 2013), while 
up and coming economies like China face a rapidly increasing number of labor 
disputes (Cheng et al., 2012). In light of such trends, new insights into the long 
standing puzzle of spillovers and labor conflict hold particular importance.
5.2 Theory and hypotheses
5.2.1 Rational learning
The classic paradox that has driven the theoretical development of economic 
bargaining models of industrial conflict may be summarized as follows: conflicts in 
collective bargaining, both manifest ones such as strikes and latent ones such as 
impasses (see Kaufman, 1981), are costly to both employers and employees, so why 
do they not avoid these costs and settle on the eventual outcome immediately? 
(Hicks, 1932). The general argument in economic bargaining models is that bargaining 
54 For instance, prolonging bargaining increases direct costs such as negotiator- and staff salaries, over-
time payments related to increased production in anticipation of a strike and increasing the strike risk 
and its associated cost itself. Moreover indirect opportunity cost arises from the delayed implementa-
tion of improvements to work rules and structure. 
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behavior is determined by negotiators’ perceptions of aspects of the bargaining 
event that are critical to reaching an agreement but are not fully observable to all 
actors (Cramton and Tracy, 2003). These aspects are typically assumed to be 
bargaining power and the economic state of the firm (i.e., its profitability and 
consequently its ability to pay). Negotiators consequently face uncertainty because 
the true value of these factors is not fully observable (Shalev, 1980). To overcome this 
uncertainty, they use information that may reveal something about these factors. For 
instance, industrial relations and labor economics research consistently finds an 
association between business cycle indicators and strikes (e.g., Franzosi, 1989; 
Card, 1990; Kaufman, 2002; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). The question of how changes 
in these business cycle indicators influence strikes (Kaufman, 1981: 334) is generally, 
although often implicitly, answered by assuming that negotiators use them to 
overcome their uncertainty about bargaining power or the economic state of the firm. 
 Similarly to business cycle indicators, information about bargaining events in the 
past of a bargaining unit and in other bargaining units may be indicative of bargaining 
power and a firm’s economic state (c.f. Burgess, 1988). Hicks contends that ‘the 
majority of […] strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation. […] Any means 
which enables either side to appreciate better the position of the other will make a 
settlement easier’ (1932: 146-147). Considering that bargaining units exists for 
multiple contract terms, ‘the experience of striking offers the bargaining parties an 
opportunity to learn from their mistakes. […] Thus one would expect bargaining units 
that have experienced a stoppage to be less likely to strike during future contract 
negotiation’ (Schnell and Gramm, 1987: 222). In other words, by using the information 
obtained from previous bargaining events, negotiators improve their knowledge, 
thereby decreasing the probability of costly mistakes such as strikes or impasses. 
 A similar reasoning lies at the heart of Kuhn and Gu’s (1999) extension of 
asymmetric information models of strikes that incorporates spillovers across 
bargaining units. Asymmetric information models became a common solution to the 
Hicks bargaining paradox in the 1980s and remain highly influential in strike research. 
These models generally assume that firms are better informed about their ability to 
pay than employees and their unions. Strikes force this information to be revealed. 
Firms will only take a strike if its anticipated costs are lower than the costs of giving in 
to union demands, i.e., they can use a strike to signal their limited ability to pay. 
Unions may use strikes as screening devices if they believe that firms are misrepre-
senting their true ability to pay. Kuhn and Gu (1999) argue that the economic state of 
different firms can be correlated, for instance when they are part of the same industry, 
due to shared changes in technology and product market conditions. Because 
outcomes and strikes reveal information about a firm’s ability to pay wages, union 
negotiators in bargaining units that negotiate later may obtain useful information by 
observing outcomes and strikes in other bargaining units. By bringing union 
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negotiators’ perceptions of the firm’s ability to pay closer in line with the firm’s true 
ability to pay, spillovers are assumed to decrease conflict.
 These theories share three building blocks 1) strikes are a result of rational action 
under incomplete information, 2) spillovers improve information (negotiators are 
implicitly assumed to only be affected by spillovers that serve this function [cf. Kuhn 
and Gu, 1999: 122]) and 3) improved information reduces conflict. Improving your 
own information by observing others is referred to by Kuhn and Gu as ‘learning’. As 
this mechanism is based on strong rationality assumptions, it will be referred to as 
‘rational learning’ here and the following hypothesis is derived: 
The more a negotiator is influenced by information about other bargaining events, the 
less likely he or she is to experience conflict in collective bargaining. (Hypothesis 1)
5.2.2 Social comparisons 
Tounadre and Villeval (2004) implement an experimental test of Kuhn and Gu’s 
sequential bargaining model and find only limited evidence for conflict-decreasing 
rational learning across bargaining units, a finding they explain by the impact of 
fairness and equity considerations. Equity theory stresses that people compare 
themselves with similar others. Adams (1963: 422) notes that ‘[t]he fairness of an 
exchange between employee and employer is not usually perceived by the former 
purely and simply as an economic matter. There is an element of relative justice 
involved that supervenes economics and underlies perceptions of equity or inequity’. 
Therefore, workers will strive for wage rates comparable to those of workers in other 
companies performing similar tasks (c.f. Frank, 1984; Akerloft and Yellen, 1990; Rees, 
1993). Social comparisons of this type govern many decision-making processes 
(Fehr and Falk, 2002) and empirical studies show that these social comparisons 
indeed play an important role in collective bargaining (Babcock, et al., 1996, 2005). 
In addition to comparisons to other workplaces, past wages are major determinants 
of employees’ preferred wages (Bewely, 1999), turning both previous outcomes and 
outcomes elsewhere into potential reference points (c.f. Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). 
 Contrary to rational learning, the social comparison mechanism does not 
assume that spillovers only occur when information is relevant to unobservable 
critical aspects of the bargaining event. Rather, the evaluation of relevance is guided 
by self-interest (c.f. Rees, 1993). Because firms and unions have opposing interests, 
these self-serving biases entail that spillovers will increase the divergence in their 
preferences, thereby leading to conflict. Social comparisons over time and between 
bargaining units thus leads to increased demands and conflicts. In contrast to 
hypothesis 1, this leads us to the following competing hypothesis:
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The more a negotiator is influenced by information about the outcomes of other 
bargaining events, the more likely he or she is to experience conflict in collective 
bargaining. (Hypothesis 2a)
5.2.3 Rational learning revisited: the sociological perspective
Spillovers are an example of social influence, which figures prominently in sociological 
theory. For instance, it is argued that facing uncertainty, organizations and their 
leaders mimic other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985). 
Such organizational learning theories (see Levitt and Marc, 1988) stress the 
importance of diffusion in organizational networks. Similarly, following Coleman et al. 
(1957), the decisions of individual actors are argued to be affected by their observation 
of the behaviour of others (see also Burt, 1987; Strang and Tuma 1993). Highlighting 
the shortfalls of an atomized conception of actors (Granovetter, 1985), a number of 
theoretical models (e.g., Granovetter, 1978) have been developed sharing the core 
notion that an individual’s propensity to initiate some action is positively affected by 
the number of others who have previously done so (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996). 
In a context of uncertainty, imitation is an ex ante rational strategy (Hedström, 1998), 
leading to the diffusion of behaviours.
 Theories of diffusion have been applied to the analysis of societal conflict (e.g., 
McAdam, 1983), including strikes. Examining aggregate data on strikes in America, 
Chicago and Paris in the late nineteenth century, Biggs (2003, 2005) concludes that 
diffusion55 plays an important role in strike waves. He proposes inspiration as a 
mechanism for diffusion between workplaces, as strikes elsewhere create occasions 
for deciding to strike (c.f. Oliver, 1989) and raise the hope of favorable results, 
especially when the observed strike is successful. Analyzing strikes in coal mines in 
French departments for the period 1890-1935, Conell and Cohn (1995) find that 
strikes, even unsuccessful ones, in one department increase the strike rate in other 
departments. They propose three mechanisms, as information about strikes in other 
workplaces may 1) raise workers’ awareness of their own grievances; 2) serve a date 
setting function and 3) offer tactical guidance by signaling favorable conditions for 
strike action. 
 The difference between diffusion-based approaches in sociology and rational 
learning theories in economics is remarkable. Whereas the latter associates spillovers 
with decreased conflict, the former stresses its conflict-increasing effects. This is 
especially noteworthy because both mechanisms are based on models of rational 
actors using information about events elsewhere to make decisions under uncertainty. 
However, while spillover models in economics were developed for contexts of 
55 In Biggs’ terminology, the process is referred to as ‘positive feedback’. 
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unionized workers and collective bargaining, sociological diffusion theories until now 
have only been considered for periods preceding the institutionalization and 
pacification of industrial relations (c.f. Biggs, 2005: 1685). To apply these insights to 
spillovers in contemporary collective bargaining, one must account for a number of 
crucial differences between the two contexts: 1) The locus of decision making has 
shifted from individual workers to trade union- and employer representatives. Even 
though industrial action is still carried out by workers, conflicts now emanate from 
decisions made at the bargaining table. 2) Date setting and consciousness-raising 
are unlikely to be significant mechanisms leading to spillovers between bargaining 
units nowadays (Conell and Cohn 1995: 372). 3) Overt industrial conflict is much less 
frequent, limiting the number of observable events. 4) Collective bargaining occurs at 
fixed intervals, creating a series of related bargaining events. This means that it is no 
longer just spillovers from other workplaces that may trigger conflict, information 
about the past bargaining events in the own bargaining unit is likely to also be very 
influential. 
 To apply the lessons of diffusion models to contemporary collective bargaining, 
this study considers the effects of diffusion on negotiators. Negotiators are aware of what 
happens in other bargaining events through their personal and intra-organizational 
networks as well as the public media. Furthermore, professional trade union and 
employers’ negotiators are involved in many different bargaining events, offering first 
hand access to information about them. Because mobilizing potential, strike funds, 
public support and profits and bargaining power are often similar to bargaining 
events in the past and in other bargaining units, observing workers’ (un-)willingness 
to participate in industrial action and the success of conflicts provides valuable 
tactical guidance. 
 Conflicting interests are inherent to the distributive nature of collective bargaining. 
Yet escalation is costly and its outcomes uncertain. Negotiators only risk conflict 
when they expect that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Information about other 
bargaining events is invaluable for such decisions. All else equal, negotiators who 
make more use of information about conflict potential in other bargaining events 
experience less uncertainty and are therefore more likely to choose conflict over 
compromise. Against hypothesis 1, the following competing hypothesis is proposed: 
 
The more a negotiator is influenced by information about the conflict potential in other 
bargaining events, the more likely he or she is to experience conflict in collective 
bargaining. (Hypothesis 2b)
5.2.4 Differences between union and firm negotiators
Strict adherence to the asymmetric information model used by Kuhn and Gu (1999) 
would suggest that only union negotiators need to reduce uncertainty by learning 
133
Spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining
5
from other bargaining events, as firm negotiators are assumed to possess perfect 
information about their ability to pay. Therefore, the use of information about other 
bargaining events by firm negotiators cannot reduce the probability of conflicts. 
Social comparisons are traditionally primarily associated with worker’s rather than 
employers’ perceptions of reference wages. Past diffusion models of industrial 
conflict considered the conflict increasing effects of spillovers to affect workers rather 
than firm owners. In contemporary labour relations, in which wages are predominantly 
determined under collective bargaining, something similar may hold true, albeit it for 
different reasons. For trade unions, high demands and industrial action can be of 
substantial propagandistic value for attracting new members (Akkerman, 2008). 
Conflict potential in other bargaining events, regardless of its impact on the collective 
agreement, reveals important information about possible gains in membership from 
tough bargaining strategies. This implies that, particularly for union negotiators, these 
spillovers reduce uncertainty about the benefits of tough bargaining and may be 
sources of inspiration for imitative conflict. Hence whatever the direction of the effect 
of spillovers on conflict, each theoretical approach suggests that this effect is stronger 
for unions than for firms, leading to the following interaction hypothesis: 
The association between the influence of information about other bargaining events 
and experiencing conflict in collective bargaining is stronger for union negotiators 
than for firm negotiators. (Hypothesis 3)
5.3 The empirical context
5.3.1 Collective bargaining in the Netherlands
The Dutch economy features a large service sector, its share of the GDP being 74%, 
whereas manufacturing accounts for 23% (EIRO, 2008). The Netherlands has 
traditionally been a pillarized society, divided along religious, ideological and status 
lines. Dutch industrial relations still reflect these divides, with the three major trade 
union federations representing Christian-democratic, social-democratic and 
white-collar interests (Ibid., 2008). Multi-unionism, where different trade unions are 
involved in the same bargaining event, is common in collective bargaining in the 
Netherlands (Akkerman, 2000, 2008). Trade union density had been declining in the 
past (Visser, 1992: 349) and is now relatively stable at approximately 24% (EIRO, 
2008). Collective agreement law requires that employers apply the collective 
agreement to all employees, regardless of their membership. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment usually extends sector level collective agreements, through 
which all employees in the sector are covered (Rojer, 2002). Consequently, collective 
bargaining coverage in The Netherlands is currently above 80% (EIRO, 2008). 
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 The Netherlands exhibit both sector- and company-level bargaining, with the 
sector level being dominant. There are approximately 1,000 collective agreements, of 
which approximately 20% are sector agreements. These may act as framework 
agreements to company-level bargaining (EIRO, 2008), i.e., in some cases there is a 
mixture of both types of agreements. 
 The Dutch system may be typified as state-sponsored coordination (Traxler, 
2003). Two important institutions coordinate labor relations at the national level. In the 
bi-partite Labour Foundation, peak organizations of trade unions and employer 
organizations meet. The Labour Foundation produces central agreements, which are 
not legally binding for the members of the peak organizations but carry significant 
weight as benchmarks for sector- and firm-level bargaining (Torenvlied and Akkerman, 
2002, 2004). During semi-annual consultations with the government, the Labour 
Foundation negotiates over social economic issues, such as the preferred wage 
increase. In addition to the Labour Foundation, representatives of the three main 
trade union federations, the three main employer confederations and independent 
members appointed by the government meet in the Social Economic Council (SER). 
The SER consults and acts as an advisory council on all major social and economic 
issues (EIRO, 2008). 
 
5.3.2 Industrial conflict in The Netherlands
Compared to most other European countries, there is little strike activity in The 
Netherlands. The official annual number of strikes between 2005 and 2011 varied 
between 17 to 31. Approximately half of these strikes were related to disputes in 
collective bargaining (CBS, 2012). The annual number of work days lost through 
industrial action varied substantially during this period, peaking at 120,600 in 2008 
and dropping as low as 4,600 in 2009. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of 
workers involved in industrial action was also highest in 2008 (51,900) and lowest in 
2009 (3,600) (Ibid., 2012). Industrial action is most prevalent in manufacturing and 
transport. 
 Conflicts in collective bargaining are usually resolved by the bargaining parties 
themselves and occasionally through a mediator. The right to strike is recognized 
through the recognition of the European Social Charter and extends to the public 
sector. Employers may resort to legal action to prevent strikes. Although no distinction 
is made between essential and non-essential services, third-party interest may be 
invoked as restriction on the right to strike (EIRO, 2002; EUROFOUND, 2012). The 
number of court interventions to industrial action is relatively high (EIRO, 2002), 
suggesting substantial conflict arising from collective bargaining that remains at least 
partially hidden from official strike statistics.  
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5.4 Data and measurements
5.4.1 Sample
Data from the 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey were used. The initial sample for this 
survey consisted of negotiators of 125 company agreements and 42 sector 
agreements. 150 of these agreements were selected via a randomized procedure 
from the pool of the approximately 1000 collective agreements. An additional sample 
of 17 agreements was added to the random sample to ensure sufficient variation on 
the dependent variable. These agreements were selected on the basis of prior 
knowledge that there had been a bargaining impasse in the form of an union 
ultimatum. Data collection began in October 2011 and ended in January 2012. To 
limit the impact of potential retrospective bias, only agreements with starting dates 
from 1 January 2009 onwards were included. Moreover, to minimize the probability of 
collecting data on bargaining events that were still in progress, agreements with start 
dates after 1 April 2011 were excluded.
 Through contacts with firms, trade unions and employer organization, as well as 
the extensive document analysis of (preliminary) contracts, official correspondences, 
communiqués and media coverage, 307 negotiators involved in the 167 collective 
agreements included in the sample were traced and invited by email for an online 
survey. Five of the negotiators were involved in several of the collective agreements 
in the sample but were surveyed for just one. 
 The survey consisted of questions about (1) negotiators’ background character-
istics, (2) various types and sources of information affecting collective bargaining and 
(3) characteristics of the collective bargaining event on the basis of which they were 
selected into the sample. Respondents were also asked to list the five most important 
other negotiators involved in their collective bargaining event. This strategy yielded 
144 additional negotiators, who were subsequently invited to participate in the study. 
In total, 451 negotiators were invited, of whom 54.10% were union negotiators and 
45.90% representing the interests of the firms. After two reminders, the non-responding 
negotiators were contacted by telephone. A total of 128 negotiators involved in 78 of 
the 167 selected collective agreements completed the questionnaire. The response 
rates were 31.96% for union negotiators and 24.15% for firm negotiators, common 
response rates for surveys of professional organization representatives. No significant 
non-response bias was found regarding the distribution of union and firm negotiators 
and sector and company agreements.  
5.4.2 Measures
Dependent variable
Conflict in collective bargaining was measured by asking negotiators whether an 
impasse had occurred in their bargaining event and if affirmed, whether any collective 
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action was initiated by the workers and/or union(s) in the bargaining event. From 
these questions, an ordinal variable was created, with ‘0’ for ‘no conflict’, ‘1’ for 
‘impasse, but no industrial action’ and ‘2’ for ‘industrial action’. If an impasse was 
reported, the type of impasse and the substantive reasons for this impasse was 
asked. An overview of the types of impasses and their reasons is reported in Appendix 
D, Tables D1 and D2. 
Independent variables 
Spillovers may entail various types of informational content, each potentially differently 
associated with bargaining impasses. The statements used to measure spillovers 
distinguished three types of informational content56: information about 1) outcomes, 
2) employees’ readiness for industrial action and 3) the success of industrial action. 
Besides informational content, sources of spillovers may vary. Three potential sources 
were distinguished: 1) the past of the own bargaining unit (prior contract periods), 2) 
other companies within the same sector, 3) companies in other sectors. Respondents 
were thus asked to rate their agreement with nine statements about the influence of a 
particular type of information on their collective bargaining. These nine statements 
are shown in Chapter 4, Table 4.1. Possible answers ranged from ‘1’ ‘not at all’ to ‘5’ 
‘very much’, with a higher value indicating more influence of that type of information.57 
To test whether the association between spillovers and conflict is different for union 
and firm negotiators, dummy variable was created for ‘union negotiator’, where the 
firm negotiators represented the reference category. 
Spillover scales
The limited sample size necessitated parsimonious multivariate models. Seeking for 
a meaningful reduction of the number of independent variables, a principal component 
analysis was performed.58 Appendix D, Tables D3 and D4 provide detailed information 
56 The favourability of information for negotiators was not quantified for three reasons: 1) Theoretically, 
the predicted prevailing effects of spillover on conflict is independent of favourability (see also the 
designs and findings of Conell and Cohn, 1995; Kuhn and Gu, 1999; and Biggs, 2005). 2) Empirically, 
such an exercise would entail a selective choice of specific bargaining events on part of the researcher 
leading to the problem of a priori limiting potential reference points. 3) The validity of such measure-
ments, i.e. researchers’ coding the potential favourability of specific information about specific bar-
gaining events to negotiators in other specific bargaining events, is at best problematic.
57 Given that some sectors exhibit a mixture of company and sector agreements, spillovers from other 
companies within the same sector cannot be a priori excluded even for sector agreements. However, 
some respondents that were selected for the involvement in sector agreements had missing values for 
this information source. Their responses were substituted with the lowest possible value, indicating no 
influence.
58 The PCA was replicated with different treatments of missing values, i.e. listwise deletion and various 
imputation models. The extracted components and factor loadings remained reasonably stable and 
lead to substantively similar interpretations throughout. 
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on the bivariate correlations of the items and the PCA), which produced two 
components with an Eigenvalue larger than 1. The first component reflected the 
influence of information about readiness for- and success of industrial action in the 
past of the bargaining unit and within the same sector (for these four items, Cronbach’s 
α=0.89). The second component showed high loadings on the influence of 
information about outcomes, readiness for- and success of industrial action in other 
sectors and medium loadings for information about past outcomes and outcomes in 
the same sector (for these 5 items, Cronbach’s α=0.76). 
 Regression-scores for each case on the two components were calculated for 
subsequent analysis. The substantive interpretation of the first component is straight-
forward as the items clearly reflect information about conflict potential from proximate 
sources. The variable measuring these component scores was therefore labeled 
‘proximate conflict spillover’. For the second component, the interpretation is less 
straightforward, with items referring primarily to information about other sectors and 
to a lesser extent to outcomes. The variable measuring its component scores was 
labeled ‘distal and outcome spillover’. 
Control variables 
Montgomery and Benedict (1989) find that negotiator experience reduces strike 
incidence (c.f. Reder and Neumann, 1980). The analysis therefore controlled for 
negotiator experience, measured as the number of times a negotiator was previously 
involved in bargaining for the particular collective agreement for which he or she was 
selected into the sample.59 Bargaining level, the size of bargaining unit and sec-
tor-specific economic conditions were also controlled for, using a dummy variable 
indicating sector agreements (with company agreements being the reference 
category), a variable for (the logarithm of) the number of employees covered by the 
agreement and a categorical variable distinguishing between the primary, secondary 
(reference category), tertiary (commercial services) and quaternary60 (non-commercial 
services). 
59 Alternatively, the estimates were also controlled for the impact of negotiator experience, measured as 
the number of years a respondent had been active as a collective agreement negotiator. This treat-
ment did not alter the findings.
60 Two of the contracts in the sample were public sector agreements. The robustness of the findings was 
confirmed by repeating all analyses excluding the corresponding negotiators.
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5.5 Analyses
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables. Of the 128 respondents, 
44 reported no conflict, 72 experienced a bargaining impasse and in 12 cases, there 
was industrial action. The past of a bargaining unit was the most influential source of 
spillover, followed by companies in the same sector, whereas information about other 
sectors was less influential. Furthermore, the reported influence of information about 
outcomes was generally higher than the influence of information about employees’ 
readiness for industrial action and about the success of industrial action. On the 
whole, these statistics suggest that negotiators are influenced by information 
spillovers both within and between bargaining units and that this influence is larger 
when the source of information is more proximate.
5.5.2 Exploring the association between spillovers and conflict
As a first step towards understanding the connection between spillovers and conflict, 
the extent to which the mean values for the nine measurements of spillovers differ 
between those negotiators who experienced some type of conflict (i.e. an impasse or 
industrial action) and those who did not was investigated (a full report of these 
bivariate analyses is available in Appendix D, Table D5). The mean value was higher 
among those who had experienced conflict for all items. Independent sample t-tests 
revealed that the mean differences were not statistically significant for items relating 
to outcomes of bargaining. However, the differences between mean values were 
found to differ significantly with p at least <0.1 (two-tailed) for all items relating to 
readiness for industrial action and to success of industrial action. These findings 
point towards a positive association between spillovers and conflict, in particular in 
those cases where the informational content of spillovers pertains to conflict potential. 
5.5.3 Multivariate analyses of spillovers and conflict
To control for possibly confounding factors and test the interaction hypothesis, 
multivariate regression models of the effect of spillovers on conflict were estimated. 
These models are reported in Table 5.2. The first main independent variable was the 
‘proximate conflict spillover’ scale, referring primarily to the influence of information 
about the readiness for- and success of industrial action in the past and within the 
same sector. The second main independent variable was the ‘distal and outcome 
spillover’ scale, which mainly captured the influence of information about other 
sectors and about bargaining outcomes. 
 The dependent variable is ordinal. Likelihood-ratio tests of the proportionality of 
odds across response categories (Wolfe and Gould, 1998) showed that the parallel 
regression assumption was not violated. Thus ordinal logistic regression models 
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were fitted. Because in the sample there were negotiators from the same bargaining 
event, not all observations are independent. Therefore, cluster robust standard errors 
were estimated. Following Hagle and Mitchell (1992), McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 was 
calculated, which may be interpreted as a close approximation of the R2 one would 
obtain from fitting an OLS regression to the latent dependent variable representing 
the probability that the outcomes occur.
 Model 1 in Table 3 shows the effects of proximate conflict spillovers, as well as 
distal and outcome spillovers on conflict. According to hypothesis 1, spillovers 
decrease conflict while hypothesis 2a predicts that spillovers related to outcomes 
increase conflict and hypothesis 2b states that spillovers related to conflict potential 
increase conflict. The findings indicate that if negotiators are more influenced by 
proximate conflict spillover, they are more likely to experience conflicts (p=0.016). An 
Table 5.1   Descriptive statistics
Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
deviation
Conflict 128 0.00 2.00 0.75 0.61
Union negotiator (ref. firm negotiator) 128 0 1 0.61
Negotiator experience 128 0.00 16.00 3.03 3.21
Sector agreement (ref. company 
agreement)
128 0 1 0.32
Number of employees covered by 
collective agreement
128 18 819500 17583.56 75686.22
Outcomes same collective agreement 
past
121 1 5 3.95 1.08
Outcomes collective agreements other 
companies same sector
119 1 5 3.46 1.32
Outcomes for collective agreements 
other sectors
115 1 5 3.06 1.16
Past readiness for industrial action 113 1 5 3.37 1.31
Readiness for industrial action other 
companies same sector
116 1 5 2.59 1.34
Readiness for industrial action other 
sectors
106 1 5 2.08 1.07
Past success of industrial action 102 1 5 3.46 1.35
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
112 1 5 2.72 1.32
Success of industrial action other 
sectors
102 1 5 2.12 1.11
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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increase from the minimum to the maximum observed value on this scale was 
associated with a decrease by 0.45 of the predicted probability of no conflict, whereas 
the probabilities of an impasse and of industrial action increased by 0.27 and 0.18, 
holding the distal and outcome spillovers scale at its mean value. This finding runs 
against hypothesis 1 and offers support for the competing hypothesis 2b derived 
from sociological perspectives. Distal and outcome spillovers do not significantly 
affect conflict. This suggests that spillovers predominantly increase conflict if the 
information refers to conflict potential and sources are sufficiently proximate and that 
Table 5.2   Ordered logistic regression estimates of the effects of different types of 
spillovers on probability of experiencing conflict in collective bargaining 
(N = 112)
Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables b s.e. b s.e.
Proximate conflict spillover 0.46* 0.19 0.67** 0.23
Distal and outcome spillover 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.19
Negotiator (dummy)
Firm Reference
Union 0.26 0.49
Negotiator experience 0.06 0.05
Agreement (dummy)
Company Reference
Sector 1.03a 0.57
Number of employees covered by collective 
agreement
-0.01 0.11
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary -0.22 0.97
Secondary Reference
Tertiary -0.00 0.48
Quaternary 1.60* 0.78
Wald Χ2 5.79  28.69
df 2 9
McKelvey and Zavoina’s pseudo R2 0.13 0.21
a Statistically significant at the 0.1 level (two-tailed);
* at the .05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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neither the predictions based on rational learning (H1) nor social comparisons (H2a) 
are supported. 
 For model 2, the dummy for union negotiator and the control variables negotiator 
experience, sector agreement, number of employees covered by the contract and 
economic sector were added. The ordered logit estimate for proximate conflict 
spillovers increased compared to model 1 and was statistically significant at p=0.004. 
Figure 1 illustrates the predicted probabilities as estimated in this model. For each of 
the three potential values for conflict, a line is drawn along the predicted probabilities 
for that value on the y-axis and the observed range of the proximate conflict spillovers 
scale on the x-axis. From left to right, the downward sloping line shows the decreasing 
probability of no conflict as the scores on proximate conflict spillovers increase, while 
the two upward sloping lines conversely show the increasing probability of impasses 
and industrial conflict. 
 To assess the robustness of these findings, the effects of the nine items used to 
measure spillovers were also estimated separately (Appendix D, Table D7). Overall, 
the findings were very similar. However, conflict was also found to increase as the 
reported influence of information about the readiness for industrial action in other 
Figure 5.1   Predicted probabilities for the range of observed scores on the 
proximate conflict spillovers scale
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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sectors increases, suggesting that spillover effects on conflict are not wholly sector- 
specific. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that any effect of spillovers on conflict should be greater 
for union than for firm negotiators. The interaction terms between the union negotiator 
dummy and the two spillover scales estimated to test this hypothesis however 
consistently failed to reach statistical significance throughout various potential model 
specifications. For reasons of space, these tests are not presented in Table 5.2. The 
two interaction models are reported in Appendix D, Table D6. 
5.6 Conclusion and discussion
This study addressed the question how and under which conditions information 
about other bargaining events affects conflict in collective bargaining. It offers the first 
simultaneous investigation of mainstream and behavioral economic bargaining theoretic 
approaches, and sociological approaches to this question. The study further developed 
sociological theory to provide new insights into spillovers and conflict in contemporary 
labor relations. Using original data of negotiators in collective bargaining, unique 
direct measurements of spillovers and their impact on conflict were analyzed. In this 
way, effects predicted by the different approaches were critically tested.
 No significant effect of spillovers referring to outcomes (e.g., wages) in other 
bargaining events was found. This suggests that neither the mechanisms described 
by economic rational learning, nor social comparisons theories by themselves adequately 
describe the influence of spillovers on conflict. As a caveat to this finding it must be 
noted that experimental research suggests that either mechanism may be behaviorally 
plausible depending on specific conditions (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), such that 
escalating and de-escalating spillovers could leave the average effect indeterminate. 
 Applying lessons from sociological diffusion theory, it was hypothesized that 
spillovers carrying information about conflict potential in other bargaining events 
leads to more conflict. Indeed substantial support for this proposition was found. The 
more negotiators are influenced by information about workers readiness for conflict 
and the potential success of conflict, the more likely it is that they experience conflicts 
in collective bargaining. Particularly spillovers from the past of the bargaining unit and 
within the same sector are associated with increased conflict. The effect thus appears 
to depend on the proximity of the information source, a pattern presumably related to 
perceptions of relevance.
 Union negotiators are unequivocally influenced more by information about other 
bargaining events. However, the relationship between spillovers and conflict did not 
vary significantly between union and firm negotiators, indicating that spillovers can 
increase the probability of conflict for both types of negotiators. A potential explanation 
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for this finding is that both sides of the bargaining table may opt for conflict and both 
sides face similar uncertainties about the associated costs and benefits. 
 Diffusion theories offer valuable insights into labor conflict but must be adapted 
to account for contemporary labor relations, which are marked by (repeated) collective 
bargaining and relatively few overt conflicts. Finding weak correlations between 
observable conflict events may lead to the misleading conclusion that conflict in 
collective bargaining is not subject to social influences.
 This study was constrained by the single-country, cross-sectional sample of 
modest size and by its reliance on retrospective data. A number of avenues for future 
research may be suggested. Incorporating questions measuring the influence of 
spillovers into country comparative questionnaire surveys of negotiators could yield 
important insights into the effects of spillovers in different institutional and economic 
contexts. The collection of matching employer-employee negotiators data offers the 
possibility to investigate how interactions of spillovers affects bargaining units. Given 
past challenges to the unitary actor assumption of union negotiators and employees 
(e.g. Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969), the addition of matching employee data would 
allow to assess to impact of their principal-agent relationship. Moreover, as causality 
remains difficult to establish with cross-sectional data and panel data is costly and 
difficult to gather, studies of collective bargaining using pre- and post-measurements 
may prove invaluable. Alternatively, experiments offer a useful method to test the 
behavioural assumptions underlying theories of spillovers in a controlled environment. 
The combination of experimental insights with traditional econometric analyses and 
the use of qualitative and quantitative data gathered directly from negotiators 
promises a comprehensive understanding of the effects of spillovers in employment 
relations.
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6.1 Introduction
Collective bargaining is influenced by information about other negotiations. These 
influences are known as ‘information spillovers’, or simply ‘spillovers’. The effects of 
spillovers on bargaining outcomes, particularly on wages, have received extensive 
academic attention. Much less is known about the effects of spillovers on conflict in 
collective bargaining. 
 In the introduction, I described the three major theoretical approaches to labor 
conflict. Two of these approaches are based on economic bargaining theory. They 
have in common that they see conflict as fundamentally irrational because it imposes 
costs on both the employers’ and the employees’ side (cf. Hicks, 1932). The first 
approach assumes that negotiators act rationally, but conflicts arise because they 
suffer from information problems. I call this the mainstream economics approach. 
The second approach relaxes the rationality assumptions about negotiators’ behavior, 
suggesting that conflicts arise due to reference-dependent preferences and cognitive 
biases. I call this the behavioral economics approach, which is based on (social) 
psychologically informed conceptions of action. The third approach is based on 
sociological theory. In contrast to the economic bargaining theoretic approaches, the 
sociological approach is based on the fundamentally Marxian assumption that 
conflict can actually be rational because its short-term cost can be outweighed by 
strategic, organizational and political gains. The extant relevant literature on spillovers 
and labor conflict has largely remained within the confines of one these approaches, 
leading to seemingly contradictory understandings of the relationship between 
spillovers and conflict. The different approaches invoke differing causal mechanisms 
for spillovers and offer differing predictions about the impact of spillovers on conflict 
in collective bargaining. 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether, how and under what conditions 
spillovers lead to more or less conflict in collective bargaining. To contribute to this 
question, four specific research questions were formulated, which I addressed by 
implementing and analyzing bargaining experiments (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) and 
by collecting and analyzing questionnaire survey data on collective bargaining 
negotiators in The Netherlands (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will summarize the findings and conclusions regarding the four specific 
research questions and then reflect on the overarching central research question. 
Subsequently, I will discuss some general scientific implications of the findings. This 
chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of the studies presented in this book 
and an outline of directions for further research on spillovers and conflict in collective 
bargaining. 
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6.2 Summary: Research questions and findings 
6.2.1  Experimental analyses of the behavioral assumptions of 
bargaining theoretic explanations for spillovers 
In Chapter 2, I experimentally studied two theoretical mechanisms, social comparisons 
and rational learning, which have been proposed as explanations for spillovers 
across different bargaining units. I refer to these as horizontal spillovers. The first of 
these mechanisms, social comparison, is based on the assumption that negotiators’ 
preferences are dependent on the observed bargaining outcomes of others. 
Negotiators are furthermore assumed to be subject to self-serving biases, such that 
they will only be influenced by the bargaining outcomes of others when these 
outcomes are favorable to themselves. Because negotiators in distributive bargaining 
have opposing aims, namely, maximizing their own earnings at the expense of other 
negotiators’ earnings, the outcomes of others that are favorable for the negotiator on 
the employer side are unfavorable for the negotiator on the employee side and vice 
versa. Spillovers that result from such self-serving social comparisons should 
therefore increase the divergence between negotiators, leading to increased conflict. 
The second mechanism, rational learning, assumes that negotiators are influenced 
by the observed bargaining outcomes of others when there is asymmetric information 
about the firm’s ability to pay and when the bargaining outcomes of others reveal new 
information about the firm’s ability to pay. The rational learning mechanism suggests 
that information spillovers decrease information asymmetry about the firm’s ability to 
pay. Because this information asymmetry is assumed to be the major source of 
conflict, spillovers resulting from rational learning should lead to less conflict. Thus, 
although the social comparison mechanism implies that spillovers increase conflict, 
the rational learning mechanism implies that spillovers decrease conflict. I therefore 
addressed the question of how horizontal spillovers resulting from rational learning 
and social comparisons influence conflict in wage bargaining. 
 To address this question, I implemented a two-person (i.e., union-firm player) 
bargaining experiment in which the firm player knew the amount of money that could 
be divided but the union player did not.61 The experiment allowed negotiators to 
interactively bargain via proposals and counterproposals rather than reducing the 
bargaining process to a one-shot game, as has been common in previous research. 
Horizontal spillovers were incorporated by providing the participants with information 
about the bargaining outcomes of one other bargaining pair of participants. The two 
experimental treatments varied whether this information allowed for rational learning 
61 This kind of asymmetric information is a necessary condition for the operation of the rational learning 
mechanism. It is also commonly accepted that this information asymmetry is a fundamental charac-
teristic of wage bargaining (see Hayes, 1984; Kennan and Wilson, 1989; McConnell, 1989; Card, 1990; 
c.f. Cramton and Tracy, 2003; see also Hicks (1932: 139) and Marx ([1853]in Lapides 1987: 47). 
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or could only affect the players through social comparisons. Bargaining without 
information about other negotiations was used as a control condition. 
 The findings indicated that, as expected, horizontal spillovers due to social 
comparisons taken in isolation increase conflict in bargaining, with conflict measured 
by the divergence between the union player’s and the firm player’s proposal. Analyses 
of the proposals provided evidence that self-serving bias in the evaluation of 
information about the bargaining outcomes of others is predominantly notable 
among union players, which may be attributed to their lack of knowledge about the 
firm’s ability to pay. In particular, the impact of information about the bargaining 
outcomes on the union players’ proposals depended heavily on whether these 
outcomes were above or below the equal split of the expected amount of money to 
be divided. I also found that even though social comparisons increase conflict during 
bargaining, this conflict is greatly reduced through the interactive bargaining process 
itself, which serves to align union and firm proposals. This finding suggests that 
previous findings based on one-shot games may overstate the impact of social 
comparisons on conflict as measured by the failure to reach an agreement because 
their design does not allow for actual bargaining to take place. The findings further 
show that when rational learning becomes possible as an alternative mechanism for 
spillovers, the self-serving biases in the evaluation of the bargaining outcomes of 
others, as well as the conflict that results from these biases, are prevented altogether. 
When the players were informed that the bargaining outcomes of others occurred in 
negotiations in which the firm had an identical ability to pay, union proposals were 
linearly related to the value of the bargaining outcomes of others, increasing when the 
firm’s ability to pay was higher and decreasing when it was lower. At the same time, 
making rational learning possible in this way did not decrease conflict below the level 
of the control treatment, in which no horizontal spillovers occurred. This finding 
suggests that the rational learning mechanism does not reduce conflict by itself as 
much as it prevents the conflict-increasing impact of social comparison. 
 In Chapter 3, I built upon the experimental design and findings presented in 
Chapter 2 to study the impact of spillovers within bargaining units over time, which I 
refer to as vertical spillovers. I first developed an integrated theoretical framework for 
studying the impact of both horizontal and vertical spillovers on conflict in bargaining 
based on economic bargaining theory. The framework distinguishes two mechanisms 
for horizontal spillovers, rational learning and social comparisons, and two 
mechanisms for vertical spillovers, reputation effects and expectation effects. The 
basic assumption underlying the rational learning and reputation effects mechanisms 
is that spillovers occur because they allow negotiators to reduce their uncertainty by 
learning about aspects of the negotiation that are subject to private information. For 
rational learning, the private information aspect is the employer’s ability to pay, 
whereas for reputation effects, it is the employer’s fairness. The basic assumption 
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underlying the social comparison and expectation effects mechanisms is that 
spillovers occur because they influence negotiators’ preferences. It is argued that, by 
and large, mechanisms based on learning imply that spillovers decrease conflict, 
whereas mechanisms based on reference-dependent preferences imply that 
spillovers increase conflict. Using this framework, I addressed the question of how 
vertical spillovers resulting from reputation effects and expectation effects influence 
conflict in wage bargaining. 
 I addressed this question by introducing two new treatments to the experimental 
design analyzed in the previous chapter. These new treatments offered information 
identical to the two treatments analyzed in Chapter 2 but added information about the 
share of money earned by the firm players in their previous negotiation. This design 
allowed union players to assess the fairness of the firm players. In this way, I studied 
reputation effects. To study expectation effects, I analyzed the impact of past bargaining 
outcomes of the union negotiators on their subsequent negotiations. 
 A general insight resulting from the findings was that, as a rule of thumb, spillovers 
due to mechanisms that imply learning decrease conflict, whereas spillovers due to 
mechanisms that imply reference-dependent preferences increase conflict. However, 
the different mechanisms do not operate in isolation but can strengthen or weaken each 
other. For instance, I found that when firm players’ fairness in previous negotiations 
was known to the union players, conflict decreased. Two processes help to explain this 
finding. Firm players who have agreed to outcomes more favorable to union players 
in previous negotiations gain ‘good’ reputations and face less conflict than do firm 
players who have been ‘greedy’ in previous negotiations. Moreover, when union players 
know that the firm player has been fair in previous negotiations, they are less likely to 
escalate their demands due to potential social comparisons across negotiations. 
Under conditions that make rational learning a feasible mechanism for horizontal 
spillovers, knowledge of fairness in previous negotiations is found to strengthen the 
association between the bargaining outcomes of others and union proposals. 
Regarding the impact of expectation effects, I found that conflict tends to increase 
with the value of the union players’ earnings in previous negotiations, particularly 
when there is also information about the firm’s fairness in previous negotiations. 
6.2.2 Analyses of negotiator survey data 
After experimentally testing the behavioral assumptions underlying bargaining 
theoretic explanations for spillovers in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I analyzed the impact 
of spillovers on bargaining behavior and subsequently on conflict in collective 
bargaining using questionnaire survey data (Dutch Negotiator Survey 2011) collected 
from collective bargaining negotiators. With these analyses, I investigated economic 
bargaining theoretic and sociological approaches to the relationship between 
spillovers and conflict in collective bargaining. 
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 In Chapter 4, I studied the influence of various types of external information on 
negotiators involved in actual collective bargaining. Although assumptions about the 
proposed influence of external information on negotiators’ bargaining behavior are 
abundant in bargaining theory, surprisingly little systematic empirical evidence for 
these influences has been gathered. I distinguished four general types of such 
external information: spillovers, information about the economic context, information 
about organizational power, and information about the institutional context. Each of 
these general types of external information was further divided into several specific 
types. I first addressed the descriptive question of the extent to which negotiators in 
collective bargaining are influenced by different types of external information. Previous 
work suggests that the influence of external information depends on certain charac-
teristics of negotiators, bargaining units, and of the type of information. Hence, I also 
addressed the question of the extent to which differences in the influence of external 
information between negotiators can be explained by the characteristics of the 
negotiators, bargaining units and the type of information. 
 Theoretically, I proposed that negotiators typically face uncertainty, including 
uncertainty about their relative bargaining power, the employers’ ability to pay, or 
what would constitute a fair outcome. External information influences negotiators 
because it allows them to reduce such uncertainties. Based on this assumption, I 
deduced a number of hypotheses about the influence of external information from 
several more specific theories and known empirical regularities. 
 The findings suggest that spillovers are very influential; negotiators report that 
information about other negotiations has a substantial impact on their bargaining behavior. 
This influence increases with the proximity of the source of the spillover. Information about 
past negotiations in the same bargaining unit has more influence than information about 
negotiations in other bargaining units in the same sector, which in turn has more influence 
than information about negotiations in other bargaining units in other sectors. My analyses 
indicate that information about the bargaining outcomes in other negotiations has more 
influence on negotiators’ bargaining behavior than information about the willingness of 
employees to participate in industrial action and information about the success of industrial 
action in other negotiations. Generally, external information was found to have a greater 
influence on union negotiators than on firm negotiators, a pattern that is particularly 
pronounced for spillovers. Although I found modest evidence that the influence of some 
types of information increases with negotiating experience, this association was not found 
for spillovers. The findings further suggested that although the influence of most types of 
external information does not differ between company-level bargaining and sector-level 
bargaining, there is considerable evidence that spillovers play a larger role in company-level 
bargaining than in sector-level bargaining. 
 In Chapter 5, I investigated the influence of different types of information about 
other negotiations on the probability of bargaining conflicts. In this chapter, I evaluated 
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the implications of three main theoretical approaches to spillovers and conflict 
against data on collective bargaining using the Dutch Negotiator Survey 2011. The 
mainstream economic approach sees conflict as fundamentally irrational and 
resulting from the existence of asymmetric information about critical aspects of the 
negotiation. Spillovers are thought to occur because negotiators can use information 
about the outcomes of other negotiations to reduce their uncertainty about these 
private information aspects, such as through the rational learning mechanism. 
Because spillovers improve the information problems that cause conflict in the first 
place, they should largely decrease conflict in collective bargaining. In contrast, the 
behavioral economics approach is based on (social) psychologically informed 
assumptions about action. Spillovers are thought to occur because they allow 
negotiators to reduce uncertainty about what constitutes fair outcomes, implying that 
negotiators and/or the people they represent have reference-dependent preferences. 
Preferences are therefore affected by information about the outcomes of other 
negotiations, such as through the social comparison mechanism. The evaluation of 
such information is thought to be subject to cognitive biases. This implies that 
spillovers increase the divergence between the two sides of the bargaining table, 
leading to more conflict. Lastly, the sociological approach sees conflict as rational 
provided that the conditions favor beneficial outcomes to conflict. Consequently, the 
sociological literature argues that labor conflicts can inspire subsequent conflict, 
leading to a diffusion of conflict. However, this approach has thus far been applied 
only to historic contexts marked by highly unregulated labor relations. I further 
developed this sociological approach to make it applicable to present-day contexts, 
which are marked by institutionalized and largely pacified labor relations. I argued 
that conflict can be rational because it may yield benefits for either side, but it will 
always impose costs on either side as well. Negotiators will only opt for antagonistic 
bargaining strategies when they are sufficiently confident that the benefits of the 
conflict will outweigh its costs. Spillovers can occur because information about other 
negotiations can help to reduce uncertainty about the costs and benefits of conflict. 
I call this the sociological rational learning mechanism, in juxtaposition to the 
economic rational learning mechanism. In contrast to bargaining theoretic approaches 
to spillover, this mechanism implies that strategic information on conflict potential, 
rather than information about bargaining outcomes, is of crucial importance. Such 
information pertains to the willingness of employees to participate in industrial action 
and the success of industrial action. Given these three theoretical approaches, I 
addressed the question of how and under what conditions information about other 
bargaining events influences the probability of negotiators experiencing conflicts in 
collective bargaining. 
 The findings suggest that differences in the influence of information about 
bargaining outcomes in other negotiations are not related to the probability of conflict. 
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Thus, neither of the economic bargaining theoretic approaches by themselves offers 
a comprehensive explanation for the link between spillovers and conflict. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that spillovers may result from both learning about 
private information and reference-dependent preferences and may hence have 
opposing effects on conflict that leave the average effect ambiguous. However, I 
found strong evidence that negotiators who are more influenced by information about 
the willingness of employees to participate in industrial action and the success of 
industrial action are more likely to experience conflicts. This is especially the case 
when the sources of such information are sufficiently proximate, that is, when the 
information is derived from past negotiations of the bargaining unit or other bargaining 
units in the same sector. In Chapter 4, I found that such information tends to influence 
union negotiators more than firm negotiators. However, in Chapter 5, I found that the 
consequences of the influence for conflict do not differ between union and firm 
negotiators; the probability of conflict increases in the same measure with the 
influence of this information on either side of the bargaining table.
6.2.3 Answers to the central research question
Based on my findings for the specific research question, I will now briefly provide 
answers to the central research question that I aimed to address in this thesis. This 
central research question is as follows: 
How and under what conditions do spillovers affect conflict in collective bargaining, 
and to what extent can different theoretical mechanisms account for this? 
Spillovers occur because information about other negotiations allows negotiators to 
reduce their uncertainty about important aspects of the negotiation. The more 
proximate the source of the spillover is to a negotiation, the more influence it has. 
Moreover, the impact of spillovers is larger on union negotiators than on firm 
negotiators, and it is larger on negotiators in company-level bargaining than on 
negotiators in sector-level bargaining. Spillovers related to the outcomes of other 
negotiations can reduce negotiators’ uncertainty about the fairness of potential 
outcomes. Such spillovers occur due to expectation effects and social comparisons 
and increase conflict. This escalating impact can be mitigated by mechanisms that 
result from negotiators’ use of information about the outcomes of other negotiations 
to reduce their uncertainty about a firm’s ability to pay and its fairness (i.e., (economic) 
rational learning and reputation effects), but these mechanisms can only operate 
when the information is known to be relevant to these two aspects. Lastly, spillovers 
also result from negotiators’ use of information about the conflict potential of other 
negotiations to reduce their uncertainty about the costs and benefits of conflict in 
their own negotiation. Such spillovers cannot be adequately explained within the 
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economic bargaining theoretic approach, which emphasizes the cost (and hence the 
irrationality) of conflict, but they can be understood through the sociological approach, 
which emphasizes the benefits (and hence the potential rationality) of conflict. I 
referred to this as the sociological rational learning mechanism and found evidence 
that spillovers that occur through this mechanism lead to conflict in collective 
bargaining. 
6.3 Theoretical contributions 
Until now, spillovers have mostly been understood and studied from one of three 
main theoretical approaches. The drawback of such a strategy is that it has produced 
confusing and seemingly contradictory predictions and findings. Mainstream economics 
studies have suggested that spillovers decrease conflict, whereas behavioral economics 
and sociological studies have suggested that spillovers increase conflict, but for very 
different reasons. 
 The main contribution of this thesis is that it offers an initial systematic attempt 
to integrate these approaches and understand their contradictions. I showed that it is 
misleading to make wholesale conclusions about the relationship between spillovers 
and conflict without considering the multiple mechanisms through which they may 
operate that have been proposed by different approaches. Spillovers can both 
increase and decrease conflict depending on the mechanisms that cause them. 
These mechanisms can be distinguished by the aspect of the negotiation for which 
they allow negotiators to reduce uncertainty. My findings suggest that the role of any 
spillover mechanism depends on the relevance of information to these uncertain 
aspects of the negotiation, which varies between different sources and the specific 
informational content. The impact of spillovers particularly varies between union and 
firm negotiators and between negotiators in company-level bargaining and negotiators 
in sector-level bargaining. This finding indicates that the impact of spillovers increases 
with the level of uncertainty negotiators experience. I draw several general theoretical 
implications from these findings. 
 First, the findings regarding social comparisons and expectation effects reiterate 
that even though theoretical explanations based on strong rationality assumptions 
can adequately capture some aspects of empirical regularities in society, individual 
actors sometimes systematically deviate from these assumptions. My experimental 
analyses showed that negotiators base their demands on their own past earnings 
and the earnings of others, regardless of whether these earnings offer any rationally 
valuable information to them. Moreover, the influence of the earnings of others on 
negotiators is, in some conditions, determined by self-serving biases that defy strong 
rationality assumptions. 
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 Second, rational choice approaches can lead to vastly different explanations 
and predictions based on their definition of the action problem. This became evident 
from the contrast in my findings between what I termed economic and sociological 
rational learning, which result from different conceptions of the rationality of labor 
conflict between the disciplines. 
 Third, sociological diffusion theory, at its core, argues that actors become more 
likely to exhibit a certain behavior when they have information about others having 
exhibited this behavior. My analyses of spillovers suggest that information about 
others can affect behavior through multiple and potentially counteracting causal 
mechanisms. This may imply that current conceptions of diffusion theory may be not 
be able to sufficiently address empirical contexts that are similarly marked by multiple 
potential patterns of influence. In such contexts, careful a priori considerations of 
potentially counteracting mechanisms and the conditions under which they operate 
would be necessary. 
6.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Despite the long-standing tacit understanding that conflict in collective bargaining is 
affected by spillovers, scientific studies of this relationship have been few and far 
between. A contributing factor to the relative infancy of this field can be found in the 
extensive methodological challenges associated with adequately identifying spillover 
effects, particularly from commonly available observational bargaining unit-, industry-, 
and country-level data. Thus, the best way to study spillovers remains an open 
question. I have addressed this question by focusing on individual negotiators, their 
bargaining behavior, and its consequences for conflict. I conducted bargaining 
experiments and collected questionnaire survey data. The experiments allowed me 
to isolate spillover effects and study the plausibility of their behavioral assumptions. 
The survey allowed me to observe the impact of various spillovers at the nexus where 
they occur: the negotiators. There are, however, limitations to my methodological 
approach. I have presented specific limitations and related suggestions for further 
research at the end of each empirical chapter. Here, I will present more general 
remarks about the limitations of my analyses and promising avenues for further 
research. 
 Bargaining experiments offer high control at the expense of limitations to external 
validity due to reliance on highly simplified representations of bargaining and the 
assumption that what holds for students in small-stakes bargaining will also hold for 
negotiators in actual wage bargaining. The experiments I conducted, which used 
more realistic unstructured bargaining, suggested that previous experimental studies 
based on highly simplified one-shot games may have yielded partially biased results. 
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The external validity of various bargaining structures, subjects and payments used in 
experimental studies should be subject to continued scrutiny. The experiments 
presented in Chapter 2 pointed to the importance of initial focal points relative to 
which the outcomes of others are evaluated through social comparisons. In the 
experiments, this focal point was given by the 50-50 split of the expected surplus, but 
it is not obvious what its equivalent would be in real wage bargaining. However, it is 
plausible that such focal points exist, and future research should work toward 
identifying them. Negotiator surveys may prove helpful in this respect. 
 Different bargaining events may affect each other in more ways than via the direct 
influence of information studied in this thesis, such as by changing the economic 
context in which other negotiations take place. Furthermore, explicit coordination 
between trade unions, between employers, and across different levels of bargaining 
centralization may occur, creating additional interdependencies between negotiations. 
Further research is needed to arrive at an integrated understanding of these inter-
dependencies and how they influence conflict in collective bargaining.
 Throughout this thesis, I have worked under the assumption that negotiators and 
the individuals they represent can be treated as unitary actors. This assumption may 
not always hold (cf. Ross, 1948; Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969), implying a need for 
future research on the way that spillovers are affected by potentially mediating and 
moderating relationships between the preferences of individuals and the preferences 
of negotiators. Moreover, given the context of declining unionization, it will become 
increasingly important to understand the mechanisms and impact of spillovers on 
conflict when workers bargain individually and/or through works councils. Under 
such conditions, the available sources of information about other negotiations and 
the strategic relevance of this information may be very different than under traditional 
union-led bargaining. 
 Finally, it should be noted that with increasing political and economic integration, 
collective bargaining is becoming progressively embedded in an international context. 
Thus, it will be important to understand whether and how spillovers operate across 
borders and what consequences cross-border spillovers have for conflict in collective 
bargaining. 
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Appendix A1
A1.1 Instructions CONTROL condition
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction: 
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision–making. The experiment 
will last approximately 1.5 hours. 
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid 
for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will receive 3 Euro. 
Additionally, you can earn points during the experiment. How much you will earn 
crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the experiment. No 
other experiment participant will learn how much you earned.
The exchange rate is: 100 points = 6 Euro, 1 point = 6 Euro-cent. 
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic communication 
device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying this rule will result in your 
exclusion from the experiment and loss of any points you have earned.
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Description box
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can become either a PLAYER 
A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the same role for all 15 rounds of the interaction and will 
interact with a different participant in the other role in each round.
In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how to divide a certain 
number of points. This number will be 24 points plus an additional number of points. The 
number of additional points can be different in each round and can be any even number 
between -12 and +12. That means that the additional points can be any of the following 
numbers: {-12,-10,-8,-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}. Only PLAYER A will learn the number of 
additional points in each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative number, so that the total 
number of points at the start of each round can be as low as 24 – 12 = 12 points; but also as 
high as 24 + 12 = 36 points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional points. After this, 
PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is 
the number of points that PLAYER B proposes to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER 
A will earn the rest of the points. After PLAYER B’s initial PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL. 
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can propose any number 
between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the PROPOSAL at any time within the 
1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B both can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent 
PROPOSAL made by the other person. Thus an agreement is reached if 
- either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
- or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is finished and the earnings 
for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [ 24 points plus the additional points ] minus the number of points 
agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 minute, PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
will both earn 0 points in that round. 
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions you will learn how many points 
you have earned in this round. Then the next round will start.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER A
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER A. At the top of this screen, you 
will learn about the additional number of points in this round. After you have learned 
the additional number of points, press OK to continue. The information presented in 
the top part of screen will also be available to you on the next screen.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER B
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER B. At the top of this screen, you 
will see some information about the number of points in this round. This information 
will also be available to you on the next screen. In the lower center part of this screen, 
you can make your initial OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in a number between 0 and 36 
and press OK to send your OPENING PROPOSAL to the other person. After that, you 
will be taken to the next screen where you will have 1 minute to reach an agreement 
on the PROPOSAL with the other person.
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SCREEN 2 PLAYER A (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
SCREEN 2 PLAYER B (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
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NEGOTIATION SCREENS
In this screen, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a PROPOSAL or accept 
the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person within the period of 1 minute. The 
screen is divided into different parts.
At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the number of 
points in the current round are shown.
In the LOWER LEFT part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type in any number 
between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will appear on the screen of the 
person you are matched to.
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you can observe the 
PROPOSALS made by the other person. Important: If you would like to accept the 
most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, first select the PROPOSAL by clicking 
on it, then click on I ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see the 
PROPOSALS you have send to the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this PROPOSAL will 
determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL was accepted within one 
minute, you will earn 0 points.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody understands 
how points are earned. After all experiment participants answered all questions 
correctly, we will first start two trial rounds of interaction to insure that everybody 
understands the how the screens work. These two rounds will not add to your 
earnings. After the trial rounds, the 15 rounds of interaction that determine your 
earnings will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
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TEST QUESTIONS:
Please write down your answers!
1)  Suppose that the additional number of points is -6 and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did PLAYER B earn? 
2)  Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
3)  Suppose that the additional number of points is 0; and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
4)  Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept any PROPOSAL 
within 1 minute. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
5)  Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER B in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER B in each round 
6)  Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER A in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER A in each round 
Please wait for us to check your answers.
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A1.2 Instructions CORRELATED and UNCORRELATED treatments
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction: 
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision–making. The experiment 
will last approximately 1.5 hours. 
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid 
for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will receive 3 Euro. 
Additionally, you can earn points during the experiment. How much you will earn 
crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the experiment. No 
other experiment participant will learn how much you earned.
The exchange rate is: 100 points = 6 Euro, 1 point = 6 Euro-cent. 
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic communication 
device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying this rule will result in your 
exclusion from the experiment and loss of any points you have earned.
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Description box
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can become either a PLAYER 
A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the same role for all 15 rounds of the interaction and will 
interact with a different participant in the other role in each round.
In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how to divide a certain 
number of points. This number will be 24 points plus an additional number of points. The 
number of additional points can be different in each round and can be any even number 
between -12 and +12. That means that the additional points can be any of the following 
numbers: {-12,-10,-8,-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}. Only PLAYER A will learn the number of 
additional points in each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative number, so that the total 
number of points at the start of each round can be as low as 24 – 12 = 12 points; but also as 
high as 24 + 12 = 36 points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional points. After this, 
PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is 
the number of points that PLAYER B proposes to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER 
A will earn the rest of the points. After PLAYER B’s initial PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL. 
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can propose any number 
between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the PROPOSAL at any time within the 
1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B both can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent 
PROPOSAL made by the other person. Thus an agreement is reached if 
- either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
- or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is finished and the earnings 
for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [ 24 points plus the additional points ] minus the number of points 
agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 minute, PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
will both earn 0 points in that round. 
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions you will learn how many points 
you have earned in this round. Then, the next round will start.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN:
During each round, some information will appear on your screen. The same type of 
information will be available to you in all rounds.
Information type 1
For our research, we conduct experimental sessions on several days. In each session, 
the participants engage in exactly the same interactions as explained in the 
Description box and as you will engage in now. Points are worth exactly as much in 
all other sessions as in the current session, and the participants in the other sessions 
are also students. 
In the UPPER LEFT part of the screen, we will display information about one other 
negotiation by some other PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair in one of these other 
sessions.
You will learn the PROPOSAL agreed to in that negotiation (= the number of points 
earned by the PLAYER B in that negotiation). In case there was no agreement in that 
negotiation, you will learn that there was NO AGREEMENT. 
In each round, this information will be about a different negotiation of a different 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair.
This information will be made available to you in all rounds.
Important: The additional number of points in this other negotiation was either 
exactly the same as the number of additional points in your current round or one of 
any of the possible number of additional points (any even number between –12 
and +12). You will learn which one of these two cases apply by looking at the UPPER 
LEFT part of the screen.
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER A
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER A. At the top of this screen, you 
will learn about the additional number of points in this round. After you have learned 
the additional number of points, press OK to continue. The information presented in 
the top part of screen will also be available to you on the next screen.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER B
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER B. At the top of this screen, you 
will see some information about the number of points in this round. This information 
will also be available to you on the next screen. In the lower center part of this screen, 
you can make your initial OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in a number between 0 and 36 
and press OK to send your OPENING PROPOSAL to the other person. After that, you 
will be taken to the next screen where you will have 1 minute to reach an agreement 
on the PROPOSAL with the other person.
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SCREEN 2 PLAYER A (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
SCREEN 2 PLAYER B (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
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NEGOTIATION SCREENS
In this screen, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a PROPOSAL or accept 
the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person within the period of 1 minute. The 
screen is divided into different parts.
At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the number of 
points in the current round are shown.
In the LOWER LEFT part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type in any number 
between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will appear on the screen of the 
person you are matched to.
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you can observe the 
PROPOSALS made by the other person. Very important!: If you would like to accept 
the most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, first select the PROPOSAL by 
clicking on it, then click on I ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see 
the PROPOSALS you have send to the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this PROPOSAL will 
determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL was accepted within one 
minute, you will earn 0 points.
In the UPPER LEFT part, you find additional information about one other PROPOSAL 
agreed upon in a previous round by one of the other PLAYER A and PLAYER B pairs. 
That means, you will thus learn the number of points earned by one PLAYER B in a 
previous round. In case there was no agreement between that pair, you will learn that 
there was NO AGREEMENT. 
Important: in each round any pair of a PLAYER A and a PLAYER B will see the same 
screen. However, only PLAYER A will know the additional number of points in that 
round.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody understands 
how points are earned. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly, 
we will first start two trial rounds of interaction to insure that everybody understands 
how the screens work. These two rounds will not add to your earnings. After the trial 
rounds, the 15 rounds of interaction that determine your earnings will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
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TEST QUESTIONS:
Please write down your answers!
1)  Suppose that the additional number of points is -6 and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did PLAYER B earn? 
2)  Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
3)  Suppose that the additional number of points is 0; and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
4)  Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept any PROPOSAL 
within 1 minute. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
5)  Suppose you see a PROPOSAL agreed to by another PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
pair in the previous round. Will you be able to tell if the additional number of 
points in that negotiation was either a) exactly the same as the additional number 
of points in your current negotiation or b) if it was one of any even number 
between -12 and +12.
 o No
 o Yes, by looking at the LOWER LEFT part of the screen
 o Yes, by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the screen
 o Yes, by looking at the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen
6)  Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER B in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER B in each round 
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7)  Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER A in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER A in each round 
Please wait for us to check your answers.
A1.3   Instructions CORRELATED/REPUTATION and 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION condition treatments
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction: 
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision–making. The experiment 
will last approximately 1.5 hours. 
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid 
for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will receive 3 Euro. 
Additionally, you can earn points during the experiment. How much you will earn 
crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the experiment. No 
other experiment participant will learn how much you earned.
The exchange rate is: 100 points = 6 Euro, 1 point = 6 Euro-cent. 
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic communication 
device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying this rule will result in your 
exclusion from the experiment and loss of any points you have earned.
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Description box
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can become either a PLAYER 
A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the same role for all 15 rounds of the interaction and will 
interact with a different participant in the other role in each round.
In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how to divide a certain 
number of points. This number will be 24 points plus an additional number of points. The 
number of additional points can be different in each round and can be any even number 
between -12 and +12. That means that the additional points can be any of the following 
numbers: {-12,-10,-8,-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}. Only PLAYER A will learn the number of 
additional points in each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative number, so that the total 
number of points at the start of each round can be as low as 24 – 12 = 12 points; but also as 
high as 24 + 12 = 36 points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional points. After this, 
PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is 
the number of points that PLAYER B proposes to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER 
A will earn the rest of the points. After PLAYER B’s initial PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL. 
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can propose any number 
between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the PROPOSAL at any time within the 
1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B both can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent 
PROPOSAL made by the other person. Thus an agreement is reached if 
- either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
- or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is finished and the earnings 
for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [ 24 points plus the additional points ] minus the number of points 
agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 minute, PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
will both earn 0 points in that round. 
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions you will learn how many points 
you have earned in this round. Then the next round will start.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN:
During each round, some information will appear on your screen. The same type of 
information will be available to you in all rounds, except for the first round.  
Information type 1
For our research, we conduct experimental sessions on several days. In each session, 
the participants engage in exactly the same interactions as explained in the 
Description box and as you will engage in now. Points are worth exactly as much in 
all other sessions as in the current session, and the participants in the other sessions 
are also students.  
In the UPPER LEFT part of the screen, we will display information about one other 
negotiation by some other PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair in one of these other 
sessions.
You will learn the PROPOSAL agreed to in that negotiation (= the number of points 
earned by the PLAYER B in that negotiation). In case there was no agreement in that 
negotiation, you will learn that there was NO AGREEMENT. 
In each round, this information will be about a different negotiation of a different 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair.
This information will be made available to you in all rounds.
Important: The additional number of points in this other negotiation was either 
exactly the same as the number of additional points in your current round or one of 
any of the possible number of additional points (any even number between –12 
and +12). You will learn which one of these two cases apply by looking at the UPPER 
LEFT part of the screen.
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Information type 2
In the UPPER RIGHT part of the computer screen, we will display information about 
the PERCENTAGE of the total number of points that the current PLAYER A earned in 
the previous period. This PERCENTAGE is the number of points earned by the current 
PLAYER A in the last round (24 points plus the additional points minus the number of 
points agreed on for the PROPOSAL) divided by (24 points plus the additional 
points)
For example, if in PLAYER A’s previous round the additional number of points was -2 
and the PROPOSAL agreed to in that round was 8; then the current PLAYER A earned 
24-2-8=14 points. The total number of points at the start of that round was of 24-2=22 
points, making current PLAYER A’s earned PERCENTAGE 14/22=64%. In that case, 
64% will appear in the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen. 
Therefore, if your role is PLAYER A, the PERCENTAGE of the total points you earned 
in any round will be known to the PLAYER B in your next round. If your role is PLAYER 
B, the PERCENTAGE of the total points that the current PLAYER A earned in the 
previous round will be known to you.
Because this information is about previous rounds, it will appear for the first time in 
ROUND 2 and then be made available to you for each of the following rounds. 
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER A
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER A. At the top of this screen, you 
will learn about the additional number of points in this round. After you have learned 
the additional number of points, press OK to continue. The information presented in 
the top part of screen will also be available to you on the next screen.
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SCREEN 1 PLAYER B
You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER B. At the top of this screen, you 
will see some information about the number of points in this round. This information 
will also be available to you on the next screen. In the lower center part of this screen, 
you can make your initial OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in a number between 0 and 36 
and press OK to send your OPENING PROPOSAL to the other person. After that, you 
will be taken to the next screen where you will have 1 minute to reach an agreement 
on the PROPOSAL with the other person.
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SCREEN 2 PLAYER A (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
SCREEN 2 PLAYER B (NEGOTIATION SCREEN)
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NEGOTIATION SCREENS
In this screen,  PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a PROPOSAL or accept 
the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person within the period of 1 minute. The 
screen is divided into different parts.
At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the number of 
points in the current round are shown.
In the LOWER LEFT  part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type in any number 
between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will appear on the screen of the 
person you are matched to.
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you can observe the 
PROPOSALS made by the other person. Very important!: If you would like to accept 
the most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, first select the PROPOSAL by 
clicking on it, then click on I ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see 
the PROPOSALS you have send to the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this PROPOSAL will 
determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL was accepted within one 
minute, you will earn 0 points.
In the UPPER LEFT part, you find additional information about one other PROPOSAL 
agreed upon in a previous session by one of the other PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
pairs. That means, you will thus learn the number of points earned by one PLAYER B 
in one round in one of the previous sessions. In case there was no agreement 
between that pair, you will learn that there was NO AGREEMENT. 
In the UPPER RIGHT part, we will display information about the PERCENTAGE of the 
total points that PLAYER A earned in the previous round.
Because this information is about previous rounds, it will appear for the first time in 
ROUND 2 and then be made available to you for each of the following rounds. 
Important: in each round any pair of a PLAYER A and a PLAYER B will see the same 
negotiation screen. However, only PLAYER A will know the additional number of 
points in that round.
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The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody understands 
how points are earned. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly, 
we will first start two trial rounds of interaction to insure that everybody understands 
how the screens work. These two rounds will not add to your earnings. After the trial 
rounds, the 15 rounds of interaction that determine your earnings will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
TEST QUESTIONS:
Please write down your answers!
1)  Suppose that the additional number of points is -6 and the  PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did PLAYER B earn? 
2)  Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
3)  Suppose that the additional number of points is 0; and the PROPOSAL that 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
4)   Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept any PROPOSAL 
within 1 minute. 
 o How many points did the PLAYER A earn? 
 o How many points did the PLAYER B earn? 
5)  What information is shown to you in the UPPER LEFT part of the screen? 
 o The number of points one PLAYER A earned in a previous round
 o  The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in all previous 
rounds
 o  A PROPOSAL agreed on by another PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair in a 
previous session
 o  The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in the previous 
round
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6)  What information is shown to you in the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen? 
 o The number of points one PLAYER A earned in a previous round
 o  The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in all previous 
rounds
 o  A PROPOSAL agreed on by another PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair in a 
previous session
 o  The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in the previous 
round
7)  Suppose you see a PROPOSAL agreed to by another PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
pair in a previous session. Will you be able to tell if the additional number of 
points in that negotiation was either a) exactly the same as the additional number 
of points in your current negotiation or b) if it was one of any even number 
between -12 and +12.
 o No
 o Yes, by looking at the LOWER LEFT part of the screen
 o Yes, by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the screen
 o Yes, by looking at the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen
8)  Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER B in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER B in each round 
9)  Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements is true?
 o  You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of PLAYER A in all 
rounds
 o  You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the persons with the 
role of PLAYER A in each round 
Please wait for us to check your answers.
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Table A2.1   Tobit regression estimates of the effects of spillovers on the opening 
proposals, subject-specific random effects
 
UNCORRELATED CORRELATED
Model 1a 2a 1b 2b
b b b b
Random effects
σ2 union players 6.344 6.615 6.467 6.472
(1.400) (1.389) (1.320) (1.320)
σ2 residual 4.293 4.023 4.589 4.580
(0.293) (0.246) (0.275) (0.274)
Table A2.2   Linear regression estimates of the effects of spillovers on the 
divergence between union and firm proposals during bargaining 
All UNCORRELATED CORRELATED
Model 1 2 3
b b b
Random effects
σ2 union players 23.960 22.589 15.782
(5.996) (9.689) (6.668)
σ2 firm players 2.992 2.903 5.127
(1.043) (1.776) (2.571)
σ2 negotiation 11.964 13.172 11.506
(0.909) (1.722) (1.445)
σ2 residual 10.956 10.965 11.278
(0.225) (0.376) (0.377)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table A2.3   Logistic regression estimates of the effects of spillovers on 
non-agreement probabilities 
ALL CONTROL CORRELATED UNCORRELATED
Model 1 3 4 5
b b b b
Random effects
σ union players 0.541 0.486 0.473 0.710
(0.196) (0.357) (0.398) (0.374)
σ firm players 0.172 0.000 0.361 0.309
(0.476) (0.815) (0.517) (0.596)
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Table A2.4   Linear regression estimates of the effects of spillovers on the value of 
the accepted proposals 
UNCORRELATED CORRELATED
Model 1a 2a  1b 2b
b b b b
Fixed effects
Intercept 10.772*** 13.721*** 7.879*** 9.144***
(1.317) (1.713) (1.176) (1.709)
Period -0.165* -0.184* 0.044 0.037
(0.077) (0.073) (0.060) (0.059)
Variable surplus 0.219*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 0.199***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Reference outcome = no 
agreement (dummy)
2.286 -0.410 3.445** 2.237
(1.198) (1.619) (1.071) (1.162)
Reference outcome 0.235** -0.065 0.341*** 0.213
(0.087) (0.163) (0.079) (0.161)
Reference outcome >12 
(dummy)
-17.753*** -6.031
(4.769) (4.340)
Interaction
Reference outcome*Reference 
outcome > 12 (dummy)
1.212*** 0.105
(0.319) (0.419)
Random effects
σ2 union players 0.446 0.654 1.059 1.090
(0.663) (0.723) (0.731) (0.738)
σ2 firm players 1.015 1.193 1.294 1.301
(0.869) (0.901) (0.872) (0.867)
σ2 residual 11.294 9.940 8.618 8.474
(1.510) (1.345) (1.074) (1.056)
Model summary
Wald χ2 (df) 56.50(4) 77.30(6)*** 91.33(4)*** 94.88(6)***
Log likelihood -364.012 -357.241 -396.165 -395.125
N 136 154
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; two-tailed; only reported for fixed effects
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Appendix B
Table B1.1   Linear regression estimates of the effects on the divergence between 
union and firm proposals during bargaining, crossed subject-specific 
random effects and negotiation specific random effects (14 Periods) 
Model
1 2
Random effects
σ2 union player 15.502 15.473
(2.703) (2.698)
σ2 (firm player) 2.287 2.272
(0.561) (0.558)
σ2 (negotiation) 10.109 10.104
(0.538) (0.537)
σ2 (residual) 9.990 9.268
(0.141) (0.140)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Appendix C
Table C1.1   T-tests for difference in mean value in influence of different types of 
external information between union and firm negotiators
Union – firm 
mean Δ
df t-value p two-tailed 
Employment developments
National 0.40 121 1.32 0.19
Sector 0.80 82.16 2.72 0.01
Local 0.64 121 2.08 0.04
Pricing developments
International -0.26 121 -0.87 0.38
National 0.18 121 0.56 0.58
Sector -0.16 121 -0.48 0.63
Organizational indicators
Militancy 1.43 121 4.66 0.00
Strike funds 0.29 121 1.32 0.19
Public opinion 0.01 121 0.05 0.96
Collective agreement developments
International 1.41 121 0.85 0.40
National 0.07 121 0.31 0.75
Sector -0.06 121 -0.24 0.81
Local -0.09 121 -0.29 0.78
Comparable companies 0.48 121 1.54 0.13
Outcomes same collective agreement past 0.21 116 1.03 0.31
Outcomes collective agreements other 
companies same sector
0.47 113 1.83 0.07
Outcomes for collective agreements other 
sectors
0.31 108 1.37 0.17
Past readiness for industrial action 1.17 106 5.01 0.00
Readiness for industrial action other 
companies same sector
0.56 109 2.18 0.03
Readiness for industrial action other sectors 0.49 99 2.31 0.02
Past success of industrial action 1.00 96 3.74 0.00
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
0.50 105 1.93 0.06
Success of industrial action other sectors 0.51 95 2.26 0.03
 
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table C1.2   T-tests for difference in mean value in influence of different types of 
external information between sector and company bargaining
Sector – 
company 
mean Δ
df t-value p two-tailed 
Employment developments
National 0.33 121 1.05 0.30
Sector 0.50 121 1.67 0.10
Local -0.72 121 -2.25 0.03
Pricing developments
International -0.24 121 -0.77 0.44
National -0.33 121 1.02 0.31
Sector -0.02 121 -0.06 0.95
Organizational indicators
Militancy -0.88 121 -2.64 0.01
Strike funds -0.44 121 -1.95 0.05
Public opinion -0.05 121 -0.19 0.85
Collective agreement developments
International -0.61 121 -2.30 0.02
National -0.01 121 -0.06 0.95
Sector 0.01 121 0.04 0.97
Local -1.88 105.74 -4.88 0.00
Comparable companies -1.14 58.6 -3.22 0.00
Outcomes same collective agreement past -0.24 114 -1.12 0.26
Outcomes collective agreements other 
companies same sector
-0.76 59.59 -2.68 0.01
Outcomes for collective agreements other 
sectors
0.45 108 1.90 0.06
Past readiness for industrial action -0.77 106 -2.92 0.01
Readiness for industrial action other 
companies same sector
0.50 72.78 1.81 0.07
Readiness for industrial action other sectors -0.29 51.61 1.22 0.23
Past success of industrial action -0.51 96 1.69 0.09
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
-0.89 73.75 3.42 0.00
Success of industrial action other sectors 0.07 95 0.30 0.77
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table C1.3   Bivariate correlations between influence of different types of external 
information and experience
Spearman’s ρ p two-tailed Pearson’s ρ p two-tailed 
Employment developments
National 0.04 0.68 -0.01 0.88
Sector 0.05 0.60 0.03 0.70
Local 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.09
Pricing developments
International 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04
National 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.10
Sector 0.10 0.28 0.12 0.20
Organizational indicators
Militancy 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.09
Strike funds 0.08 0.37 0.03 0.71
Public opinion 0.02 0.79 -0.01 0.93
Collective agreement developments
International 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04
National -0.05 0.56 -0.11 0.20
Sector -0.06 0.49 -0.03 0.70
Local 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.70
Comparable companies -0.11 0.22 -0.05 0.57
Outcomes same collective 
agreement past
-0.05 0.56 -0.08 0.39
Outcomes collective agreements 
other companies same sector
-0.03 0.72 -0.03 0.76
Outcomes for collective 
agreements other sectors
0.02 0.86 0.00 0.97
Past readiness for industrial 
action 
0.02 0.85 0.00 0.97
Readiness for industrial action 
other companies same sector
-0.02 0.80 -0.02 0.85
Readiness for industrial action 
other sectors
-0.05 0.59 -0.02 0.82
Past success of industrial action -0.06 0.53 -0.07 0.50
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
-0.10 0.29 -0.07 0.48
Success of industrial action other 
sectors
-0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.11
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table D1  Types of impasses (non mutually exclusive categoriesa)
Frequency
Negotiations had to be stopped for union members consultation 34
Negotiations had to be stopped due to irreconcilable differences of opinion 30
The employer made a final offer 22
(One of the) union(s) issued a formal strike threat in the form of an ultimatum 15
a  Bargaining events may exhibit more than one type
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
Table D2  Issues that led to impasses (non mutually exclusive categoriesa)
Frequency
Predefined answering categories
Regular wages 55
Overtime pay 6
Irregular hours pay 5
Variable pay 10
Leave 4
Working hours 16
Employment 4
Working conditions/working environment 5
Common issues mentioned in open answering fields
Pensions 8
Various fringe benefits 8
Technical issues/bargaining procedure/application of the collective agreement 9
a Multiple issues may have existed
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table D4   Rotated component matrix, nine items measuring the influence of 
information about other bargaining events in collective bargaining in  
The Netherlands, 2011
Component
1 2
Eigenvalue 4.71 1.24
Outcomes prior contract periods 0.12 0.36
Outcomes in the same sector 0.36 0.58
Outcomes in other sectors 0.06 0.87
Past readiness for industrial action 0.88 0.10
Readiness for industrial action other companies same sector 0.72 0.46
Readiness for industrial action other sectors 0.43 0.76
Past success of industrial action 0.91 0.15
Success of industrial action other companies in same sector 0.82 0.33
Success of industrial action in other sectors 0.35 0.75
KMO test = 0.74; Bartlett’s test: χ2=659.609; sig. 0.000
Extraction: Principal component; Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
Table D5   T-tests for differences between conflict and no conflict negotiators in 
mean value of reported influence of spillovers
Conflict-
no conflict 
mean Δ
df t-value p two-tailed 
Outcomes same collective agreement past 0.33 119 1.59 0.11
Outcomes collective agreements other 
companies same sector
0.02 106 0.07 0.95
Outcomes for collective agreements other 
sectors
0.13 113 0.58 0.56
Past readiness for industrial action 0.56 111 2.18 0.03
Readiness for industrial action other 
companies same sector
1.00 103 2.27 0.03
Readiness for industrial action other sectors 0.49 104 2.30 0.02
Past success of industrial action 0.85 100 3.20 0.00
Success of industrial action other 
companies same sector
0.65 96 2.61 0.01
Success of industrial action other sectors 0.44 100 1.95 0.05
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table D6   Ordered logistic regression estimates of the effects of different types  
of spillover on probability of experiencing conflict in collective bargaining 
(N = 112)
Model 3 Model 4
Independent Variables b s.e. b s.e.
Proximate conflict spillover 0.79* 0.31 0.67** 0.23
Distal and outcome spillover 0.015 0.19 0.25 0.35
Negotiator (dummy)
Firm Reference Reference
Union 0.23 0.49 0.24 0.50
Negotiator experience 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Agreement (dummy)
Company Reference Reference
Sector 1.00a 0.58 1.01a 0.56
Number of employees covered by collective 
agreement
-0.00 0.11 -0.00 0.11
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary -0.18 0.95 -0.27 0.96
Secondary Reference Reference
Tertiary -0.02 0.49 -0.01 0.48
Quaternary 1.57* 0.78 1.60* 0.78
Proximate conflict spillover*union negotiator -0.21 0.35
Distal and outcome spillover*union 
negotiator
-0.14 0.45
Wald Χ2 29.11 29.28
df 10 10
McKelvey and Zavoina’s pseudo R2 0.21 0.21
a Statistically significant at the 0.1 level (two-tailed);
* at the .05 level
** at the .01 level
*** at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table D7   Ordered logistic regression estimates of the effects of different types of 
spillover on the probability of experiencing conflict in collective 
bargaining
Independent Variables  Outcomes Readiness for industrial action Success of industrial action
Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector  Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors
Logit for spillover measurement 0.21 -0.02 0.01 0.39* 0.30* 0.56* 0.53** 0.40* 0.29
(0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Negotiator (dummy)
Firm Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Union 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.26 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.47 0.46
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.46) (0.49) (0.55) (0.47) (0.47)
Negotiator experience 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Agreement (dummy)
Company Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Sector 0.37 0.36 0.12 0.79 0.49 0.57 0.85 0.77 0.42
(0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.55) (0.49) (0.63) (0.62) (0.54) (0.57)
Number of employees covered by collective 
agreement
-0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.13 0.11 0.25 -0.29 0.09
(0.73) (0.78) (0.72) (0.80) (0.79) (0.74) (0.91) (0.91) (0.71)
Secondary Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Tertiary -0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.08
(0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.53) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50)
Quaternary 2.20** 2.09* 2.51** 1.72a 1.88* 2.24* 1.48 1.81* 2.63*
(0.79) (0.85) (0.93) (0.94) (0.74) (0.96) (1.08) (0.73) (1.02)
Wald Χ2 15.09 13.93 13.52 23.97 21.92 26.23 29.48 24.26 20.95
df 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
McKelvey and Zavoina’s pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16
N 121 119 115 113 116 106 102 112 102
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed); ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Table D7   Ordered logistic regression estimates of the effects of different types of 
spillover on the probability of experiencing conflict in collective 
bargaining
Independent Variables  Outcomes Readiness for industrial action Success of industrial action
Past Same sector Other sectors Past Same sector  Other sectors Past Same sector Other sectors
Logit for spillover measurement 0.21 -0.02 0.01 0.39* 0.30* 0.56* 0.53** 0.40* 0.29
(0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Negotiator (dummy)
Firm Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Union 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.26 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.47 0.46
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.46) (0.49) (0.55) (0.47) (0.47)
Negotiator experience 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Agreement (dummy)
Company Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Sector 0.37 0.36 0.12 0.79 0.49 0.57 0.85 0.77 0.42
(0.45) (0.48) (0.50) (0.55) (0.49) (0.63) (0.62) (0.54) (0.57)
Number of employees covered by collective 
agreement
-0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Economic sector (dummy)
Primary 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.13 0.11 0.25 -0.29 0.09
(0.73) (0.78) (0.72) (0.80) (0.79) (0.74) (0.91) (0.91) (0.71)
Secondary Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Tertiary -0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.08
(0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.53) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50)
Quaternary 2.20** 2.09* 2.51** 1.72a 1.88* 2.24* 1.48 1.81* 2.63*
(0.79) (0.85) (0.93) (0.94) (0.74) (0.96) (1.08) (0.73) (1.02)
Wald Χ2 15.09 13.93 13.52 23.97 21.92 26.23 29.48 24.26 20.95
df 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
McKelvey and Zavoina’s pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16
N 121 119 115 113 116 106 102 112 102
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed); ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey.
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Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting)
Inleiding
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de vraag of, hoe en onder welke omstandigheden 
informatie over andere cao-onderhandelingen conflicten in cao-onderhandelingen 
beïnvloedt. Cao’s bepalen de arbeidsvoorwaarden en werkomstandigheden van 
werknemers, de loonkosten van bedrijven, en zijn van grote invloed op samenlevingen. 
Hoewel het aantal stakingen tegenwoordig in westerse landen lager is dan in het 
verleden, is er nog steeds sprake van een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid cao-conflicten in 
deze landen. Tegelijkertijd neemt het aantal conflicten elders in de wereld toe, en 
lijken recente sociaaleconomische ontwikkelingen ook het risico op een heropleving 
van conflict in westerse landen te hebben vergroot (Kelly, 1998; ILO, 2013). Inzicht in 
de processen die cao-conflicten beïnvloeden is daarom van groot belang.  
 Dat verschillende cao-onderhandelingen elkaar beïnvloeden is bekend. Weten-
schappelijk onderzoek heeft reeds veel inzichten opgeleverd in hoe onderhande-
lingsuitkomsten in cao’s, met name loonafspraken, kunnen afhangen van informatie 
over wat er in andere cao’s is afgesproken. Veel minder is echter bekend over hoe 
conflicten, zoals bijvoorbeeld stakingen of onderhandelingsimpasses, in cao-onder-
handelingen worden beïnvloed door informatie over andere cao-onderhandelingen. 
In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik daarom de mechanismen die een dergelijke invloed 
kunnen verklaren. Dit doe ik aan de hand van experimenteel onderzoek waarbij ik 
gebruik maak van onderhandelingsexperimenten, en aan de hand van vragenlijst-
onderzoek onder cao-onderhandelaars in Nederland. Daarbij onderzoek ik zowel 
horizontale beïnvloedingsprocessen, waarbij onderhandelaars worden beïnvloed door 
informatie over onderhandelingen voor andere cao’s, alsook verticale beïnvloedings-
processen, waarbij onderhandelaars worden beïnvloed door informatie over onder-
handelingen voor de eigen cao in het verleden.   
 Conflicten in cao-onderhandelingen, en arbeidsconflicten in het algemeen, zijn 
een domein van onderzoek van verschillende wetenschappelijke disciplines en 
subdisciplines, met name enerzijds de economie en anderzijds de sociologie en 
politicologie. Opmerkelijk is dat er hierdoor drie verschillende zienswijzen op de 
invloed van informatie over andere onderhandelingen op cao-conflicten bestaan. 
Binnen de economie moeten twee zienswijzen worden onderscheiden, welke beiden 
een beroep doen op onderhandelingstheorieën. In de orthodoxe economische 
zienswijze hebben onderhandelaars vaak geen beschikking over alle informatie die 
nodig is om conflicten te voorkomen. Kennis over andere onderhandelingen verbeterd 
hun informatie en verminderd zo de kans op conflict. In de gedragseconomische 
zienswijze zijn onderhandelaars vooral gericht op het behalen van uitkomsten die zij 
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als eerlijk en rechtvaardig kunnen beschouwen. De preferenties van onderhande-
laars worden in deze zienswijze sterk beïnvloed door de onderhandelingsresultaten 
elders. Hierdoor kunnen de preferenties van de onderhandelaars aan werkgevers en 
werknemerszijde uiteen gaan lopen en zullen er conflicten ontstaan. De sociologische 
zienswijze doet een beroep op diffusietheorieën om de invloed van informatie over 
andere onderhandelingen op conflict te verklaren. In deze zienswijzen zijn werkgevers 
en werknemers tot op zekere hoogte in constante strijd verwikkeld en leidt informatie 
over conflicten in andere onderhandelingen middels diffusieprocessen tot verdere 
conflicten in andere onderhandelingen. 
 In hoofdstuk 1 zet ik elk van deze zienswijzen in detail uiteen. Ik begin daarbij met 
een overzicht van de ontwikkeling van de wetenschappelijke literatuur over arbeids-
conflicten binnen de economie en sociologie, om vervolgens te beschrijven hoe deze 
ontwikkelingen geleid hebben tot verschillende zienswijzen op de invloed van informatie 
over andere onderhandelingen op conflict. Ik laat zien hoe de verschillen tussen de 
theoretische verklaringen van de invloed van informatie over onderhandelingen op 
conflicten tussen de economie en sociologie berusten op de fundamentele aannames 
die er in deze disciplines over arbeidsconflicten worden gemaakt. Binnen de 
economie worden conflicten, in navolging van Hicks (1932), gezien als niet rationeel 
omdat zij altijd kosten voor alle betrokken partijen met zich meebrengen. Binnen de 
sociologie echter is de, in de kern marxistische, opvatting gebruikelijk dat conflicten 
weldegelijk rationeel kunnen zijn omdat zij op lange termijn de positie van werknemers 
kunnen versterken. Hieruit volgt dat, terwijl economen aannemen dat rationele onder-
handelaars conflicten zullen vermijden, sociologen juist aannemen dat rationele 
 onderhandelaars voor conflict zullen kiezen, mits zij hiermee hun strategische positie 
kunnen verbeteren. Tevens laat ik zien dat verschillen binnen de economie in de 
zienswijze op de invloed van informatie over andere onderhandelingen op conflict te 
wijten zijn op verschillende aannames over de rationaliteit van het gedrag van actoren. 
De orthodoxe economie gaat uit van rationele onderhandelaars met onafhankelijke 
preferenties, die alleen voor conflict zullen kiezen omdat zij over onvoldoende 
informatie beschikken om tot vreedzaam resultaat te komen. De gedragseconomie 
maakt minder sterke aannames over de rationaliteit van onderhandelaars, door ervan 
uit te gaan dat hun preferenties afhankelijk zijn van referentiepunten, welke zij vaak op 
niet rationele wijze interpreteren.  
 Vervolgens laat ik zien hoe ik met dit proefschrift bijdraag aan de huidige kennis 
over de invloed van informatie over andere onderhandelingen op conflict door te 
werken aan een integratie van de economische en sociologische zienswijzen en 
deze systematisch te toetsen. Centraal staat daarbij de vraag hoe en onder welke 
condities informatie over andere onderhandelingen cao-conflicten beïnvloeden, en in 
hoeverre de verschillende theoretische mechanismen dit kunnen verklaren. Deze 
centrale vraag beantwoord ik aan de hand van vier specifieke onderzoeksvragen. 
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Het eerste deel van de rest van het proefschrift bestaat uit hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3. 
Hierin behandel ik eerst de vraag welke rol rationele leerprocessen en sociale 
vergelijkingen spelen in de het ontstaan van onderhandelingsconflicten. Vervolgens 
behandel ik de vraag welke rol verwachtingen en reputaties spelen in het ontstaan 
van onderhandelingsconflicten. Deze twee vragen beantwoord ik met behulp van 
onderhandelingsexperimenten. Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift bestaat uit 
hoofdstuk 4 en hoofdstuk 5. Hierin behandel ik eerst de vraag in hoeverre cao-onder-
handelaars beïnvloed worden door externe informatie en in hoeverre verschillen in 
deze invloed verklaard kunnen worden aan de hand van kenmerken van de onder-
handelaars, kenmerken van de onderhandelingen, en kenmerken van de externe 
informatie. Vervolgens behandel ik de vraag in hoeverre de invloed van informatie 
over andere onderhandelingen de kans dat cao-onderhandelaars conflicten zullen 
hebben beïnvloedt. Deze twee vragen beantwoord ik aan de hand van een groot - 
schalig vragenlijstonderzoek dat ik onder cao-onderhandelaars in Nederland heb 
uitgevoerd.         
Deel 1:  Experimentele toetsing van mechanismen uit de 
economische  onderhandelingstheorie 
In hoofdstuk 2 doe ik onderzoek naar twee mechanismen die (horizontale) beïnvloe-
dingsprocessen tussen verschillende onderhandelingen kunnen verklaren en hun 
invloed op onderhandelingsconflicten. Het eerste mechanisme, sociale vergelijkingen, 
is ontleent aan de gedragseconomie. Hierbij wordt ervan uitgegaan dat de onder-
handelingsresultaten in andere onderhandelingen referentiepunten vormen voor 
 onderhandelaars, aan de hand waarvan zij oordelen over de eerlijkheid van mogelijke 
onderhandelingsuitkomsten in hun eigen onderhandeling. Onderhandelaars kiezen 
er echter voor om wel of juist niet naar andere onderhandelingsuitkomsten te kijken 
op basis van hun eigenbelang. Daardoor zullen onderhandelaars met tegengestelde 
belangen, zoals werkgevers and vakbondsonderhandelaars, door informatie over 
andere onderhandelingen verder uit elkaar gedreven worden, hetgeen in meer conflict 
resulteert (Babcock et al., 1996; Babcock et al., 2005). 
 Het tweede mechanisme, rationeel leren, is ontleent aan de orthodoxe economie. 
Hierbij wordt ervan uitgegaan dat vakbondsonderhandelaars niet weten wat het be-
talingsvermogen van de werkgever is. Onderhandelingsresultaten in andere onder-
handelingen kunnen de vakbondsonderhandelaars echter helpen dit betalingsver-
mogen beter in te schatten. Hierdoor zullen zij hun looneisen matigen, wat tot minder 
conflict zal leiden (Kuhn en Gu, 1999).  
 Deze mechanismen toets ik aan de hand van een onderhandelingsexperiment. 
In dit experiment worden loononderhandelingen gemodelleerd als een verdeling van 
een som geld tussen twee mensen, waarvan er slechts een weet hoeveel geld er 
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precies te verdelen valt (de werkgeverrol), terwijl de ander dat niet precies weet (de 
vakbondsonderhandelaarrol). De deelnemers aan het experiment ontvangen informatie 
over de onderhandelingsuitkomsten van andere deelnemers. Deze informatie staat 
het de deelnemers altijd toe om sociale vergelijkingen te maken, maar alleen in 
sommige gevallen kunnen zij deze informatie ook gebruiken om rationeel te leren. 
 Ik analyseer vervolgens hoe ver de eisen van de twee mensen die met elkaar 
onderhandelen gedurende de onderhandeling uit elkaar liggen. Deze afstand gebruik 
ik als een maat voor conflict in de onderhandeling. De resultaten duiden erop dat 
sociale vergelijkingen inderdaad tot meer conflict leiden. Echter, wanneer rationeel 
leren mogelijk is, neemt de hoeveelheid conflict juist af. Dit laat zien dat zowel sociale 
vergelijkingen alsook rationeel leren ervoor kunnen zorgen dat informatie over andere 
onderhandelingen conflicten doen ontstaan of doen uitblijven in loononderhandelingen. 
Of dit leidt tot meer of juist minder conflict hangt ervan af of de informatie over andere 
onderhandelingen alleen middels sociale vergelijkingen van invloed kan zijn, of dat 
deze informatie ook rationeel leren toelaat.  
 In hoofdstuk 3 breid ik het onderhandelingsexperiment dat ik in hoofdstuk 2 heb 
onderzocht verder uit. Dit doe ik door sommige deelnemers nu ook informatie te 
geven over onderhandelingsuitkomsten die de deelnemers in de werkgeversrol in 
het verleden hebben behaald. Daarnaast analyseer ik de invloed van in het verleden 
behaalde onderhandelingsuitkomsten van de spelers in de vakbondsonderhandelaar rol. 
Dit doe ik om naast horizontale beïnvloedingsprocessen ook verticale beïnvloedings-
processen te onderzoeken, dat wil zeggen de invloed van eigen onderhandelings-
uitkomsten in het verleden op onderhandelingen in het heden. 
 Wederom is er sprake van twee potentiële mechanismen. Het eerste mechanismen 
bestaat uit reputatie-effecten. Dit houdt in dat kennis over de eerlijkheid van de 
werkgever op basis van wat de werkgever bij eerder onderhandelingen deed, van 
invloed is op het onderhandelingsgedrag op de vakbondsonderhandelaar in het 
heden. Zulke informatie kan namelijk gebruikt worden om een inschatting te maken 
hoe waarschijnlijk het is dat de werkgever een laag loon zal proberen te betalen, ook 
al zou deze een hoger loon kunnen betalen. Door deze onzekerheid te verminderen, 
kunnen reputatie-effecten ervoor zorgen dat er minder sprake van conflict is (cf. 
Bewley, 1999; Milgrom en Roberts, 1981).
  Het tweede mechanisme bestaat uit verwachtingseffecten. Dit houdt in dat 
loonafspraken gemaakt in het verleden voor werknemers, een bijgevolg voor vak-
bondsonderhandelaars, verwachtingen creëren over toekomstige loonafspraken. 
Dit resulteert erin dat een loonafspraak gemaakt in het verleden een minimum 
aanvaardbare waarde worden voor volgende onderhandelingen. Wanneer werkgevers 
niet aan dit minimum kunnen voldoend kan dit resulteren in conflicten (Bewley, 1999; 
cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
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 Mijn analyse van deze uitbreiding van het onderhandelingsexperiment uit 
hoofdstuk 2 suggereert dat reputatie-effecten soms inderdaad tot minder conflict 
leiden, terwijl verwachtingseffecten soms juist tot meer conflict leiden. Er blijkt echter 
ook een complex samenspel te bestaan tussen horizontale en verticale beïnvloedings-
processen. Zo versterkt de aanwezigheid van reputatie-effecten de conflict verlagende 
invloed van rationeel leren, maar verminderen zij juist de conflict verhogende invloed 
van sociale vergelijkingen.   
Deel 2:  Vragenlijstonderzoek onder cao-onderhandelaars in Nederland
In hoofdstuk 4 doe ik onderzoek naar de invloed van verschillende vormen van 
externe informatie op het onderhandelingsgedrag van cao-onderhandelaars. Daarbij 
kijk ik niet alleen naar informatie over andere onderhandelingen, maar ook informatie 
over economische, institutionele en organisatorische factoren. Ik analyseer de 
invloed van externe informatie met behulp van een vragenlijstonderzoek dat ik onder 
cao-onderhandelaars in Nederland heb gehouden. 
 In de kern beargumenteer ik dat de reden dat onderhandelaars beïnvloed worden 
door informatie over externe informatie gelegen is in het ontbreken van volledige kennis 
over alle relevante aspecten van hun onderhandeling, en daarmee gepaard gaande 
onzekerheid. Externe informatie wordt gebruikt om kennis over deze onzekere aspecten 
van de onderhandeling te verbeteren en zo onzekerheid te verminderen. Vanuit dit 
algemene theoretische raamwerk formuleer ik een vijftal hypothesen.  
 Ten formuleer ik de hypothese dat informatie over onderhandelingen van meer 
invloed zal zijn, naarmate deze informatie dichter bij de onderhandelaar staat en dus 
meer onzekerheid kan wegnemen. Dit zou betekenen dat informatie over onderhan-
delingen in het verleden van de een bepaalde cao (verticale beïnvloeding) meer 
invloed heeft dan informatie over onderhandelingen voor andere cao’s (horizontale 
beïnvloeding) en dat informatie over cao’s in dezelfde sector meer invloed heeft dan 
informatie over cao’s in andere sectoren. Deze hypothese blijkt sterke steun te vinden 
in mijn empirische bevindingen.  
 Ten tweede formuleer ik de hypothese dat de vakbondsonderhandelaars meer 
beïnvloed zullen worden door externe informatie dan werkgeversonderhandelaars. 
Dat zou komen omdat zij minder goed dan de werkgever zelf kunnen inschatten aan 
welke looneis de werkgever kan voldoen, en omdat zij vaak de onderhandelingen 
met een initiële looneis moeten aftrappen. Daardoor zullen zij meer onzekerheid 
ervaren en bijgevolg meer behoefte hebben aan externe informatie. Ook deze 
hypothese wordt sterk gesteund door mijn empirische bevingen.    
 Ten derde formuleer ik twee hypothesen over de invloed van ervaring op de 
invloed van externe informatie. Enerzijds zou het namelijk zo kunnen zijn dat meer 
ervaren onderhandelaars met minder onzekerheid te maken hebben, waardoor zij 
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minder gebruik zullen maken van externe informatie. Anderzijds zou het echter ook 
zo kunnen zijn dat meer ervaren onderhandelaars juist geleerd hebben dat externe 
informatie een effectieve manier kan zijn om hun kennis over cruciale aspecten van 
hun eigen onderhandeling te verbeteren. De empirische resultaten bieden geen 
enkele steun voor de hypothese dat meer ervaring leidt tot minder invloed van externe 
informatie. Wel is het zo dat ervaren onderhandelaars soms juist meer beïnvloed 
worden door externe informatie. Echter, dit verband is zeer zwak en voor veel vormen 
van externe informatie geheel afwezig. Deze bevindingen duiden erop dat ervaring 
geen goede verklaring is voor verschillen tussen onderhandelaars in de mate van 
invloed van externe informatie.
 Ten vierde formuleer ik de hypothese dat sommige vormen van externe informatie, 
namelijk informatie over economische factoren minder invloed op onderhandelaars 
in bedrijfstak-cao’s zullen hebben dan op onderhandelaars in ondernemings-cao’s. 
Deze hypothese leidt ik af van de theorie van Calmfors en Driffhill (1988), welke 
impliceert dat de economische context een minder belangrijk aspect is van onder-
handelingen voor bedrijfstak-cao’s dan van onderhandelingen voor ondernemings- 
cao’s. Deze hypothese wordt niet gesteund door de empirische bevindingen. 
 Tenslotte formuleer ik de hypothese dat informatie over andere onderhandelingen 
van meer invloed is op onderhandelaars in ondernemings-cao’s dan op onderhan-
delaars in bedrijfstak-cao’s, wat vooral te wijten is aan Nederlandse onderhandelings-
context, waarin ]een hoge mate van economische en strategische afhankelijkheid 
van bedrijfstak-cao’s bestaat. Voor deze hypothese vind ik enige steun in de 
empirische bevindingen. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek de consequenties van verschillen tussen cao-onder-
handelaars in de mate van invloed die informatie over andere onderhandelingen op 
hen heeft op de kans dat deze cao-onderhandelaars met conflicten in hun cao- 
onderhandelingen te maken krijgen. Daarbij toets ik de implicaties van de orthodoxe 
economische, de gedragseconomische, - en de sociologische zienswijze op deze 
beïnvloedingprocessen. Wederom gebruik ik hiervoor het vragenlijstonderzoek dat ik 
onder cao-onderhandelaars in Nederland heb gehouden. 
 Op basis van de orthodoxe economische zienswijze formuleer ik de hypothese 
dat onderhandelaars die sterker beïnvloed worden door informatie over de onder-
handelingsuitkomsten in andere cao-onderhandelingen, minder kans op cao- 
conflicten zullen hebben. Dat komt volgens de theorie (Kuhn en Gu, 1999) omdat 
deze informatie vakbondsonderhandelaars in staat stelt een betere inschatting van 
het betalingsvermogen van de werkgever te maken, en zij daarom minder geneigd 
zullen zijn om te hoge eisen te stellen.
 Op basis van de gedragseconomische zienswijze formuleer ik de hypothese dat 
 onderhandelaars die sterker beïnvloed worden door informatie over de onderhandelings-
uitkomsten in andere cao-onderhandelingen, juist meer kans op cao-conflicten 
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zullen hebben. Dat komt volgens de theorie (Babcock et al., 1996, 2005; cf. Bewely, 
1999) omdat onderhandelaars de uitkomsten van andere onderhandelingen 
gebruiken om te beslissen wat een rechtvaardige en eerlijke uitkomst van hun eigen, 
huidige onderhandeling zou zijn. Vakbondsonderhandelaars zullen daarbij geneigd 
om vooral te kijken naar andere cao-onderhandelingen waarin een relatief hoog loon 
is afgesproken, terwijl werkgeversonderhandelaars juist meer geneigd zullen zijn om 
te kijken naar andere cao-onderhandelingen waarin een relatief laag loon is 
afgesproken. Op deze wijze zullen de posities van de onderhandelaars onder invloed 
van informatie over andere onderhandelingen verder uit elkaar komen te liggen. 
 Mijn empirische bevindingen bieden noch voor de eerste, noch voor de tweede 
hypothese steun. Dit suggereert dat de economische theorie geen goede verklaring 
biedt voor de gemiddelde invloed van informatie over andere onderhandelingen op 
cao-conflicten, al zou zij in specifieke gevallen nog wel op kunnen gaan. 
 De derde hypothese die ik formuleer, leid ik af uit de sociologische zienswijze op 
de invloed van informatie over andere onderhandelingen op conflict. Hierbij geldt dat 
niet zozeer informatie over de onderhandelingsuitkomsten in andere onderhandelin-
gen van belang is, als wel informatie over de actiebereidheid van werknemers en het 
eventuele succes van acties in deze andere onderhandeling. Ervan uitgaande dat de 
keuze om het op een conflict aan te laten komen soms rationeel kan zijn, maar dat er 
ook grote kosten aan conflict verbonden kunnen zijn, beargumenteer ik dat onder-
handelaars die sterker beïnvloed door informatie over actiebereidheid en het succes 
van acties in andere onderhandelingen, een grotere kans op cao-conflicten zullen 
hebben. Immers, onderhandelaars zullen pas het risico van conflictueuze onderhan-
delingsstrategieën nemen waneer zij er met enige zekerheid van uit kunnen gaan dat 
de kosten van eventuele conflicten kleiner zullen zijn dan de opbrengsten van deze 
conflicten. De empirische resultaten van mijn onderzoek bieden sterke steun voor 
deze hypothese. De kans op cao-conflicten neemt duidelijk toe naarmate cao-onder-
handelaars sterker worden beïnvloed door informatie over de actiebereidheid en het 
succes van eventuele acties in andere onderhandelingen. 
 Verassend genoeg blijkt dit effect even sterk voor vakbondsonderhandelaars als 
voor werkgeversonderhandelaars. Dit suggereert dat, omdat er nu eenmaal voor 
beide zijden geldt dat de keuze voor conflictueuze onderhandelingsstrategieën een 
risico op kosten door conflicten met zich meebrengt, beide zijden gebruik maken van 
informatie over andere onderhandelingen om deze kosten in kaart te brengen en op 
basis daarvan hun onderhandelingstrategie bepalen.    
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Slotbeschouwing 
In de slotbeschouwing geef ik op basis van het onderzoek uit de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken een antwoord op de centrale vraag: Hoe en onder welke condities 
beïnvloed informatie over andere onderhandelingen cao-conflicten, en in hoeverre 
de verschillende theoretische mechanismen dit kunnen verklaren? 
 Ik concludeer dat de invloed van andere onderhandelingen voortkomt uit het 
ontbreken van volledige kennis bij de onderhandelaar over alle relevante aspecten 
van hun onderhandeling. Naarmate informatie over andere onderhandelingen relevanter 
is voor het verbeteren van deze kennis, zal zij meer invloed hebben. Daarbij is het zo 
dat respectievelijk vakbondsonderhandelaars en onderhandelaars voor ondernemings- 
cao’s sterker beïnvloed worden dan werkgeversonderhandelaars en onderhandelaars 
voor bedrijfstak-cao’s. Aspecten van de onderhandeling waarover onderhandelaars hun 
kennis trachten te verbeteren met behulp van informatie over andere onderhandelingen 
zijn bijvoorbeeld 1) het vermogen van de werkgever om aan looneisen te voldoen, 
2) de rechtvaardigheid en eerlijkheid van mogelijke onder handelingsuitkomsten, 
3) de eerlijkheid van de werkgever, en 4) de kosten en opbrengsten van mogelijke 
cao-conflicten. Vooral dit laatste aspect blijkt belangrijk om de consequenties voor 
informatie over andere onderhandelingen op cao-conflicten te begrijpen. Dit komt 
overeen met de aannames van sociologische theorieën over  arbeidsconflicten en 
diffusieprocessen maar werd tot op het heden nog niet onder kend in de economische 
onderhandelingstheorieën welke het onderzoeksdomein domineren. 
217
Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae
Alex Lehr was born in Vlissingen (the Netherlands) on December 1st, 1982. He completed his 
secondary education at the Christelijke Scholengemeenschap Walcheren (CSW). In 
2005, he started studying Sociology at Tilburg University, where he obtained his 
bachelor’s degree in 2008. He obtained his master’s degree at Radboud University 
in 2009, after writing his master thesis on evolutionist and naturalist worldviews, and 
their impact on religiosity and moral norms in the Netherlands. Between February 
2010 and July 2014 he worked as a PhD candidate at the Political Science Department 
of Radboud University in the research program “Contagious Conflict. Learning from 
Industrial Conflict”. During this period, he participated in the courses and activities of 
the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). In 2013, 
he undertook a research internship with dr. Bernd Brandl at the University of York 
(United Kingdom) and carried out a research project on employers organizations for 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). Between August 2014 and October 2015, 
he worked as a lecturer and researcher at the Political Science department of 
Radboud University, where as of November 2015, he holds a position as Assistant 
Professor.
218
219
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements 
This dissertation results from a research project that I conducted as a PhD student at 
the Political Science Department of Radboud University in the period February 2010 
– July 2014. It would never have been completed successfully if not for the help, 
support and constructive criticisms of a great number of people. Putting my 
 acknowledgments of the part that these people played on paper is therefore turning 
out to be one of the most stressful aspects of writing this dissertation, for fear of 
inadvertently omitting someone. Should you be among those deserving my thanks 
but not mentioned below, please accept my deepest apologies. 
 I am greatly indebted to my two supervisors Agnes Akkerman and René 
Torenvlied. Agnes, you more than anyone will have lasting influence on the scientist 
and teacher I aspire to be. What I learned from you is that being critical does not and 
should preclude having open mind and being enthusiastic about research. Thank 
you for your continued support and for never ceasing to challenge me. René, thank 
you for being there whenever I was in need of help, advise or simply a different point 
of view. 
 Two chapters of this thesis are based on experimental research, something I had 
little experience in prior to starting the project. I was very fortunate to be able to call 
upon Jana Vyrastekova for help and guidance in order to carry out these experiments. 
Jana, you have one of the cleverest brains I have ever had the pleasure of picking. 
Many thanks for all your help.
 Starting my career as a scientist would have been impossible without the help 
and advice of Wout Ultee, under who’s supervision I wrote my master’s thesis and 
published my first scientific article, and who recommended me to what would 
become my future supervisors. Wout, thank you for teaching me how to ask questions. 
Thanks also to Manfred te Grotenhuis for being willing to recommend me.  
I would like to thank the members of the reading committee, Eelke de Jong, Ariana 
Need and Bernd Brandl, for the time and effort they invested in assessing the 
manuscript of this thesis. 
  I especially owe much to Bernd Brandl. Bernd, thank you so much for suggesting 
to me to become involved in Research Network 17 of the European Sociological 
Association, for asking me to participate in your research project for the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), for inviting me to the University of York, and for generally 
helping me to find my way through the field of industrial relations. It was and is a great 
pleasure to work with you. Many thanks also to Barbera Bechter for her hospitality 
during my visit to the UK. 
 My research project was part of the larger ‘Contagious Conflict’ research project, 
which funded the research of multiple PhD candidates and postdocs, as well as the 
work of several student assistants. Many thanks to everyone that was a part of this 
220
research project. Special thanks to Giedo Jansen and Kirsten Thommes, who were 
postdocs in this project and helped me stay on track, offered invaluable advise and 
at times kept me from going insane. 
  Collecting the questionnaire survey data on collective agreement negotiators in 
the Netherlands that I analyzed in this dissertation would not have possible without 
the help of Maurice Rojer, Brigitta Kraayvanger and of course all the negotiators that 
were willing the fill in the questionnaire. Thank you all for helping me obtain such a 
great source of information on collective agreement negotiations.
 For almost six years now, I have had the pleasure to work at the Department of 
Political Science of the Radboud University Nijmegen. I owe much to all the passionate, 
brilliant and altogether fun people that work there as researchers, teachers and as 
supporting staff. Thank you all for being the best colleagues I could wish for. My 
special thanks to Bertjan Verbeek and Marcel Wissenburg, who were and are great 
“bosses” to work for and with, and to Andrej Zaslove for providing some much 
needed perspective while I was finalizing this dissertation. Many thanks also to all the 
people at the Nijmegen School of Management (NSM)/Institute of Management 
Research (IMR) that supported and helped me over the years.  
 Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to a few people that have had a 
profound impact on my life and made it a life worth living. I want to thank Marnix 
Schot, a friend through thick and thin, for the countless hours we have spent 
discussing life, the universe and everything. Many thanks also to the entire Schot 
family, for always welcoming me with such kindness into their home. I am deeply 
grateful to my “in-laws” Dini and Sjef Heijmans, who accepted me unconditionally 
and have always made me feel like a part of their family. I also owe a great deal to my 
mother, Marijke Clarijs. Without her unwavering support and confidence in me, and 
without her encouragement for me to grow intellectually, and as a person, things 
would have been very different.
 Finishing my dissertation and moving forward in my career would not mean 
anything to me if I would not be able to share it all with my girlfriend, Naomi Heijmans. 
Naomi, thank you so much for being a part of my life. You are beautiful in every way. 
I love you.    
  
